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ABSTRACT
This research attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the Venezuelan
industrial deconcentration policy. More specifically it attempts to answer
the question: Have government instruments (both incentives and restrictions)
contributed to the deconcentration of industry? To address this issue
requires answering the following more specific questions:(1) Has
deconcentration of industry indeed taken place? (2) Can any such
deconcentration be attributed to the policy instruments applied? (3) What
have been the other factors influencing industrial location and what has
been their relative impact?
An advanced econometric method of analysis was used (that of discrete choice
models) suplemented with conventional statistical analysis and interviews
with Venezuelan entrepeneurs. All experimentation with the model of
locational choice was done with the sub-sample of data for the period prior
to the introduction of the financial incentives package, i.e., 1975-1976.
This model fits the second sub-sample (for the year 1977-78) equally well,
i.e., it seems to be structurally stable.
The results indicate that three of the six industries studied, leather,
non-electric machinery, as well as electric machinery manufacturing groups,
have deconcentrated their locations during the period 1977-78. The other
industrial groups studied, textiles, plastics and transportation equipment,
seem to have experienced no major change in their relative locations.
There seems to be little or no evidence that changes in the spatial pattern
of industry, where such did occur, are related to the application of
government instruments.
In order to explain why some industrial subgroups deconcentrated while others
did not, a hypothesis was developed which proposes that during the study
period, government protection for industrial promotion distorted the
traditional factors of location supressing deconcentration. Evidence to
support this hypothesis was obtained from several sources, including
interviews with industrialists.
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The results also show that entrepeneurs in Venezuela may be basing their
industrial location decisions on a more careful consideration of relevant
factors than is usually thought. Results for the sample studied indicate
that (1) Wages, accessibility to both inputs and markets, presence of
technical expertise and water availability seem to exert a large influence.
(2) Potential labor unrest may also influence location to some extent, -
although its importance is relatively limited. (3) As expected, the relative
importance of the variables changes according to the manufacturing sector
considered. An unexpected finding is that government financial incentives
do in fact seem to be an important locational factor for the plastics
industry.
The policy utility of this research ranges from showing that a conflict
may exist between industrial deconcentration and industrial promotion
policies, to demostrating the potential usefulness of an econometric model
for exploring alternative policy measures and their impact on the locational
decision of firms.
Dissertation Committee:
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Dr. Alan Strout, Lecturer (M.I.T.)
Dr. David Wheeler, Associate Professor (Boston University)
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1PART I: INTRODUCTION
1 Background information
The traditional overall goal of a country is development. But the concept
of development cannot be understood in isolation from the political
ideology of the state. Thus, until recently, the Venezuelan government
has considered development to be generally synonymous with economic growth.
Only during recent years has some attention been given to the objectives
of equity and environmental conservation.
The Venezuelan government understands that in order to work toward the
overall goal of development, a society must make trade-offs among the
objectives of efficiency, equity and environmental conservation. If the
scale of achievement of each of these objectives is very high, then it may
be concluded that there is no need for government intervention. But since
in Venezuela this is not the case, the government has decided to give
further consideration to the planning of development. In the past the
Venezuelan government assumed that economic development would be
maximized if it expanded the possibilities for exporting those products
where it could achieve comparative advantages. Since the 1950's, the
government has also tried to expand the national economy through the policy
of import-substitution. More recently, in 1976, the policy of industrial
deconcentration was added to the set of policy measures with the purpose
of modifying the spatial pattern of development.
21.1 Regional characteristics
In order to set a proper framework for this study, a brief description will
be presented of the main characteristics of Venezuela.
One of Venezuela's major characteristics is its rapid recent growth. The
population has doubled in less than twenty-five years, and the percentage
of population classified as urban has shifted from less than 48 percent
to more than 74 percent in the same period. As a consequence, there has
been an increasing difficulty for the administrative structure to deal
effectively with problems arising as a result of these rapid and
accelerating changes.
Economic growth has been equally remarkable. For example, the increase in
Venezuela's import capacity during the last decade was greater than that
in all. the rest of Latin America combined, and its per-capita income is
one of the highest in Latin America.
Sharp contrasts are particularly striking in Venezuela, for many aspects
of Venezuelan life (economic, social, political, spatial) are skewed towards
the extremes, with relatively little in the middle.
The maldistribution of income is severe. The biggest variation in income
is between city and country; yet, the skyscrapers alternating with "ranchos"
(informal and often makeshift dwellings) dramatize the point effectively
in the big cities.
3The country's economy is also, to a considerable extent, dominated by extremes.
At one extreme are a few advanced sectors, highly industrialized and
comparable to the forward elements in the most advanced industrial
economies. At the other end, half the farm families still live in primitive
agricultural areas, practically outside of the monetary economy.
One of the most striking characteristics of the Venezuelan economy is the
dominant position of the oil industry. While employing only 2 percent of
the labor force, oil provides about 20 percent of the gross national
product, nearly two-thirds of the total revenues of the national government,
and most of the available foreign exchange. Under present circumstances it
is, therefore, revenues from oil which provide most of Venezuela's
capacity for public capital investment to stimulate economic growth.
In the cultural s.phere, the cosmopolitan life of Caracas contrasts with
the life of the backward rural farmers. Similarly, the centralization of
power in the capital city has skewed the distribution of decision-making
toward the center.
Geographically, Venezuela's land ranges from snowcapped peaks to torrid
swamps and sabanna. About two-thirds of the population live in the
mountain ranges extending northeast from the Andes; yet more than
two-thirds of the country's area is less than 500 meters above sea-level.
National growth and national life are increasingly concentrated in a few
larger cities --above all, in the narrow and overcrowded valley of
Caracaso
4From the above description we can see that historically Venezuela has been
characterized as presenting spatial duality. This duality is reflected in a
high concentration of population and economic activities in the north-central
area while the rest of the national territory has few urban centers with
few significant economic activities.
The north-central area is known as the industrial axis of the country. This
axis extends from the city of Caracas to Puerto Cabello, which is the
second largest port and is located near the city of Valencia. See Fig. 1.1
and Fig. 1.2
In order to have an idea of the magnitude of the concentration problems
in the north-central area, which only occupies 2.3 percent of the nation's
territory, some indicators are presented below (Venezuela, )
The north-central area:
- Contains 41 percent of the total population;
- Concentrates 48 percent of the total urban population;
- Is the location of 46 percent of the total working population;
- Contains about 67 percent of the Venezuelan manufacturing
industry;
- Produces 74 percent of the value-added generated by industrial
activity;
- Generates about 74 percent of the GNP (excluding that obtained
by the extraction of oil and iron).
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71.1.a Problems
The regional imbalances imply the presence of backward regions which
contribute little towards national economic development. The lack of
development in most of the regions has generated problems in human and
natural resources.
Human resources: The potential value of Venezuela's human resources is
amply attested by national growth in the last three decades. Nevertheless
(in view of the widespread lack of education and technical skills, and the
shortcomings of social organization), a formidable task remains in making
full use of these human resources.
Among the many problems that can be identified are those related to
unemployment and subemployment. In relation to subemployment, it can be
argued that this situation generates an under-utilization of human
resources, which is reflected in the low working productivity in the
peripheral regions of the country.
Regional imbalances and concentration of economic activities in the
Metropolitan Region have also created a mobility of the population towards
the growth regions. This migration process has reinforced the imbalances.
The situation in the regions exporting population has worsened with the
loss of their most dynamic people. At the same time, this phenomenon has
created enormous problems for the receiving regions, specifically in the
provision of jobs and services.
8Natural resources: The lack of development of the productive capacity of
the backward regions with high potential for economic development has
created losses due to under-utilization and primitive methods of
exploitation of the natural resources.
1.1.b Opportunities
As has been indicated above, a great many problems are due to imbalances
between the industrial axis and the rest of the country. But at the same time,
extraordinary opportunities remain for development. Venezuela is richly
endowed with natural resources, of which so far only oil has been
extensively developed, and iron and bauxite in a more limited way. The
country has vast mineral deposits and an enormous potential for electric
power, which is now beginning to be developed. Other resources include
manganese, coal, lead and natural gas.
There are substantial opportunities in Venezuela for economic progress in
other areas such as forestry, cattle-raising, commercial farming, and in
the development of tourism. So far, only the Guayana Region has been
expanding the productive capabilities of the nation by bringing new
resources into play.
From the above description it can be seen that:
(1) In terms of efficiency, Venezuela is probably not working at its
full capacity;
9(2) In terms of equity, the sharp contrasts of the different aspects
of Venezuelan life (economic, social, political, spatial) are
skewed toward the extremes with relatively little in the middle;
(3) In the environmental dimension, the country faces the
destruction of its natural resources, as well as the
deteriorating conditions of its man-made habitat.
1.2 Historical context
The concentration of activities in the north-central area originated in
colonial times when exports to Spain led to the concentration of activities
along the coastline. Manufacturing activities in Venezuela in the
nineteenth century, and well into the present century, were confined to
various forms of artisan industries. Until World War II, the amount of
industrialization achieved was very limited.
In the late 1890's and during the following decade, several small
hydroelectric power plants were constructed along the rivers draining the
Caracas valley. This improvement in infrastructure was a prerequisite for
investment in manufacturing. Similarly, various thermoelectric plants were
built at the begining of this century to supply energy to the cities of
Valencia, Puerto Cabello and Maracaibo. When the development of this
infrastructure was already under way, changes occurred in two important
areas: the growth of a domestic market for manufacturers and the introduction
of protection against imported products. The domestic market grew in the
years before the First World War, as purchasing power increased due to
the coffee export booms of the 1890's. Undoubtedly, much of this increase
10
was channeled into importing consumer products. For many products, such as
textiles and cigarettes, protective tariffs were introduced from the late
1890's onwards, and these were obviously of importance to domestic
entrepreneurs.
The political take-over by Juan Vicente G6mez in 1908, with the political
tranquility and financial order that accompanied it, seemed to provide
an impetus to undertake new manufacturing. G6mez provided a favorable
climate for foreign investors to develop the resources of the country. This
was in contrast to his predecessor, Cipriano Castro, who antagonized foreign
interests. The new conditions attracted petroleum companies in particular,
whereas foreign investment in manufacturing remained on a rather small
scale. By 1913 the city of Caracas and its port, La Guaira, accounted for
over one-quarter of the manufacturing enterprises in the country. The city
of Valencia and its port, Puerto Cabello, had the next largest
concentration, with nearly as many enterprises as Caracas (Karlsson, 2
During the interwar period, foreign oil investments and export earnings
experienced a tremendous rise. As income increased for some segments of the
population, particularly during the twenties, the markets grew for many
domestic manufacturers. Nevertheless, the industrial development of the
twenties was limited to a handful of industries, primary textiles,
cigarettes and beverages, i.e., industries which enjoyed either high tariff
protection (textiles and cigarettes) or strong natural protection by virtue
of high transport costs (beverages) (Karlsson,3 ).
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In the late 1930's, the government initiated a first but modest program
to encourage industrial development in the country. The program however,
was counteracted by the government's foreign trade policy. In 1939, a trade
agreement was signed with the United States (revised and extended in
1952), which reduced import duties on a series of products. This agreement,
it has been argued, came to substantially reduce the possibilities for
further industrial progress (Karlsson, ).
By 1936, Caracas had expanded its share of manufacturing activity to half
of that of the national territory. The city of Valencia continued to be
number two. During the 1950's government service sectors expanded even
further within the Metropolitan Region, having the effect of attracting
many people to Caracas.
A marked shift in the growth structure occurred after 1958, when a
comprehensive import-substitution program was adopted. As a result of this
policy, the imports of semi-manufactured products and to some extent raw
materials, increased sharply. Manufacturing industries were attracted to
locations near the international ports and the largest market areas.
During the 1950's some well managed establishments in Caracas, as well as
new manufacturing firms, realized that the Valley of Caracas offered very
limited space for future expansion. Consequently, they looked for
alternative cities in which to locate. The Municipal Council of the city
of Valencia, composed of very dynamic people, realized that an opportunity
existed to further develop the economy of the city. They decided to create
12
a good industrial climate for entrepeneurs by offering the first organized,
industrial park in Venezuela. This park had all the necessary physical
infrastructure (water, electricity, roads, etc.), as well as municipal tax
holidays and other special incentives. Also, industrialists found that
Valencia had an acceptable labor force with some industrial tradition, a
good infrastructure, inexpensive land, favorable municipal incentives, port
facilities through Puerto Cabello and a location near Caracas. Furthermore,
the construction of a high quality highway from Caracas to Valencia
(completed in 1958) reduced travel time between the two cities to less
than two hours. Hence, entrepeneurs decided to locate in Valencia, and
later on, in other cities along the highway. As a consequence, the area
between Caracas and Valencia grew at a very fast rate. Therefore, based on
all the factors mentioned, it is not surprising that a high concentration
of activities has occurred in the north-central area (see Fig. 1.2).
1.3 The case for intervention
The existing political ideology of the state, as a mixed economy, supports
government intervention under the assumption that the undesirable situation
described earlier is a product of market imperfections.. Furthermore, it
assumes that the government has the power and the political will to
intervene.
If the various regional problems were self-righting over a short period of
time, there would be little case for intervention. However, some scholars
5
believe that regional growth may not be convergent (Myrdal, ), and some
government intervention is needed (Hirschman, 6). It must also be added
13
that even if a laissez-faire approach is eventually self-righting, the
inevitable distress of the intervening period would probably necessitate
some form of intervention.
This suggests to the Venezuelan policy makers that there is a case for
intervention, but intervention is costly, and there is a need for further
evidence that such action is justified on economic and/or non-economic
grounds (Glasson, ).
Economic arguments figure prominently in the case for intervention. It may
be argued that the economic growth of the country could be substantially
increased by utilizing more fully the wasted and potential resources of
the depressed and underdeveloped regions.
From the social argument point of view, it may also be argued that the
cumulative process of regional growth increases the gap between rich and
poor regions. The latter are trapped in a "vicious circle", a downward
stagnation spiral. The lack of economic opportunities and poor
environmental conditions encourage selective out-migration, leaving a
top-heavy population distribution, poorer services, and an overall
reduction in the growth potential of the area. By intervening in these
problems and reducing differences in per-capita regional income levels,
a policy of industrial deconcentration can make a substantial contribution
to the national goal of socialequality.
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Finally, political arguments, although often not explicit, are nonetheless
of considerable importance. Their importance stems from the fact that they
are explicitely voiced in the affected geographic areas. People feel very
strongly about problems such as unemployment. It follows that in democratic
countries such as Venezuela it is a sound policy to appease depressed areas,
because these areas, if neglected for some time, will invariable vote
against the government. If the neglect extends over a long period,
separatist tendencies may develop.
1.4 Government measures
In 1974, the Venezuelan government, conscious of the socio-economic
problems caused by the concentration of activities in the north-central
area, decided to intervene in the spatial distribution of the manufacturing
industry. A series of presidential decrees were issued to give a legal
framework to the policy of industrial deconcentration.
There are three aims behind the Venezuelan industrial deconcentration
policy. One is to prohibit the location of new manufacturing activity in
the Metropolitan Region (Caracas and its surrounding area). A second is to
induce industries considered hazardous to move their locations to safer
places and to encourage non-hazardous firms, already located in the
congested Metropolitan Region, to move to designated development areas.
The third aim is to attract new manufacturing plants to the designated
development areas.
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Among the policy instruments for carrying out industrial deconcentration
are straightforward financial and fiscal incentives, the provision of
industrial parks and control over location.
From location theory and empirical observation, it is said that an
incentive can only influence a firm to choose one location rather than
another if the incentive sufficietly outweights the benefits the firm
could obtain in the location of its first choice. As a corollary, it may
be said that we cannot expect a firm to locate in a development area if it
is not compensated in full.
Hence we may ask: Do the incentives given outweight the benefits of the
preferred location? Does the policy of industrial deconcentration fullfil
its objectives? What is the policy accomplishing?
One might argue that it is too early to answer these questions. Few years
have elapsed since the policy was put into operation and, due to time
lag considerations, no real effects can be perceived this soon. This
implies waiting until more time has passed, when changes in the spatial
distribution of industry can be better perceived. Nevertheless, a careful
analysis of processes of industrial location and change indicates that the
mechanics as well as the impacts of the Venezuelan policy measures may not
be fully understood. It should be stressed that discrepancies between
intended purposes and unintended effects may lead to serve misallocation
of resources: for example, when incentives are given to firms that would
have located in the designated areas anyway; or when subsidies to capital
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are given with the purpose of creating new employment opportunities but,
in practical terms, these subsidies may lead to capital-intensive
technology with limited effect on the desired objective. Therefore, it is
extremely important to try to understand the consequences of the policy of
industrial deconcentration as early as possible. Rodwin8 stresses this
point when he says that "It is debatable whether we know enough about urban
growth strategies either to deal with them effectively or to secure the
necessary understanding early enough to avoid doing more than good." Hence,
we may argue that an "early understanding" is crucial, and efforts in this
direction should be welcomed. The worst thing that may happen with this
approach is to find no evidence of being off the path leading toward the
desired goals. If this happens, we are in the same situation as if no
monitoring activity had taken place, but with the advantage of having
created a data bank for control purposes. Therefore, the "early understanding"
approach is endorsed here.
1.5 Controversies
What do we know at present about the effects to date of the Venezuelan
policy of industrial deconcentration? There seems to be little or no
agreement in at least two of the studies currently available. A report
prepared by the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente 9) is
very optimistic about the policy, claiming that the pattern of behavior of
the entrepeneur is changing. The report states that "All these indexes show
without doubt a real tendency by the public as well as private sector to
deconcentrate industrial investment toward the hinterland of the country."
On the other hand, a document prepared the same year by the National
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Planning Office (Cordiplan, 10) indicates that the policy has merely accentuated
existing tendencies towards concentrating manufacturing activity in the
city of Caracas and its surroundings.
Hence, we may ask ourselves how two different research efforts directed at
evaluating the same policy have reached opposite conclusions?
A closer look at the evidence presented in the two reports mentioned
earlier shows that their conclusions are logical and well-argued outcomes
of the data used. Hence, an answer to the above question may lie in the
data. Because the pertinent data for a proper evaluation of the policy of
industrial deconcentration are not available, the researchers of these two
reports had to rely on less appropriate data. For example, Cordiplan used
aggregate data for the number of establishments by administrative regions.
The use of aggregate data to describe the locational behavior of the
manufacturing industry has many drawbacks. Among them are:
1.- Aggregate industrial data fail to capture the fact that each
industrial subgroup may behave differently by reacting in a
different way to the policy or other stimuli. For example, the
plastic industry may behave differently from the textiles or
leather products industry. Hence, there may be some industrial
subgroups which are deconcentrating; others may be concentrating
even more; while others may remain stationary.
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2.- Aggregate spatial data do not reflect the degree of industrial
activity in each of the five area subdivisions of the policy. The
use of an administrative region (see Fig. 1.3) as the spatial
unit may be misleading since the area subdivisions, according to
the administrative regions, are different from the subdivisions
as defined by the policy of industrial deconcentration. This
divergence will be described in later chapters.
3.- Aggregate data may hide the dynamics of the manufacturing sector
of the economy: For example, if one talks about the net change in
the number of establishments in a particular administrative region
over a two year period, this says nothing about the total number
of establishments that are new, the number of firms that went
out of business, or the plants that have changed location. This
latter information is crucial for a proper evaluation of the
policy.
On the other hand, the report prepared by the Ministry of the Environment
uses indicators such as the number of industrial projects which
entrepeneurs said they are planning to set up in the near future, or the
number of new manufacturing firms that have registered with the Ministry of
Development. The use of these sorts of data assumes for example that what
the entrepeneur said will actually take place. Furthermore, it also assumes
that if no new firms registered with the Ministry of Development have
declared Caracas as a location, then this city has had in fact no new
manufacturing activity.
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Clearly more reliable conclusions will be reached if proper data are used.
But data collection is costly and time consuming. Are the data worth
collecting? In general, the marginal benefits of using better data are
unknown until the data are analyzed; Only then can we say if the exercise
was worthwhile. The opposite conclusions reached by the two reports described
earlier indicate that there is some justification for gathering appropriate
data that will give us a more satisfying baseline to use for evaluating the
policy of industrial deconcentration.
There are, no doubt, risks involved when gathering data; for example, that
of collecting more data than is actually needed. There are two main
possibilities for solving this issue: On the one hand, one may set up an
ad-hoc operation of data collection where entrepeneurs for example, are
asked for specific variables considered relevant to the hypotheses that are
going to be tested, or where municipal councils, as another example, are
asked about their local incentives. On the other hand, one may set up an
operation to organize data already in existence, but which are dispersed
or incomplete, i.e., an operation that will make accessible data more
readily available.
The first approach is costly and time consuming. It is difficult to define
in advance the level of detail of the information needed. Furthermore, it
is expensive to return to the surveyed entity for additional information
if more is needed. The advantage of the first approach, however, is that
more relevant and consistent data- can be obtained.
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Since in our case a considerable amount of previously unexploited data in
fact exist --although with some gaps-- and seem to be of acceptable quality,
the second approach looks appropriate, i.e., to dig out from different
sources the required data, fill as many gaps as necessary, and then organize
the data in an appropriate way. This approach allows for collecting the
minimum necessary data that will do the "job", allowing one to go deeper
into the data gathering organization as the need arises. This is the
approach followed in this research.
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2 REGIONAL POLICIES AND THE RESEARCH
2.1 Regional goals and objectives
The inequalities in regional levels of income, unemployment, migration and
economic growth rates in Venezuela have stimulated government intervention
with the overall goal of reducing inter-regional disparities.
Among the objectives of the Venezuelan regional policy (Venezuela, 1), the
main ones have been to:
- Increase employment in lagging areas;
- Restrain expansion of employment in the congested
metropolitan region;
- Create a more diversified industrial structure;
- Reduce net outward migration from previously neglected
regions;
- Utilize more fully the resources and comparative advantages
of the neglected regions;
- Maintain and strengthen provincial cultures and identity;
- Equalize access to a good environment --including housing,
education and health services.
From an economic viewpoint, the ultimate objective of regional policy may
be to reverse or reduce the cumulative decline of lagging regions
designated for new development by creating a rate of economic growth
sufficient to secure full employment in those regions.
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The employment-generation strategy should be sustainable in the longer
run without special incentives and in the medium run should avoid excessive
demand inflation. Ideally, the accompanying self-sustained economic growth
should preferably be obtained without impairing the growth rate in other
regions, thereby securing a net increase in the economy as a whole. This
latter goal, of course, may pose a major task as long as capital is scarce.
Some of the objectives listed above may be in conflict with one another
and with wider economic objectives. For example, there may be a conflict
between the objective of full employment in all regions and the general
demand-management objectives of the government, i.e., the avoidance of
excessive demand inflation and a satisfactory balance of payments.
The transition to self-sustained growth for particular regions is likely
to be a long and gradual process. Each contribution to the objective of
reaching full employment with the aid of subsidies (i.e., medium-term
objective) can be expected to make a contribution to the longer-term
objective of self-sustained economic growth, only insofar as the
manufacturing sector becomes more competitive than it would otherwise be.
2.2 Regional policies
In a mixed economy, an area with high unemployment can reduce its
unemployment rate in two main ways:
1) Through a migration policy, i.e., assisting the movement of
labor to places where people are more likely to find a job.
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2) Through a policy of industrial deconcentration, i.e., assisting
the movement and creation of industries in places where an excess
of labor is located. This alternative includes the promotion of
industrial growth in lagging areas.
In Venezuela, the stated policy to be used for the achievement of regional
development objectives is industrial promotion in lagging areas, i.e., taking
"jobs to the people." This has been interpreted to mean a policy of
industrial deconcentration (Ministerio de Fomento, 2), coupled with the
strategy of spatial concentration of investment and service activities in
growth centers. Hence, a policy of industrial dispersal, combined with a
"concentrated decentralization" strategy (Rodwin, 3), is perceived by the
Venezuelan government as the cornerstone for the development of the
national territory.
The basic assumption underlying the policy of industrial deconcentration is
that most of the unemployment in lagging or development areas, rather than
from structural or frictional causes, results from demand deficiency, i.e.,
the assisted areas suffer excessive unemployment, not because they are
inferior locations for the growth of modern industries, but because there
is no industrial tradition and appropriate agglomeration economies to
encourage industrial growth. It is expected that the introduction of new
industries in designated areas will reinforce the indirect impact of new
activities until a point is reached where, in a group of industries linked
by the interchange of goods and services, the multiplier effects become
significantly stronger, signalling a qualitative as well as a quantitative
change.
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This regional policy may be in conflict with sectoral policies. Taking full
advantage of modern industrial technology, as favored by the sectoral
approach, may give rise to locational decisions recognized as non-optimal
from the point of view of long-term regional development policies.
2.3 Policy instruments
A crucial factor in these locational manipulations is the use of incentives
and restrictions, intended to channel investment into specific areas and
induce firms to perform and behave in accordance with certain social goals
and objectives.
In Venezuela, there is an array of policy instruments for carrying out
industrial decentralization. Among these instruments are:
a) Direct incentives, i.e., straightforward financial and fiscal
incentives such as grants, loans and tax concessions;
b) Indirect forms of assistance such as the provision of industrial
parks and improvement of transportation and communication
facilities;
c) Negative incentives, i.e., control over location.
2.4 The research
These three elements -- objectives, policies and instruments-- although
present a hierarchical structure (see Fig. 2.1) are interrelated; they
constitute a system. As such, each component affects the other, i.e., each
element is interrelated with the other two (see Fig. 2.2).
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I: Instruments
0: Objectives
MR P: Policy
Fig. 2.2 Interrelation between Objectives, Policy and Instruments
Three primary relations can be observed in Fig. 2.2, which give rise to the
following questions:
Question 1: Has the policy of industrial
deconcentration fulfilled
the regional objectives?
(Objective-Policy relation)
To evaluate if the policy itself has made a contribution or has been a
success, one should return to the objectives listed earlier and estimate
the contribution of each. Furthermore, ideally we should assign a weight to
each objective since, a priori, we can expect them to differ in importance.
However, such as exercise is impractical and could only achieve a
superficial result.
In spite of the difficulties mentioned, this question of the actual impact
on regional objectives is a very important one. Industrial establishments,
for example, may move to the assisted areas but bring their employees with
0
I P
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them. They may also recruit labor from the existing workforce, rather
than from among the unemployed, causing wages to rise. In these two cases,
they may make only an indirect contribution to the objective of increasing
employment opportunities in the designated regions, even though from the
point of view of the policy --moving industry to development areas-- it is
successful.
O Question 2: Is the changing pattern of
industrial location a result
of the policy instruments
I P
applied? (Instruments-Policy
relation)
A careful consideration of the policy instruments used in Venezuela may
suggest that they have merely accentuated existing market trends: on the
one hand, incentives may be given to firms that will locate in the
development areas anyway, and on the other hand, the incentives offered
may not be sufficient to attract desirable industries to the assisted
regions.
In the former case, it is possible that the opening of a branch plant in
a development area, for example, is due to the firm's response to an
increase in the regional demand for its products. In this situation, the
incentives received by the firm become an additional source of profits.
In the latter case, where the incentives offered are not sufficient to
attract desirable industries to the designated areas, it is possible that
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the number of locational choices available to some industrial firms is
strongly limited. An example may be the need of the entrepeneur of a small
firm to be close to the central government, either because the government
is his major client or because it grants him special licenses. Spatially,
this implies the need to be located in the Metropolitan Region.
Question 3: How have policy instruments
0
affected the regional
objectives? (Instruments-
Objectives relation)
Worldwide, the mechanics and impact of policy instruments are rarely fully
understood. Rather, incentives and restrictions are often applied
indiscriminantly, and, as a result, discrepancies between intended
purposes and unintended effects can lead to severe misallocation of
resources. For example, subsidies to capital are often believed to
encourage capital-intensive technology with consequently a limited effect
on the creation of new employment opportunities. Furthermore, subsidies
may help non-competitive industries to survive, or get industries to move,
which would move without subsidies.
These researchable questions are so broad and complicated that any one of
them could become by itself a dissertation topic. However, there is a need,
therefore, to limit the scope of this work. Due to the fact that the
Venezuelan government is currently considering modifying the policy
instruments applied, so as to accelerate the deconcentration of industry,
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the primary question to be examined in this dissertation is a variant of
question 2, above:
Have Government instruments (both incentives and restrictions) contributed
to the deconcentration of industry?
2.5 Difficulties in measuring the effects of regional policies
The main difficulty in trying to assess the effect of policy on the
variables chosen to represent policy objectives such as employment figures
is that these variables are far from being influenced by regional policy
alone. There are other causal factors, such as long-term structural changes,
migration, and short-term variations ascribed to the trade cycle. The
problem is even more complicated because the policy instruments are unlikely
to have been consistently applied over time and space.
The government's regional deconcentration policy is designed to be
implemented by a battery of instruments. This makes it harder to represent
policy by a single indicator. Hence, the following additional questions
have to be answered: How to separate the effects of the various government
instruments? Are these effects additive? Do the instruments augment one
another's effectiveness? An additional difficulty is the long-term lag
between cause and effect which has been observed in regional policy.
Finally, the analysis is costrained by the availability of data and the
method of analysis used. It is notable that in similar studies done in
Great Britain and Germany (OECD, ), for example, the analysis often relies
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on statistics, not generally available in other countries, relating to the
various economic characteristics of quite small development areas.
In Venezuela, this last problem is very pronounced. In some instances the
data do not exist, and in others, data exist but the institutions which
have the information are reluctant to release it. In most cases, when data
are available, the uses of the data are limited by problems of unreliability
and inconsistency.
2.6 Limitations of the research
For the purpose of reducing research to reasonable proportions:
* The dissertation will not analyze the conflicts and merits of
the regional development objectives.
* The study will not consider the controversy regarding the
mobilizarion of industries versus the mobilization of people.
* The research will not analyze the reasons why the government
should or should not attempt to induce firms to settle in
development areas (concentration versus deconcentration
strategies).
* As indicated earlier, the dissertation will attempt to
evaLuate the effects of the instruments on the policy of
industrial deconcentration (question 2, above), but will not
deal with the effects on the regional objectives, caused by
either the policy or the instruments (questions 1 and 3).
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3 THE POLICY OF INDUSTRIAL DECONCENTRATION
3.1 The economic environment of the industrial spatial policy
The Venezuelan industrial deconcentration policy is aimed at discouraging
the location of new manufacturing industry in the north-central region of
the country as well as redirecting industrial firms to designated areas.
To put the manufacturing spatial policy into perspective, a brief
description of the Venezuelan sectoral economic policies for industrial
promotion will be outlined here. Five policy tools for promoting
industrialization in Venezuela will also be identified (World Bank, 1):
1.- Tariffs and licensing.
The first and most important tool is a set of tariffs and quantitative
restrictions to provide protection from import competition. Along with
import licensing, the Venezuelan protective system has relied greatly
on specific tariffs, which were generally low for those imports either
not produced domestically or subject to licensing, but which were
prohibitively high for other imports which competed directly with
national production. This practice was apparently encouraged by the
commercial treaty signed with the United States in 1939, under the terms
of which both countries agreed not to increase tariff levels on a
specified list of products. This commercial treaty was ended by
Venezuela and a new tariff was announced later in 1972 and introduced in
May 1973. In this new treaty specific tariffs and import licenses were
less important than formerly but not eliminated.
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Licences serve to plug gaps in the tariffs wall. Thus, if a customs
category covers a variety of products, only some of which are produced
in the country, that category becomes subject to a low tariff combined
with licencing. Licences requests made for the purpose of importing a
product produced within the country are denied; requests for importing
other products are approved (World Bank, 2
2.- Tariff exonerations.
The granting of tariff exonerations on the importation of industrial
goods is done on a case by case basis by the government. The magnitude
of tariff exonerations deserves emphasis. In 1970, for example, foreign
trade data show imports of raw materials and machinery for industry
valued at Bs. 1,216 million for which exonerations were granted. This
was equal in magnitude to almost half of the Bs. 2,571 million of
3
imports for which duties were collected (World Bank,3)
3.- Local content regulations.
Content regulations as a tool for government industrial policy set
dates by which a certain percent of a given industry's output,
measured by either value or weight, must be of national origin. Such
regulations are best known in the automobile industry. (Other products
governed by these regulations include: air conditioners, washing
machines, and pumps). These regulations stipulate the firms authorized
to engage in production and the brands they are authorized to produce.
The regulations have also been used to reduce the number of firms, brands,
and models in order to minimize costs caused by loss of economies of
34
scale. Furthermore, this policy stipulates that any part, once having
been produced locally and included in local content, may not be imported
at a future date, i.e., this tends to insulate parts producers from the
threat of future imports competition. Enforcement of these regulations
is carried out merely by denying licences and tariff exonerations to
unauthorized firms or brands,
4.- Provision of credit facilities.
This fourth government policy for industrial promotion involves the
provision of credit facilities with subsidized interest rates. The
study done by the World Bank4 indicated earlier concludes that up to
1973 government institutions were of secondary importance as sources
of long-term credit except in the cases of food processing and the
steel industry. This situation changed in 1974 with the reformulation
of the economy. The marked increase in petroleum prices produced a
large increase in government revenues, much of which were subsequently
earmarked for industrial development. To this end, the Venezuelan
Investment Fund (Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela) was created in
1974.
This Fund has been the recipient of up to 50% of the country's oil
revenues annually, and it is authorized to use these revenues to
finance expansion and diversification of the Venezuelan economy, make
loans and investment abroad to preserve the value of petrodollars, and
to promote development of international financial cooperation programs.
Hence, the Venezuelan Investment Fund deals mainly with very large
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projects such as petroleum, petrochemicals, electric power and basic
metals. The Venezuelan Development Corporation (Corporaci6n Venezolana
de Fomento) traditionally is a major source of long-term credit for
very large enterprises which are mostly government-ownedo
More diversified lending to industry is the responsability of the
Industrial Credit Fund (Fondo de Credito Industrial) also created in
1974 and the Corporation for the Development of Small and Medium
Sized Industry, or Corpoindustria (Corporaci6n de Desarrollo de la
Pequefia y Mediana Industria). The Industrial Credit Fund finances
projects ranging in size from 6 to 40 million bolivares and its
lendings are channeled through other financial institutions such as
private banks and investment houses (financieras). Smaller loans, under
Bs. 6 million, are the concern of the National Commission for Industrial
Development, or Conafin (Comisi6n Nacional para el Fomento Industrial)
which has been in existence since the 1960's. Conafin was reestructured
as a corporation in 1974 changing its name to Corpoindustria.
5.- Export incentives.
A number of incentives, the most important of which involved
preferential access to credit, have been in effect since the early
1960s. Nevertheless, the principal incentive lies not in financing but
in subsidies, expressed as a percent of f.o.b. export value. The rate
depends on the import value embodied in the exported product, ranging
from 30% subsidy for products with no import content, down to 11% for
70% import content (World Bank,5 ).
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From the above description of the tools used in Venezuela for industrial
6
promotion, we may agree with the study done by the World Bank, quoted
earlier, that says:
"The salient feature of the Venezuelan industrial environment is
the high degree of protection from import competition made possible
by government policies."
Later on the report adds:
"By this process the industrial sector has become highly dependent
on favorable treatment by government policymakers. Possible
variations in government policy carry greater potential effect on
profitability than does any likely development in cost reduction or
new product promotion."
3.2 The legal framework of the policy
The implementation of the industrial decentralization policy is effected
through a set of presidential decrees, laws and resolutions which together
are intended to prohibit the location of new manufacturing activity in or
near Caracas, to induce firms considered hazardous to leave their
locations for safer places, to stimulate industries already located in the
congested Metropolitan Region to move to designated areas, and to attract
new manufacturing activity to designated development areas. From the set of
legal instruments issued since 1974 to implement the industrial
deconcentration policy, the following are the most relevant to our study.
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Presidential Decree No.134 (June 4, 1974)
Authorize the granting of incentives to firms which locate in less
developed parts of the country.
Presidential Decree No.135 (June 4, 1974)
Prohibit new manufacturing establishments from locating in the city of
Caracas unless they qualify under special conditions, i.e., they supply or
give basic services to the inhabitants.
Presidential Resolution No.5608 (August 20, 1974)
Create the Deconcentration Commision to advise the executive branch of the
government about further implementation of the industrial deconcentration
policy.
Presidential Decree No.713 (January 21, 1975)
Modifies decree No0 125 by augmenting the prohibited area to include not
only the city of Caracas, but its surrounding area, i.e., the nearby towns
such as Los Teques and La Guaira.
Presidential Decree No.1477 (March 23, 1976)
Divides the country into five geo-demographic regions (Zones A, B, BM, C
and D) for the purpose of establishing the variation in the level of
incentives that firms will receive in each of the designated areas. (See
Fig. 3.1: The zones are described further, below).
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Presidential Decree No.1478 (March 23, 1976)
Draws up two lists of industries: one is comprised of those existing firms
that are allowed to relocate within area A, the Caracas 'Metropolitan Area;
the other list groups those industries deemed to be dangerous, such as
those involved with industrial chemicals, petroleum and coal derivatives,
etc., which should leave their locations for safer places. These lists are
identified here as group II and III.
7
According to Dra. Inirida Toledo the wording of this decree was carefully
chosen for the purpose of closing the loophole opened by decree 135, so
that in effect no new establishment wouldbe allowed to locate in Caracas.
Indeed, a careful analysis of this decree shows that attempts were made to
avoid listing those industries that, according to decree 135, were allowed
to locate in Caracas because they "supply or give basic services to the
inhabitants." On the other hand, annex 1 of the policy document (Ministerio
de Fomento, 8) lists those industries which are considered to supply and give
basic services to the inhabitants. Although this list is used in the policy
document to establish priority for industries to be located in a particular
zone of area BM (chiefly, locations adjacent to Caracas), we will expand its
use to designate those industries that can locate in Caracas according to
decree 135. (This list will be identified as group I). Expanding the use of
the list allows a more lenient evaluation of the policy, i.e., industries
on list I located in Caracas, are not "trangressors" of the policy.
From the above discussion, we may infer that the industrial deconcentration
policy has three lists of industries, identified here as groups I, II and III.
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List I includes producers of household consumer goods and services such as
basic foodstuffs, clothing, furniture, and others. New firms belonging to
this list are allowed to locate in area A, the Caracas metropolitan area,
provided they are of small and medium size. List II is a subset of list -I.
Existing firms on list II are allowed to relocate within area A. For
example, it is possible for a bakery to move to another location within area
A for the purpose of enlarging his production system. Firms on list III are
those deemed dangerous and should leave area A. In summary, new firms, not
assigned to list I, are prohibited from locating in area A. Existing firms
not assigned to list III may continue operating in area A and only those
firms on list II may relocate within area A.
3.3 The spatial framework of the policy
From the set of presidential decrees and resolutions mentioned above, it
can be seen that the underlying idea of the Venezuelan policy of industrial
deconcentration is to limit the expansion of manufacturing activity in the
Metropolitan Region and to divide the country in various zones. Each of
these zones has incentives to attract industries. These incentives vary
among zones, following the national goal of reducing inter-regional
disparities in wealth and well being. Venezuela's five areas of industrial
deconcentration are (see Fig. 3.1):
Area A Corresponds, as already noted, to the Metropolitan Area of Caracas.
Only small and medium size firms on list I are permitted to locate
in this area. Existing firms on list II are allowed to relocate
within the region. Highly polluting and/or dangerous industries
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(list III) are forced to leave this area. Only firms forced to
move their plants receive tax and other concessions to ease the
relocation burden. All other industries receive no incentives.(See
Fig. 3.2).
Area B Corresponds to the populated centers west of the Metropolitan Area,
i.e., from Caracas to Valencia, comprising most of the Venezuelan
industrial axis. Industries locating in this area receive no
incentives.
Area BM Corresponds to the area that is marginal, i.e., surrounds areas A
and B (see Fig. 3.2). Some incentives are given to firms who locate
in this area, especially to those who were forced to leave area A.
Area C Comprises those regions covering the bulk of the country's
geographical area (see Fig. 3.1) that are considered best fitted
for the absorption of new economic activities. Consequently this
zone receives a number of incentives. Within this area, 33
settlements were selected to receive the incentives. Following the
concentrated-decentralization strategy (Rodwin, 9), five cities were
selected from the 33 settlements to become the Venezuelan growth
centers. The following is a list of the five cities or conurbations
(see Fig. 3.3):
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1 Barcelona-Puerto La Cruz-Cumana
2 Barquisimeto
3 Maracaibo-Costa Oriental del Lago
4 San Cristobal-San Antonio-La Fria
5 Ciudad Bolivar-Ciudad Guayana
Area D Corresponds to the national territory that does not belong to any
of the other areas. This area might get the same government
incentives as area C, but only under special permission following
detailed study.
In chapter 2 it was argued that aggregate spatial data will not necessarily
reflect the amount of industrial activity in each of the five areas
identified by the industrial deconcentration policy. The use of an
administrative region as the spatial unit may be misleading since the area
subdivisions setup according to the administrative regions, are different
from the subdivisions that follow from the policy of industrial
deconcentration. This can be observed when Fig. 1.2 and Fig. 3.1 are
compared. A more detailed example of these discrepancies can be seen in
the Capital Region, i.e., one of the eight administrative regions. Fig. 3.4
shows the Capital Region. When comparing Fig. 3.4 with Fig. 3.2, we see that
the Capital Region overlaps area A and part of Area BM. Hence, if industries
have moved from Caracas to, say, Santa Lucia or the town of Cila, which are
in a designated area receiving incentives (BM), this movement is not
registered by the Capital Region which may show that no change has taken
place.
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3.4 The operational framework of the policy
The nature of the impact of government incentives on locational choice
may be better appreciated by examining a summary of the operational
framework within which decisions are taken. The process begins in a given
manufacturing sector with the decision, for example, to undertake national
production in partial substitution of imports. The decision may result from
the initiative, either of an entrepeneur or of the Ministry of Development
which continually searches out new possibilities for import substitutions
and advertises them to the private sector. Once a proposal for import
substituting production, as well as the location of a new plant, is
approved by the Ministry of Development, the Government becomes committed
to providing a certain degree of tariff protection. Once tariff protection
is given against a particular competing import, such protection is
available to any firm wishing to produce the import-substituting product.
However, three additional policy instruments are administered on a
case-by-case basis individually for each firm: exonerations on imported
inputs, access to government credit --financial incentives-- and tax
holidays --fiscal incentives. According to the World Bankl0 study, cited
earlier, when three or four companies have initiated production and
completely eliminated imports of the equivalent product, additional
latecomer firms desiring to enter the new industry are often denied
government support in the form of exoneration and credit.
The highly centralized decisions that take place in Caracas should be
stressed. Exonerations on imported inputs are granted by the Ministry of
Development. Government financial institutions for large size loans are
47
located in Caracas, while for small and medium size loans the financial
institutions are in the city of Maracay (Corpoindustria headquarters). The
Regional Corporations --there is one in each of the administrative regions--
in theory may function as an intermediary between the firms and the
government financial organizations, but entrepeneurs prefer to operate
directly with the principal office. Hence, they travel all the way to the
North-Central area to submit their applications and obtain approval.
3.5 Expected outcome
Based on the description of the industrial promotion and industrial
deconcentration policies presented earlier, we may ask what could be the
outcome of the policy of industrial deconcentration? In order to answer
this question, we may want to look first to what history can teach us.
In Latin American countries as well as in many other countries, policies
aimed at the regional dispersal of industry have a long history. These
countries have chosen deliberately to plan and promote the process of
deconcentration with the expectation that industrial activity will probably
concentrate further, if left to the vagaries of the market forces. For
example, the first country in Latin America to adopt financial incentives
was Mexico (Gilbert, 11) when, in the 1930's, several states bordering the
United States were granted concessions from import duties. Other countries
such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile also had long experiences with policies
of industrial deconcentration (United Nations, 12).
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This richness of experiences available in other countries may give us a
clue as to what we may expect in Venezuela as a consequence of the policy
of industrial deconcentration. For example, a study done by Lavelll3 on the
administrative controls upon location in Mexico indicates:
"The Mexican government also applied some controls on industrial
location but did not implement them vigorously. A more typical
method was the attempt to influence industrial location by threatening
to refuse companies additional water, fuel and gas supplies. Although
there are cases where they have been effective, in Mexico controls
upon location would seem to have had comparatively little effect.
In general more companies have set up in Mexico City, to gain access
to the government bureaucracy, than have dispersed as a result of
location controls."
In the Latin American context Gilbert14 stresses that:
"In several Latin American countries, political conditions have
allowed governments to implement policies aimed at the regional
dispersal of industry. But, in general, these policies have employed
rhetoric rather than action, and only in Chile, Brazil, Cuba and
Puerto Rico have any major changes been made in the regional
distribution of industry. Even in these countries government action
has only slowed the tide towards a highly localized spatial
distribution and not reversed it. Such a situation has not arisen
because governments lacked suitable tools for dispersal, for a
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variety of methods have been employed, Rather, it seems as if the
political will to implement these methods is the element that was
lacking."
It may be argued that in Venezuela, the possible lack of political will
may not necessarily be the only major constraint faced for a satisfactory
implementation of the policy. There is something equally important that is
missing: the institutional process that will allow "things to happen." For
example, even under the assumption that there is political will as well as
properly designed tools for dispersal, it is not clear how the government
machinery is going to go around to coordinate the implementation of the
policy. In other words, there seem to be no answers to questions such as
the following:How should the various government organizations such as those
dealing with housing, water supply, transportation, health and education
expand their activities in the designated growth centers in a coordinated
way? The growth centers are clearly defined but it is less clear how the
actual improvement of these centers will take place, i.e., how the proper
physical and social infrastructure will be constructed and serviced so that
the new schools have teachers and the new industrial parks have water.
Other unanswered issues are: How will the Ministry of Development control
the prohibition to locate in the city of Caracas? What should the
relationship beteen the local authorities of Caracas and the national
authorities be (such as the Ministry of Development) in terms of the policy
of industrial deconcentration? In other words, it seems that the following
assumptions were made by government officials when designing the industrial
deconcentration policy:
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* The establishment of industrial parks in designated areas will be
properly coordinated by the corresponding government agencies.
This implies that industrial parks will have the necessary
life-support systems, i.e., a good water supply, a reliable supply
of energy, an appropriate drainage system, etc. Furthermore,
government agencies in charge of the social infrastructure such as
housing, schools, health facilities, etc. will also coordinate
their efforts to supply the expected needs of the designated
growth centers,
* Government financial institutions will follow the guidelines of
the deconcentration policy and only give subsidized interest rates
to firms locating in the designated areas.
* Municipal Councils will collaborate. Local authorities of towns
where new manufacturing activity is not encouraged by the
deconcentration policy, will not try to have their own industrial
park.
It can be argued that these assumptions do not hold, not only in the
Venezuelan context but also in most of the more developed countries. It is
necessary to properly address the issue of the institutional process which
would explicitly deal with these problems and which will indicate
procedures to be followed so that what has been assumed will really exist.
We may argue that the lack of a proper specification of the institutional
process that should be used to implement the industrial deconcentration
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policy (independently on how well each policy instrument has been designed)
may lead the whole operation to failureo
It would be appropriate at this point, to review some other assumptions
that seem to have been made by government officials when designing the
policy instruments:
* The financial and fiscal incentives are large enough to overcome
the cost disadvantage of not locating in the preferred area.
It can be argued that it is doubtful that the financial and fiscal incentives
given are large enough to overcome the cost disadvantage of not locating
in the preferred area --generally the north-central area. Some of these
cost disadvantages that must be overcome are related to the large investments
of capital in inventories of materials that may be needed to insure
continuity in production at distant locations. Another disadvantage to be
overcome by the incentives offered is the preference of managers and
technicians for a way of life which can be had only in the major cities.
Any location away from the big city is often regarded as a place of exile.
To get high level personnel away from the big cities, substantial
increments in salaries and benefits must be offered. To this should be
added the need for face-to-face relations when exonerations and licenses
are required for imported inputs. Furthermore, conditions change
frequently and unpredictably: regulations are changed, ministries are
reorganized, etc. Indeed, it is often crucial to be at the center of
influence, decision and information.
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* New manufacturing firms rely heavily on government sources of
finance. By confining the loans to designated areas, new industries
will be directed towards the designated growth centers.
It can be argued that the assumption about new manufacturing firms having
to rely heavily on government sources of finance may not necessarily be true.
This may be the case of small size industries, but not necessarily for
medium and large firms, since the countries exporting the needed machinery
and equipment often grant -- as subsidy to exports-- attractive loan
conditions at below market interest rates.
* Few firms will contravene the prohibition to locate in Caracas and
unauthorized new firms located in the city of Caracas will be
easily detected and forced to leave the area. Furthermore the
government has the power and the will to force a hazardous industry
located in an unsafe place to move to a better location.
Although the government has the legal instruments to enforce the law, it is
highly unlikely that these instruments will be used to force certain
manufacturing firms to leave Caracas. Furthermore, unauthorized firms of
small size may locate in Caracas because they can camouflage their
manufacturing activity as an operation that is not banned, such as commerce
or service.
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From the above discussion, we migh, in general, expect to find that the
industrial deconcentration policy has yet not worked. If any
deconcentration occurred, it is likely to be due to other factors such as
diseconomies of agglomeration (e.g0 high land cost, congestion, etc).
Overall, we may expect (with or without the industrial deconcentration
policy) very little deconcentration of industry. At most we may speculate
that the Venezuelan industrial axis will expand, not only to the south of
Caracas, but to the west as well, following the establishment of
settlements able to supply the life support systems and social
infrastructure needed for industrial growth.
For market, agglomeration potentials and many other considerations
mentioned earlier, industries will want to locate in the Metropolitan Area.
The high cost of congestion in Caracas itself will make industries look
for nearby towns in which to locate. Since the towns to the south of
Caracas --Cua, Santa Teresa and others-- and to the east --Ciudad Fajardo--
are very close to the capital city (see Fig. 3.2) and since they
additionally belong to a deconcentration area receiving some incentives,
i.e., BM, we may expect a spillover effect in these towns. We may expect
some industries that supply the national market but for whom being very
close to Caracas is less crucial to locate towards the west of the
industrial axis, such as in the towns of Bejuma and Nirgua (see Fig. 3.2).
In this way they can be close to both the geographic center and to the
industrialized axis of the country.
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Overall, we may expect the industrial deconcentration policy to have little
or no effect on locational decisions and that any deconcentration that may
have occurred, to be due to locational factors not related to the policy
instruments.
3.6 The research issues
So far we have speculated about the possible outcome of government policy
and we may ask ourselves whether some of the issues discussed above have
taken place. Nevertheless, we should recall the previous discussion in
chapter 1 about the limitations imposed by the very short period that has
elapsed since 1974 when the first presidential decree relating to industrial
deconcentration policy was issued.
As discussed earlier, it is important to have an "early understanding" of
the possible consequences of the policy. The answer to the main issue posed
in chapter 2, i.e.,
Have government instruments (both incentives and restrictions) contributed
to the deconcentration of industry?
requires answers to the following more specific questions:
Issue 1 Has deconcentration of industry indeed taken place?
Issue 2 Is any such deconcentration a result of the policy instruments
applied?
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Issue 3 What have been the other factors influencing industrial location
and what has been their relative importance?
In the following chapters, attempts will be made to answer each of these
questions by using, first, the available aggregate data. Since aggregate
data prove inadequate to the task, an operation was set up to organize data
already in existence, but which are disperse or incomplete.
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PART II: THE RESEARCHABLE QUESTIONS
4 Has deconcentration of industry taken place?
This chapter will attempt to investigate the locational pattern of industry
in Venezuela over time. First, results using aggregate data will be
analized, and then results by stratifying the sample by industry subgroups
will be presented. Finally, results for new manufacturing activity
(disaggregate data) will be shown.
4.1 Choice of indicators
A priori, the effects of the policy of industrial deconcentration are
expected to be felt in the level of relative participation of the regions.
Hence, it is necessary to decide which indicators of industrial activity
will provide a satisfactory picture of what regional policy may have
achieved. The choice of indicators has to take into account data
availability and the type of changes that are going to be measured. Since
our interest is to find out to what extent the regional policy has affected
the pattern of industrial location, it is clearly desirable to choose
indicators which measure the size and dispersion of the manufacturing
industry. Some commonly used indicators are, for each of the several
regions considered:
- Total employment
- Number of industrial establishments
- Number of manufacturing projects
- Manufacturing investment
- Production value
57
From the point of view of data collection, the basic statistical unit is
the firm (defined as identical with an "establishment" in this study).
Once this unit has been identified, some of its characteristics may be
obtained. This sequence is necessary because it is impossible, for
example, to acertain number of employees or production value before
identifying the firm.
Since regions may not be dependent upon new industry for their development
but can have an indigenous industry capable of expansion, the effect of the
policy on expansion of an existing establishment will not be detected by
measuring the number of firms. A better indicator under these circumstances
will be employment figures.
4.'2 Data issues
Today, the collection, processing and publishing of information regarding
the manufacturing industry in Venezuela is mainly in the hands of the
Central Statistical Office (Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informatica).
In 1971, the systematic collection of data on the manufacturing industry
was initiated, taking into account the spatial dimension. Since then, a
yearly survey of industries has been conducted. The results, in aggregate
form, are available for the years 1971 , and 1974 to 1978. Results for other
years are not available.
Published data are presented by administrative regions. Since representative
sampling of the region is conducted, any attempt to infer behavior of the
industry in smaller area subdivisions may lead to misleading results.
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4.3 Aggregate results for Venezuela
Using available aggregate data, the distributional pattern of
establishments over time can be seen. Table 4.1 shows the number of
establishments in each region, as a share of the national total, for the
years 1971, 1974, 1976 and 1978.
Changes can be observed in the Capital Region, where from 1974 to 1976,
the region's share of the national total grew from 50% to 55%. The Central
Region seems to have steadily been reducing its share, from 17% in 1974 to
15% in 1978. The Andean and Nor-oriental Regions on the other hand, grew
1% between 1976 and 1978 (from 7% to 8% and from 5% to 6%, respectively).
From the results shown in Table 4.1, we can hardly conclude that the
spatial pattern of industry by administrative regions have change
substantially. At most we may say that between the years 1974 and 1976, the
manufacturing industry as a whole, increased its concentration in the
Capital Region by five percentage points, at the expenses of the other
regions. (Variations of one percent are meaningless, because of rounding
errors, when percentages are estimated).
We may argue, in addition, that results for the Venezuelan manufacturing
industry when presented as a whole may fail to illuminate the fact that
each industrial subgroup may behave differently by reacting in a different
way to a particular stimuli.
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TABLE 4.1
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION'S SHARE OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE NATIONAL TOTAL,
FOR ALL THE VENEZUELAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Region 1971 1974 1976 1978
Capital 51 50 55 54
Central 16 17 16 15
Centro-Occidental 8 7 7 7
Zuliana 8 9 7 7
Andes 7 8 7 8
Sur 1 0 0 0
Nor-Oriental 7 6 5 6
Guayana 2 3 3 3
Total 100 100 100 100
Number of establishments 6,401 7,554 9,538 10,478
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas:
Cordiplan 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas: Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
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An exhaustive analysis of all the manufacturing sectors of the Venezuelan
economy is beyond the scope of this research. There is a need however, to
select some manufacturing sectors to highlight the methodology developed
here and to give additional insight into the locational dynamics of
Venezuelan industrial firms.
4.4 Selection of the manufacturing sectors
There are over 27 3-digit ISIC (International Standard Industrial
Classification) manufacturing codes. A decision had to be made as to which
ones to study. In choosing these industries, the following criteria were
used:
a) Sectors falling within the middle range of firm numbers --those
having between 140-300 establishments-- were chosen. Fig. 4.1 shows
the frequency of establishments by 3-digit ISIC code, Hence, 11 sectors
were chosen initially. The reasoning behind this is as follows: On
the one hand, industrial sectors with a large number of establishments,
for example bakeries, serve a very local market and the regional
policy will have a neglible effect on them. On the other hand, there
are sectors that have very few plants probably serving national or
international markets --such as oil refineries. Because there are so
few of them, studying them will give very limited insight into the
locational behavior.
b) During the time periods studied industries chosen had to experience
a great deal of new activity i.e., a high rate of growth.
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c) The industries chosen had to have strong linkages with other
manufacturing industries, and with localized inputs and markets,
as indicated by the input-output table of the Venezuelan economy.
(Conavial, 1). This criterion was introduced so as to include the
possible effect of government spatial policies on the location of
transport-oriented industries.
d) Diversity in the level of effective protection --Since government
economic policies to protect or spur manufacturing may have
inadvertent effects on the locational decision of firms, the
selection of the manufacturing groups should take this factor into
account. Fig. 4.2 shows the level of effective protection by 3-digit
2
ISIC industry group (World Bank,2
e) Diversity in the industries' capital/labor intensity --For this
purpose, the mean electricity consumption value in KWH per thousand
hours worked was used as a proxy, acknowledging its limitations.
Fig. 4.3 presents the range available. This criterion was
incorporated to reflect the possible tendency of labor intensive
industries to deconcentrate.
As a result of the above considerations, the following 3-digit ISIC, code
were chosen for further study:
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ISIC code
321
323
356
382
383
384
A detail description of th
4.12 at the end of this ch
Textiles
Leather and leather products
Plastics products
Machinery and equipment, except electrical
Electric machinery and equipment
Transportation equipment
ese industrial subgroups is presented in table
apter.
4.5 Aggregate results by sectors
Since results for the Venezuelan manufacturing industry as a whole may fail
to indicate the fact that each industrial subgroup may behave differently,
results for each of the six manufacturing groups selected will be presented
for analysis. The time series of a region's share of establishments from
the national total of manufacturing subgroups selected, are presented in
tables 4.2 to 4.7.
Textiles (ISIC 321)
In table 4.2 we can see that the Capital Region had a steady increase from
1971 to 1978 at the expense of the Central Region, while the other regions
remained almost unchanged. We may conclude that during the period 1971-1978,
the textile industry was steadily concentrating in the Capital Region.
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Leather and leather products (ISIC 323)
From observation of table 4,3, we can see that during the period
1974-1976, the Capital Region had an increase at the expense of all the
other regions except the Nor-oriental --which only had a slight increase.
In other words, the leather industry concentrated even more in the Capital
Region from 1974 to 1976. From 1976 up to 1978, it remained unchanged.
Plastic industry (ISIC 356)
Table 4.4 shows that although some deconcentration took place in the Capital
Region between the years 1971 and 1974, after this period no significant
changes occurred in any of the administrative regions.
Machinery and equipment, except electrical (ISIC 382)
Table 4.5 indicates that during the period 1974-1976, the relative share
of the Capital Region increased sharply -- from 49 to 59 percent-- at the
expenses of the Central and Zulia Region, and then remained almost
unchanged.
Electric machinery and equipment (ISIC 383)
From table 4.6 we can see that the Capital Region's share declined from
1971 to 1978. The Central Region's share has been increasing since 1971
but in 1976 started to decline. This decline was compensated by an
increase in the Zulia Region and the Nor-oriental Region. It seems there
was a spillover effect from the Capital Region to the Central Region.
67
Transportation equipment (ISIC 384)
We can see in table 4.7 that the Capital Region's share increased from
1971 to 1978, although in the period 1976-1978 the increase is negligible.
Furthermore, we can see that the Andean and Nor-oriental Regions
increased their shares slightly during the same period at the expense of
the Central and Centro-occidental Regions.
4.5.a Preliminary conclusions
As pointed out earlier, Venezuelan manufacturing activity is concentrated
in an industrial axis extending over part of the Capital Region as well as
over part of the Central Region. One way to ascertain whether or not
deconcentration of manufacturing activity has taken place, is to combine
the shares of the Capital and Central Regions. This is presented in
table 4.8.
From this table it can be seen that, with the exception of the plastic
industry and the non-electrical machinery industry, which show a relative
higher share for 1971 and 1976 respectively, as compared to the other
years,- no major.changes took place during the period of the study, i.e.,
no significant evidence of concentration or deconcentration trends can be
found.
4.5.b Limitations of the preliminary conclusions
Two major observations can be made about the preliminary conclusions
presented above. One is that the results are not given by the officially
defined areas of industrial deconcentration. Hence, a proper evaluation of
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Region
Capital
Central
Centro-
TABLE 4.2
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION'S SHARE OF THE NATION'S TEXTILE PLANTS
1971 1974 1976
60 67 70
24 21 18
Occidental 5 4 4
Zuliana
Andes
Sur
Nor-Oriental
Guayana
Total
Number of establishments
2
5
0
3
1
100
136
1
6
0
1
0
100
192
1
6
0
1
0
100
247
1978
71
17
4
1
6
0
1
0
100
264
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas, 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas: Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
TABLE 4.3
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION' S SHARE OF THE NATION'S LEATHER INDUSTRIAL PLANTS
gion 1971 1974 1976 1978
pital 62 56 66 65
ntral 14 15 11 10
ntro-Occidental 3 6 3 3
liana 3 5 2 2
des 13 13 11 14
r 0 0 0 0
r-Oriental 4 4 6 5
ayana 1 1 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100
imber of establishments 77 93 126 142
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas, 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas: Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
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TABLE 4.4
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION'S SHARE OF THE NATION'S PLASTIC INDUSTRIES
Region
Capital
Central
Centro-Occidental
Zuliana
Andes
Sur
Nor-Oriental
Guayana
Total
Number of establishments
1971
81
16
1
1
1
0
0
0
100
129
1974
72
18
2
5
2
0
1
0
100
216
1976
73
17
3
4
2
0
1
0
100
291
1978
73
16
4
4
2
0
1
0
100
316
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas, 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas: Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
TABLE 4.5
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION'S SHARE OF THE NATION'S MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
(EXCEPT ELECTRICAL) INDUSTRIES
Region
Capital
Central
Centro-Occidental
Zuliana
Andes
Sur
Nor-Oriental
Guayana
Total
Number of establishments
1971
52
17
10
12
3
0
3
3
100
112
1974
49
22
7
12
4
0
4
2
100
166
1976
59
18
7
7
4
0
3
2
100
229
1978
57
18
7
7
4
0
4
3
100
251
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas, 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas: Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
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TABLE 4.6
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION'S SHARE OF THE NATION'S ELECTRIC MACHINERY
AND EQUIPMENT INDUSTRIES
Region 1971 1974 1976 1978
Capital 73 64 63 62
Central 18 24 27 25
Centro-Occidental 2 4 3 3
Zuliana 5 7 4 6
Andes 0 0 0 0
Sur 0 0 0 0
Nor-Oriental 1 0 1 3
Guayana 1 1 2 1
Total 100 100 100 100
Number of establishments 128 162 202 205
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas, 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas: Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
TABLE 4.7
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION'S SHARE OF THE NATION'S TRANSPORTATION
EQUIPMENT INDUSTRIES
Region 1971 1974 1976 1978
Capital 29 34 41 42
Central 24 38 34 30
Centro-Occidental 10 8 10 9
Zuliana 9 5 3 3
Andes 2 5 4 6
Sur 0 0 0 0
Nor-Oriental 6 5 3 5
Guayana 2 5 5 5
Total 100 100 100 100
Number of establishments 149 157 205 233
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas, 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas; Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
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TABLE 4.8
COMBINED SHARES OF THE NATION'S ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE
CAPITAL AND CENTRAL REGIONS
Industry 1971 1974 1976 1978
Textile 84 88 88 88
Leather 76 71 77 75
Plastic 97 90 90 89
Non-electrical machinery 69 71 77 75
Electrical-machinery 91 88 90 87
Transportation equipment 71 72 75 72
SOURCES: - Cordiplan, Encuesta Industrial 1971, (Caracas:
Cordiplan 1973).
- OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, (Caracas: Oficina Central
de Estadistica e Informatica, 1974 and 1976).
- OCEI, Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
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the effects of the policy instruments is difficult. Secondly, aggregate
figures, like the ones used so far in this research, do not allow us to
properly assess the spatial tendency of the manufacturing industry, i.e.,
to have an "early understanding" of what may be happening. Since the data
are given in terms of the net number of establishments that existed in a
particular year, nothing is known about the actual number of new firms
established in an area, or about firms that went out of business, or of
plants that changed locations. Data of these kind may give us valuable
information for our evaluation. Therefore, attempts will be made to find
the necessary data that will allow us to overcome the above mentioned
limitations.
4.6 Alternative sources of data
Published survey data from the industry sample (Encuestas Industriales)
are presented by administrative regions. In this study this source of data
will be called survey results (SR). A survey is made every year of a
representative sample of the region. Results are stored in computer tapes
which will be called survey tapes (ST).
The sample's values stored in the survey tapes are statistically expanded
to give results to represent all the Venezuelan manufacturing activity.
However, the survey data cannot be used to analyze changes by areas of
industrial deconcentration for two major reasons: first, the
administrative region subdivisions are different from the subdivisions that
follow from the policy of industrial deconcentration and second, as
suggested earlier, any attempt to use the sample to infer behavior of the
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industry at any smaller area subdivision is not representative and may
lead to misleading results.
A better source of sample-error-free information will thus be Venezuela's
annual official directory of manufacturing industries. The directory
contains the listing of all industries in a particular year. Each firm is
registered by name, five-digit industrial code, location and number of
employees. It is -from this list of industries that the Central Statistical
Office sample is selected. The directory is updated every year: new firms
are added and establishments that went out of business are removed.
Therefore, the directory is the ideal basic source of information or
changes in industrial location. The only drawback is that the updating is
done on the original computer tape of the directory. Thus, the record of
the previous year's directory is erased by the changes, i.e., there is
only one copy of the directory and this reflects only the conditions of
the latest surveyed year. Fortunately, along with the 1978 directory (the
latest one) it was possible to obtain a printout of the 1975 directory,
which inexplicably had been saved. Since there was no other source of
information, it was decided the best approach would be to recreate the
previous directories, employing the two available directories (for 1975
and 1978) and the yearly surveys as well as some other partial lists.
Once the decision to recreate the directories was made, the next task was
to decide which years to restore. Consequently, it was necessary to
identify the periods to be analyzed.
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This research centers on two important events:
(1) Changes in the economy owing to the additional revenues from
oil, and
(2) Implementation of the Industrial Deconcentration Policy.
Changes in the economy began to accelerate in 1974 due to additional
revenues from oil. The national budget increased threefold during this
year as can be seen in table 4.9. Only a fraction of this increase could
be explained by inflation.
TABLE 4.9
VENEZUELAN NATIONAL BUDGET
Year Million bolivares, current prices
1971 12,768.0
1972 13,478.4
1973 14,872.0
1974 42,518.5
1975 39,878.0
1976 44,571.0
1977 50,693.5
1978 51,212.7
SOURCE: Venezuela, Mensaje Presidencial, 1980
Although the first presidential decree setting up the framework of the
industrial deconcentration policy was issued in June 1974, the complete
legal instrumentation was only established in March, 1976 when the areas
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of deconcentration were defined. Consequently, any possible effects of
the negatives incentives, i.e., control over location, as well as, changes
in the economy, may be reflected from 1975 on. Similarly, effects of other
government instruments, such as financial and fiscal incentives, will be
observed only after 1976, The above discussion, coupled with data limitations
--no survey tapes are available prior to 1974-- suggest two major periods:
Period I: 1975-1976,
Period II: 1977-1978.
To detect changes in the periods chosen, directories for the year 1974,
1976 and 1978 were needed. Since the 1978 directory was available,
directories for 1974 and 1976 had to be recreated.
4.7 Recreation of the directories
The basic sources
The basic sources of information used to recreate the 1974 and 1976
directories were:
a) Directories: Available for 1975 and 1978. They list all the
establishments (about 7,386 in 1975 and 10,478 in 1978) that existed in
each particular year. They list the name, 5-digit industrial code,
I.D. number, location, and number of employees for each firm.
b) Survey tapes: Available for years 1974 to 1977. Contain the information
on each of the surveyed establishments that was selected from the
corresponding directory.
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c) Survey results: Available for 1971, 1974 and 1976. Contain the
aggregate results of the survey. These are obtained by expanding the
sample so as to reflect the total population of firms.
d) Combined list: A working OCEI list, grouping together all the
establishments that existed in 1975, 1976 and 1977. The list also
indicated I.D. numbers that were re-assigned to new firms once the
original firm disappeared from the region. This reallocation of I.D.
started to take place in 1976.
This scattered information obtained from the above sources was further
complicated by problems such as the following:
a) Each establishment has an I.D. number that is unique only within a
particular four-digit code and region. This implies that there is
really no unique number since a firm's region and four-digit code must
also be specified. As a consequence, when an establishment transfers to
another region it is difficult to follow because once in a new location,
the firm receives a new I.D. number.
b) From 1976 on, the I.D. number of an establishment that went out of
business was assigned to a new firm.
c) Sometimes, an establishment was inadvertedly registered twice, i.e.,
it has two I.D. numbers.
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d) In 1975, the 8 administrative regions that were used as the basis for
the I.D. numbers were reorganized into 9. This change implies that the
I.D.'s of many establishments were changed to reflect the new region to
which they belonged.
4.7.a The process
For the recreation of the directories, we used different building blocks
of information depending on whether we were dealing with the periphery or
with the core regions (Central and Capital regions in 1974 and Centro
Norte Costera in 1976).
Periphery
For regions in the periphery, the source of information was the survey tape
from the corresponding year. The reason for choosing the survey tape is
that in these regions, the survey is not a sample, but a census, i.e., all
the firms are interviewed. Hence, the directories for the peripheral
regions were obtained by listing all the firms that were counted. Because
the survey tape does not register the name of the establishment, this was
obtained from the 1975 and 1978 directories.
Core regions
Core regions required a different treatment, since only establishments
employing over 50 people are fully represented in the encuesta. For others,
the survey tape only had a sample. Hence the problem was to find out which
other establishments existed in a particular year. The year each firm was
established, at first thought to be a very interesting piece of information,
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was found to be unreliable as major evidence. There were instances when,
for the same establishment, different beginning years were found in
consecutive survey tapes. After several schemes, the approach used was to
add firms (following a numeric procedure) to those already identified in
the survey tape, up to the number of establishments that the survey results
listed that year. The basis for this aggregation procedure is the fact
that the Central Statistical Office (Oficina Central de Estadistica e
Informatica) assigns consecutive I.D. numbers to establishments. The main
assumption that the Central Statistical Office makes is that each
consecutive number is assigned to a newer firm in the region, i.e., the
newer the firm, the higher its I.D. number.
The procedure used can be explained better with an example. Let us suppose
that for a particular four-digit industrial category in a specific region,
the 1975 directory (D75) specifies the existence of 7 establishments. The
survey results (SR) indicate that in 1974 there were only 5 establishments,
(f=5). Furthermore, the 1974 survey tape (ST74) has information about two
firms with, say, I.D. numbers 12 and 14.
I.D. number
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
D75 X X X X X X X
ST74 I X X I
Added from D75 X X X
SR74: f=5 1 2 3 4 5
79
Hence, establishments 11, 13 and 15 were added to the two establishments
appearing in the 1974 survey tape so as to reach the specified total of 5.
This example presents the basic principle of the methodology. During the
process itself, many different conditions had to be faced. Some of these
cases will be briefly presented in order to give a better idea of the
case-by-case approach that had to be used. For example, in some instances,
it was found that in the D75, an I.D. number was missing, implying that
the corresponding firm was not in the region by 1975. To find out whether
the firm corresponding to the missing IoD0 number existed in the region in
1974, we first looked into the ST74 for this establishment. If it was found,
then the procedure followed the general scheme:
I.D. number
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
D75 X X X - X X X
ST74 X I X I
Added from D75 X X X
SR74: f=5 1 2 3 4 5
If the missing I.D. number was not found in the ST74, a null hypothesis
was tested, indicating that the establishment dissappeared from the region
prior to 1974. Then, the general procedure was again followed:
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I.D. number
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
D75 X X X - X X X
ST74 X X
Added from D75 X X X
SR74: f=5 1 2 3 4 5
The next task was to find out whether the last establishment added --I.D.
number 16-- had a foundation year of 1974 or earlier. If affirmative, then
establishment 14 dissapeared prior to 1974 --otherwise f would be 6 instead
of the specified 5--. If establishment 16 was found to have its year of
foundation more recently than 1974, --implying that it could not belong to
the set of 1974 firms--, then establishment 14 was considered to have
existed in 1974 and the null hypothesis was rejected. Care was taken to
find appropriate evidence with regard to the year of an establishment's
foundation, for example, by checking that in two survey tapes, the year
declared was the same.
The aggregation procedure for recreating the 1974 directory had to be
different from that of the 1976 directory, since the sources of information
were different. For the recreation of the 1974 directory, the 1974 survey
tape was used as the core and the 1975 directory was used to supply the
additional establishments (see above example). For the recreation of the
1976 directory, the 1976 survey tape was used as the core, and to supply
the additional establishments needed, the OCEI working list was used. This
working list, prepared initially by the Central Statistical Office,
81
contained all the establishments that existed in 1975, 1976 and 1977, not
classified by year but indicating those ID. numbers that were re-assigned
to new firms once the original firm left the region. The procedure used to
aggregate establishments for D76 was similar to the one employed for D74,
but it was complicated by the fact that from 1976 on, old I.D. numbers were
re-assigned to new establishments. Hence, care was taken to consider the
effect of this problem when recreating the 1976 directory.
4.8 Comparison of directories
Once the directories were recreated, various factors could be examined for
each of the periods under consideration. For example, which firms were
new, i.e., founded during the period; closed down, i.e., went out of
business; were stationary, i.e., remained in the same location; and which
ones moved to another location or arrived from another region. For this
purpose, a classification methodology was developed. The methodology
developed is based on a comparison of directories and has the following
two steps:
1.- Matching of directories
2.- Fine tuning
Step one: Matching of directories
By comparing D74 with D76 it was possible to identify changes that occurred
in the years 1975 and 1976. Furthermore, by comparing D76 with D78, changes
during the years 1977 and 1978 were identified. This matching was done
using the I.D. number, the 5-digit industrial code and the administrative
region. This step can be better explained by Fig. 4.4, which makes reference
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to changes between 1974 and 1976. A similar diagram would apply to
1976-1978.
The matching process resulted in the following:
Group 1 This list of establishments comprises those firms whose location
in 1976 was the same as in 1974. Therefore they were stationary
during the period under study.
Group 2 Firms on this list are those whose location in 1976 was different
from 1974, but they remained in the same administrative region,
i.e., they moved within the region (inter-regional movers).
Group 3 Establishments on this list are those who appear in D76 but do
not appear in D74, i.e., they are newcomers to the region.During
the period 1975-1976 they may:
a) have left another region to come to the region under
consideration, i.e., immigrant firms;
b) be newly created firms.
Group 4 This list contains those establishments that appeared in D74
but did not appear in D76. During the intervening period they
may:
a) have left the region and moved into another region, i.e.,
outmigrant firms;
b) have gone out of business, i.e., closedowns.
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The following case exemplifies how some of the complications were handled
during the matching of the directories. Suppose that during 1975-1976,
establishment C identified with the I.D. number 3 disappeared from the
region. Furthermore, in 1976 establishment F appeared and was assigned the
I.D. number 3 because that number was vacant.
D74 D76
I.D. No. I.D. No.
1 A A 1 A
2 B B 2 B
3 C - 3 F
4 D D 4 D
We can see that when comparing D74 with the left hand of D76, establishment
C will be shown on list 4. Furthermore, when comparing D74 with the right
hand of D76, establishment F will appear on list 3.
Step two: Fine tuning
This step differentiates between 3a (immigrants) and 3b (new plants), as
well ad 4a (outmigrants) and 4b (closedowns). Each establishment on list 3
--newcomers to the region by 1976-- was looked up by its name in an
alphabetical listing of all Venezuelan establishments that existed in 1974.
Whenever possible, the establishment's previous location in another region
was also obtained. In this manner list 3a was created. In a similar way,
each establishment in list 4 --those who disappeared from the regional
directory in 1974-- was looked up in the 1976 national listing, and if
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possible its new location was obtained. Hence list 4a was created. List 3b
(new firms) was obtained as a residual. In a similar way, industries on list
4b (closedowns) were obtained from the difference between lists 4 and 4a.
4.9 Disaggregate results
The recreation and comparison of directories gave us disaggregate data. This
type of data allowed us to determine the location of new manufacturing firms
for each of the periods analized. This is shown in table 4.10. Because
deconcentration area D had a negligible level (less than 0.25%) of total
manufacturing establishments, it was removed from the analysis. Table 4.10
shows the deconcentration areas' share of the national total of new
establishments, (new plants) and for the six selected industrial subgroups.
We can observe in table 4.10 that during the first period, i.e., years
1974-1976, the number of new establishments was almost three times the
number in the second period. This could be explained by the fact that
during the first period, the sudden change in the national economy due to
the additional revenues from oil created a larger demand than before. To
supply this demand increase, new manufacturing firms sprung up. By 1977,
the economy had leveled off at its new value and the new plants dealt
mainly with the normal economic growth.
In table 4.10 we can also see that in the case of leather, non-electric
machinery as well as for electric machinery and equipment, area A's share
of new establishments dropped more than 33 percentage points, while area
C's share increased by at least the same percentage. In general, area B
seems to reflect the same trends as area A.
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TABLE 4.10
DECONCENTRATION AREA'S SHARE OF THE NATIONAL TOTAL OF NEW ESTABLISHMENTS
TEXTILES LEATHER PLASTICS
1974-76 1976-78
76
6
7
11
100
69
8
4
19
100
1974-76 1976-78
79
0
2
19
100
41
0
6
53
100
1974-76 1976-78
71
13
8
8
52
7
15
26
100100
Number of
new firms
NON-ELECTRICAL
MACHINERY
1974-76 1976-78
66
11
10
13
100
30
6
15
49
100
ELECTRIC
MACHINERY
1974-76 1976-78
51
26
11
12
100
17
8
8
67
100
TRANSPORTATION
EQUIPMENT
1974-76 1976-78
41
20
15
24
38
12
9
41
100 100
Number of
new firms 87 33 61 12 74 34
SOURCES: Own estimations based on recreated directories and OCEI,
Directorio Industrial, (Caracas, 1978).
NOTE: See chapter 3 for definition of the areas of
deconcentration.
Area
A
B
BM
C
Total
82 26 52 17 98
Area
27
A
B
BM
C
Total
87
An important aspect to note is that for the six industrial subgroups
analized, all new manufacturing activity in area BM took place in the
Capital Region. This give us some indication of the possible spillover
effect, i.e., industries finding difficulties locating in area A because
of say, congestion, high land cost, or prohibition to locate, went to
Caracas' nearest desirable area.
As indicated earlier, the Venezuelan manufacturing activity is concentrated
in an industrial axis that extends itself over areas A, B and that part of
area BM belonging to the Capital Region. Since all the new manufacturing
in area BM falls in the Capital Region --for the industrial subgroups
analized-- we may combine the shares obtained from areas A, B and BM, to
see whether deconcentration of manufacturing activity took place. These
results are presented in table 4.11 which shows the Venezuelan industrial
axis' share of the nation's total of new establishments.
4.9.a Tentative conclusions
We see from table 4.11 that each of the six industries shows a similar
trend to deconcentrate. Some of this deconcentration may be explained by
the big increase in income and demand during 1974-76 which took place
more near Caracas and led to an unusually high concentration of new firms
during this period. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, for leather,
non-electric equipment and for electric machinery, the industrial axis has
reduced by more than 33 percentage points its share of the national total
in the second period. Hence, it may be argued- that these three industrial
subgroups experienced deconcentration during the second period.
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TABLE 4.11
VENEZUELAN INDUSTRIAL AXIS' SHARE OF THE
OF NEW ESTABLISHMENTS
Industry
Textiles
Plastics
Transportation e
Leather
Non-electric mac
Electric machine
SOURCE:
NATIONAL TOTAL
Change in share,
1974-76 1976-78 percentage points
89% 81% -8
92 74 -18
quipment 76 59 -17
81 47 -34
hinery 87 51 -36
ry 88 33 -55
Own estimations based on the recreated directories
and OCEI, Directorio Industrial (Caracas, 1978).
For the other manufacturing groups analyzed --textiles, plastics and
transportation equipment-- we may conclude that the changes in their shares
are mainly due to the distortions created by the big increase in demand
and therefore, are not significant enough to suggest that changes have
occurred in their spatial distribution.
4.9.b Limitations of the tentative conclusions
One of the major limitations of the conclusions indicated above is the
absence of disaggregate data prior to 1974. When an industrial subsector
shows a tendency to deconcentrate in the second period, we do not know
whether this tendency started that period or was a phenomena that had its
origins in a previous period. This limitation will make it more difficult
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to relate the pattern of industrial deconcentration to possible effects
of government policies. Nevertheless, what is important at this moment is
to see whether deconcentration of manufacturing activity took place during
the period analized. The next chapters will attempt to deal with
causality issues.
Another limitation of these results derives from the way in which the
disaggregate date were obtained, i.e., to the possible margins of errors
when recreating the directories. There is no doubt that the process of
recreating the directories may have added some possible sources of errors.
These will be discussed in the light of the tentative conclusions reached.
The disaggregate data in table 4.11 shows for all the industrial subgroups
studied, a tendency --sometimes very slight-- to deconcentrate. We may ask
ourselves whether there is a built in bias in the methodology used to
recreate the directories, that gives us these sort of results. For
dispersion to be seen, we have to have a greater number of new establishments
in area C when compared to areas A, B and BM combined (see table 4.11). We
should remember that the new establishments were obtained from the survey
tapes. Furthermore, in area C, the survey tapes are not a sample but a
census and only those firms registered in the survey tape were considered
and some identified as new firms. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
methodology registered more establishments than those that were in the
survey tapes. For the other deconcentration areas --A, B and BM-- the
survey tapes contain a sample. There is a chance that when adding the
establishments needed to complete the directory, some errors were made.
These errors could lead to the identification of an existing establishment,
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first as going out of business and then, becoming a new firm. If this
happened for some firms, we may expect to find more new establishments
in areas A, B and BM than existed in reality. This would give a higher
weight to the industrial axis which will then indicate a tendency to
concentrate. Therefore, if errors were made, they would have tended to
show an opposite effect to the deconcentration effect found. We may conclude
that the deconcentration effect that can be seen in table 4.11 is a
conservative one. Furthermore, we may expect in some cases, to find the
disaggregate more accurate than the aggregate data.
4.10 Summary of chapter 4
The purpose of this chapter was to find out whether dispersion of the
Venezuelan manufacturing industry has taken place. Under the hypothesis
that aggregate data may hide spatial tendencies, a major effort was
undertaken to recreate the manufacturing directories so as to obtain
disaggregate data. Results using disaggregate data give some evidence that
the leather, non-electric machinery as well as electric machinery
manufacturing groups have deconcentrated their locations during the period
1976-1978. For the others industrial subgroups studied, textiles, plastics
and transportation equipment the evidence is less unequivocable. These
results suggest the following questions: Why do some industrial subgroups
show a tendency to deconcentrate while others do not? Furthermore, we may
ask: Is deconcentration a result of the policy instruments? The next
chapters will attempt to address these questions.
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TABLE 4.12
DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUFACTURING GROUPS SELECTED FOR STUDY
Major Group
group
321 Manufacture of textiles
3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
Preparing fibres for spinning, such as ginning, retting,
scutching, scouring, carding, combing, carbonizing and
throwing; spinning; weaving; bleaching and dyeing;
printing and finishing of yarns and fabrics. Manufacture
of narrow fabrics and other small wares; braids and other
primary textiles. Yarn, fabric and jute mills.
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods except wearing
apparel
Establishments not engaged in weaving which are primarily
engaged in making up from purchased materials, house
furnishings such as curtains, draperies, sheets, pillow
cases, napkins, table cloths, blankets, bedspreads,
pillows, laundry bags and slip covers; textile bags;
canvas products; trimmings of fabrics; embroideries;
banners, flags and penants. Also included are stitching,
pleating and tucking for the trade.
3213 Knitting mills
Establishments, such as hosiery and knitting-mills,
primarily engaged in producing hosiery.
Outwear, underwear, nightwear, other knitted apparel;
and knitted fabrics and laces from natural and synthetic
fibres. Included are the bleaching, dyeing and finishing
of knitted products.
3214 Manufacture of carpets and rugs
The manufacture of woven, tufted or braided carpets and
rugs of any textile fibre or yarn and mats or mattings
of twisted paper, grass, coir, sisal, jute or rags.
3215 Cordage, rope and twine industries
The manufacture of rope, cable, cordage, twine, net and
related products from abaca (Manila), sisal, henequen,
hemp, cotton, paper, jute, flax, man-made fibres,
including glass, and other fibres. The twisting of these
fibres is also included.
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TABLE 4. 12-Continued
Major Group
group
3219 Manufacture of textiles not elsewhere classified
The manufacture of linoleum and other hard-surfaced floor
coverings other than of cork, rubber, plastic,
irrespective of type of backing; oil-cloth, artificial
leather which is not wholly of plastic, and other
impregnated and coated fabrics except rubberized; felt
by processes other than weaving; laces except knitted;
batting; padding, wadding, and upholstery filling from
all fibres; processed wast and recovered fibres and
flock; tire cord and fabric.
323 Manufacture of leather and products of leather, leather
substitutes and fur, except footwear and wearing apparel
3231 Tanneries and leather finishing
The tanning, currying, finishing, embossing and
japanning of leather.
3232 Fur dressing and dyeing industries
The scraping, currying, tanning, bleaching and dyeing of
fur and other pelts for the trade and the manufacture of
fur and skin rugs and mats and other fur and skin articles
not elsewhere classified.
3233 Manufacture of products of leather and leather substitutes,
except footwear and wearing apparel.
The manufacture of products of leather and leather
substitutes, except footwear and other wearing apparel,
such as luggage, handbags, pocketbooks, cigarette and
key cases and coin purses; saddlery and harness whips;
and similar articles made of leather, plastics,
fibreglass and other leather substitutes.
356 3560 Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere classified
The moulding, extruding and fabricating of plastic
articles not elsewhere classified, such as plastic
dinnerware, tableware, and kitchenware; plastic mats;
synthetic sausage casings; plastic containers and cups;
laminated sheets, rods and tubes from purchased plastic
raw materials; plastic components for insulation; plastic
footwear; plastic furniture; and plastic industrial
supplies, e.g., machinery parts, bottles, tubes and
cabinets.
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TABLE 4.12-Continued
Major Group
group
382 Manufacture of machinery except electrical
3822 Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment
The manufacture and repair of agricultural machinery and
equipment for use in the preparation and maintenance of
the soil, in planting and harvesting of the crop, in
preparing crops for market on the farm, or in dairy
farming and live-stock raising; for use in performing
other farm operations and processes, such as planting,
seeding, fertilizing, cultivating, harvesting; ploughs,
harrows, stalk cutters, milking machines, farm tractors,
etc.
3823 Manufacture of metal and wood working machinery
The manufacture, alteration and repair of wood-working
and metal-working machinery, such as machinery for
sawmills, planing mills, furniture makers and veneer
workers; lathes, boring, drilling, milling, grinding,
shearing and shaping machines; power saws and sanders;
drop forges and other forging machines; rolling mills,
presses and drawing machines; extruding, melting and
non-electrical welding machines; and machine tool
cutters, dies and jigs. The manufacture of attachments
and accessories for wood-working and metal-working
machines is included.
3824 Manufacture of special industrial machinery and equipment
except metal and wood working machinery
The manufacture, alteration and repair of special
industrial machinery and equipment except metal-working
and wood-working machinery, such as food machinery,
textile machinery, paper industry machinery, printing-
trade machinery and equipment, chemical industry machinery
and equipment, oil refining machinery and equipment,
cement-making and clay-working machinery, heavy machinery
and equipment used by construction and mining industries.
3825 Manufacture of office, computing and accounting machinery
The manufacture, renovation and repair of office machines
and equipment, such as calculating machines, adding
machines, accounting machines; punched-card system
machines and equipment; digital and analog computers and
associated electronic data processing equipment and
accessories; cash registers; typewriters; weighting
machines except when scientific apparatus for
laboratories; duplicating machines except photo-copying
machines; and other office machines.
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TABLE 4.12-Continued
Major Group
group
3829 Machinery and equipment except electrical not elsewhere
classified
The manufacture, renovation and repair of machinery and
equipment, except electrical machinery, not elsewhere
classified, such as pumps, air and gas compressors;
blowers, air conditioning and ventilating machinery; fire
sprinklers; refrigerators and equipment; mechanical power
transmission equipment; lifting and hoisting machinery,
cranes, elevators, moving stairways, industrial trucks,
tractors, trailors, and stackers; sewing machines; small
arms and accessories, heavy ordinance and artillery;
industrial process furnaces and ovens; automatic
merchandising machines; washing, laundry, dry-cleaning
and pressing machines; cooking ranges and ovens; and other
service industry machines. Included are manufacture of
general purpose parts of machinery, such as ball and
roller bearings, piston rings, valves; and shops engaged
in manufacturing, rebuilding or repairing various kinds
of machinery and equipment and associated parts and
accesories on a job or order basis for others.
383 Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus,
Appliances and supplies
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and
apparatus
The manufacture, renovation and repair of electric
motors; generators and complete turbine-generator and
engine-generator sets; transformers; switch gear and
and switchboard apparatus; rectifiers; other electrical
transmission and distribution equipment; electrical
industrial control devices such as motor starters and
controllers, electronic timing and positioning devices,
electromagnetic clutches and brakes; electrical welding
apparatus; and other electrical industrial apparatus.
3832 Manufacture of radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus
The manufacture of radio and television receiving sets,
sound reproducing and recording equipment, including
public address systems, gramophones, dictating machines
and tape recorders; gramophone recorders and pre-recorded
magnetic tapes; wire and wireless telephone and telegraph
equipment; radio and television transmitting, signalling,
and detection equipment and apparatus; radar equipment
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TABLE 4.12-Continued
Major Group
group
and installations; parts and supplies specially used for
electronic apparatus classified in this group; semi-
conductor and related sensitive semi-conductor devices;
fixed and variable electronic capacitors and condensors;
radiographic, fluoroscopic and other X-ray apparatus
and tubes.
3833 Manufacture of electrical appliances and housewares
The manufacture of electrical appliances and housewares,
such as electric space heaters; blankets; and heating
pads; hot plates, broilers, roasters, toasters and food
mixers; ironers and mangles; fans, vacuum cleaners and
floor waxes and polishers; hair driers, tootbrushes,
electric hair clippers, shavers and hot water heaters.
3839 Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies not
elsewhere classified
The manufacture of other electrical apparatus, accessories
and supplies not elsewhere classified, such as insulated
wires and cables; storage and primary batteries, wet and
dry; electric lamps and tubes; fixtures and lamp sockets
and receptacles; snap switches, conductor connectors,
and other current-carrying wiring devices; conduits and
fittings; electrical insulators and insulation materials
except porcelain and glass insulators.
384 Manufacture of transport equipment
3841 Ship building and repairing
Shipyards and boatyards engaged in building, repair and
specialized painting and calking of all type of ships,
barges, lighters, and boats, except rubber boats;
specialized marine engine and ship parts manufactures;
the conversion and alteration and breaking-up of ships.
3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles
The manufacture, assembly, re-building and major
alteration of complete motor vehicles such as passenger
autobobiles, commercial cars and buses, lorries and truck
trailers, universal carriers, special purpose motor
vehicles (ambulances, taxi-cabs, etc); trailer and
pickup coaches; vehicle-drawn canravans; motorized
sleighs; specialized manufacture of motor vehicle parts
and accessories such as engines, brakes, clutches, axles,
gears, transmissions, wheels and frames.
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Major Group
group
3844 Manufacture of motorcycle and bicycles
The manufacture, assembly, re-building and major
alternation of motorcycles, scooters, bicycles,
tricycles, pedicabs, and specialized parts such as
motors, saddles, seat posts, frames, gears and handle
bars.
3849 Manufacture of transport equipment not elsewhere
classified
The manufacture of transport equipment, not elsewhere
classified, such as animal-drawn wagons, carts and
sleighs; hand-drawn pushcarts, wheel-barrows and baby
carriages.
SOURCE: United Nations, Indexes to the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) of All Economic
Activities, Publication No. E.71.XVII.8, (New York:
United Nations, 1971).
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5 IS DECONCENTRATION A RESULT OF THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS APPLIED?
In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to determine the spatial
pattern of distribution of the Venezuelan manufacturing industry. This
chapter will attempt to find out whether government incentives have
affected the locational pattern of industry. An earlier chapter described
the difficulties in measuring the effects of regional policies. Due to
these difficulties, it will not be possible in this chapter to employ
conventional statistical methods for either rejecting or accepting
locational hypotheses. Instead, we will assess the reasonableness of
alternative hypotheses on the basis of the assembled indirect evidence. In
later chapters, an attempt to find additional evidence will be made by the
use of econometric models.
5.1 Description of the policy instruments
In Venezuela, there is an array of policy instruments for carrying out
industrial deconcentration. The instruments can be classified as:
1) Direct incentives, i.e., straightforward financial and
fiscal incentives;
2) Indirect forms of assistance, such as the provision of
industrial parks and improvement of transportation and
communications facilities;
3) Negative incentives, i.e., prohibition against certain
locations.
98
Each of these instruments will be described and analyzed in turn.
5.2 Financial incentives
As indicated in chapter 3, prior to the policy of industrial deconcentration
and following the government's interest in industrial development, a set of
policy tools for industrial promotion was operational. These tools were not
locationally oriented. Therefore, credit at low interest rates, for example,
was granted to firms independent of their location. In 1976, with the policy
of industrial deconcentration, government financial agencies were authorized
to give credit under more advantageous conditions than those prevailing in
the market (Decree 1477). The interest rate, loan period and grace period
varied with:
1) The use of the loan --for land and construction, machinery
and equipment or working capital;
2) The investment decision --new firms, expansion or relocation;
3) The size of the establishment --small, medium, medium-large
or large;
4) The area of deconcentration --A, B, BM,C or D.
5.2.a Financial institutions
In Venezuela, there are three major financial institutions dealing with
the manufacturing sector:
1) Corpoindustria or Corporation for the Development of small
and medium sized industries (Corporacion para el Desarrollo
de la Pequefia y Mediana Industria) handles credit
applications for up to 6 million bolivares. Hence, it deals
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mainly with small (5-20 employees) and medium-sized (21-50
employees) establishments.
2) Industrial Credit Fund (Fondo de Credito Industrial) handles
credit applications between 6 and 40 million bolivares.
Therefore, it deals mainly with medium-large (51-100
employees) and large (more than 100 employees) establishments.
3) Venezuelan Development Corporation (Corporaci6n Venezolana de
Fomento) is the major government source of long-term credit.
Since it handles a few very large enterprises, which are
mostly government-owned, the locational aspects of such
applications are dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
5.2.b Level of subsidy
According to the original policy document (Ministerio de Fomento, ), the
announced interest varied between 3% in area C to 9% in area B; the loan
period varied between 2 years for working capital and 20 years for land
and construction. Similarly, the grace period varied between 6 months for
working capital and 3 years for land and construction. These conditions can
be seen in tables 5.1 and 5.2.
In actual practice, it seems that the conditions given were different from
those indicated by the policy. For example, area BM was supposed to have
more favorable conditions than area B. But in reality both areas apparently
received the same benefits. This can be seen in Table 5.3, which shows the
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loan terms actually given by Corpoindustria. Unfortunately, it was not
possible to obtain the actual loan terms given in practice by the
Industrial Credit Fund.
In order to determine how much savings an entrepreneur could have made by
locating in the areas of deconcentration, a single indicator for the level
of subsidy in each area was needed. This indicator had to combine into one
measure subsidized interest rates, a market interest rate, loan period and
a grace period. Furthermore, these aspects varied with the use of the money:
whether for land and construction, machinery and equipment, or for working
capital. After studying several'approaches, one was chosen which was based
on the concept of net present value and reflected the percentage savings,
in present value terms, obtained by an entrepreneur locating in each of
the areas of deconcentration. For each of the components of the loan, e.g.,
machinery, working capital, etc., the present discount value of the series
of payments was calculated at the actual rate of interest. This measure
allowed us to combine both subsidized and market interest rates, as well as
grace and loan periods. The market rate of interest was 10% at that time.
It should be noted that when the subsidized and market rates were the same,
the percentage savings was zero.
From the information available, it was possible to determine what
proportion of a loan was for working capital, for machinery, etc. The
following are the percentages for the loans given by Corpoindustria:
101
TABLE 5.1
ANNOUNCED FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR NEW, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZE ESTABLISHMENTS
OFFERED BY CORPOINDUSTRIA
SMALL-SIZE
Land &
constructionArea
Machinery &
equipment
A No. years
Grace period, years
Interest rate
B No. years 10 8 2
Grace period, years 1 1 0.5
Interest rate 7 7 8
BM No. years 15 8 2
Grace period, years 1 1 0.5
Interest rate 5 5 6
C&D No. years 20 10 2
Grace period, years 2 1 0.5
Interest rate 3 3 4
MEDIUM-SIZE
Land & Machinery & Working
Area construction equipment capital
A No. years
Grace period, years
Interest rate-
B No. years 10 8 2
Grace period, years 1 1 0.5
Interest rate 8 8 9
BM No. years 15 8 2
Grace period, years 1 1 0.5
Interest rate 7 7 8
C&D No. years 20 10 2
Grace period, years 1 1 0.5
Interest rate 4.5 4.5 5
SOURCE: Ministerio de Fomento, Politica de Desconcentraci6n
Industrial, (Caracas, 1977) pp.82-83
NOTE: For.description of the areas of deconcentration see
chapter 3.
Working
capital
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TABLE 5.2
ANNOUNCED FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR NEW, MEDIUM AND MEDIUM-LARGE SIZED
ESTABLISHMENTS, OFFERED BY THE INDUSTRIAL CREDIT FUND
Area
A No. years
Grace period, years
Interest rate
Land &
construction
Machinery &
equipment
B No. years 10 10 5
Grace period, years 2 2 1
Interest rate 8.5 8.5 8.5
BM No. years 12 12 10
Grace period, years 3 3 2
Interest rate 7 7 7
C&D No. years 15 15 15
Grace period, years 3 3 3
Interest rate 7 7 7
SOURCE: Ministerio de Fomento, Politica de Desconcentraci6n
Industrial, (Caracas, 1977) pp. 82-83
NOTE: For description of the areas of deconcentration see
chapter 3.
Working
capital
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TABLE 5.3
ACTUAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR NEW, SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ESTABLISHMENTS,
GIVEN BY CORPOINDUSTRIA
Land &
construction
A No. years
Grace period, years
Interest rate
15
1
7
Machinery &
equipment
8
1
7
B No. years 15 10 2
Grace period, years 1 1 0.5
Interest rate 7 7 8
BM No. years 15 10 2
Grace period, years 1 1 0.5
Interest rate 7 7 8
C&D No. years 20 10 2
Grace period, years 2 1 0.5
Interest rate 3 3 4
SOURCE: Personal interviews with Corpoindustria's personnel.
NOTE: For description of the areas of deconcentration see
chapter 3.
Area Working
capital
2
0.5
8
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Land and construction 30%
Machinery and equipment 60%
Working capital 10%
By multiplying the percentage savings for each use by its corresponding
participation proportion, and summing the three uses, a single indicator
of the percentage savings in present value terms was obtained for each
deconcentration area. Results are presented in table 5.4 for Corpoindustria.
For an example and more details about the discounting procedure used, the
reader is referred to Appendix C.
TABLE 5.4
PERCENTAGE SAVINGS BY AREAS OF DECONCENTRATION ACTUALLY
OFFERED BY CORPOINDUSTRIA
Area of deconcentration Percentage savings
A 13.69
B 14.77
BM 14.77
C 35.08
D 35.08
SOURCE: Own estimations based on data supplied by
Corpoindustria personnel.
Looking at the savings that may be obtained in each of the areas of
deconcentration (see table 5.4), it is interesting to notice that:
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a) For those establishments that were allowed to locate in area A
and hence received financial incentives, the difference between
choosing area A instead of area B or BM amounts to about one
percentage point.
b) The percentage savings obtained by locating in area BM instead
of area B is zero.
c) Considerably greater savings, in relative terms at least, would
be found from locating in either area C or D rather than A, B
or BM.
The percentage savings indicated above are for Corpoindustria. For the
Industrial Credit Fund, which handles establishments of more than fifty
employees, the percentage savings are presented in table 5.5.
TABLE 5.5
PERCENTAGE SAVINGS BY AREAS OF DECONCENTRATION OFFERED BY
THE INDUSTRIAL CREDIT FUND
Area of deconcentration Percentage savings
A 0.00
B 8.51
BM 20.60
C 23.08
D 23.08
SOURCE: Own estimations based on the conditions stated
in the policy document, Ministerio de Fomento,
Politica de Desconcentraci6n Industrial, (Caracas, 1977).
106
Values for the Industrial Fund are based on the conditions stated in the
policy document, since information on the actual conditions given is not
available. It should be noted that for these larger firms the percentage
savings between selecting area C instead of a preferred one can be quite
small. For example, in the case of chosing BM instead of C, the savings
is only 2.48 percentage points.
5.2.c Impact of the financial incentives
To determine the extent to which financial incentives affected the
locational pattern of new industry, a closer examination of the behavior
of the financial institutions was necessary. As is always the case, data
were limited. Corpoindustria happened to have better data available than
did the Industrial Fund and, since small and medium-sized industries formed
a very large percentage of new establishments, it made sense to analyze
Corpoindustria in more detail.
During the years 1974 to 1978, Corpoindustria managed 22% of the lending
money handled by the three above-mentioned government agencies. This
relatively small amount of funds, however, represented 78% of the number
of loans granted by the three agencies. Furthermore, of the six
manufacturing groups studied in detail, 86% of the new establishments were
of small or medium size.
Within the limitations of the data, the following proposition was
analyzed: If industrialists took advantage of the financial incentives in
developing areas, this should be reflected in the number of credit
107
applications in these areas. Since the data available are in terms of number
of credits awarded, not in terms of number of applications, it was assumed
that the proportion of applications approved did not vary with the region.
Hence, the number of credits granted in each region was used as a proxy for
the number of applications. Similarly, because the information available did
not differentiate between credits for new firms or for expansions, it was
assumed that the proportion of expansions to new firms did not vary by
regions. Although both of these assumptions may be questionable, we had no
evidence in either case on which to base a different proportion.
Table 5.6 shows the actual shares for period 0 (1973-74) and period I
(1975-76). Furthermore, it indicates the expected share for 1977-78
(period II) when the incentive was operational. The expected share was
estimated by extrapolation of the tendencies, i.e., by the change in share
between period 0 and period I. For example, for the bulk of the national
territory (regions 3 to 8), there was an increase of 7.7 percentage points
between the first two periods (55.9 - 48.2 = 7.7). By adding this change in
share to the actual share of period I (7.7 + 55.9), we obtain the expected
share for period II, i.e., 63.6%. Because data were not available by
deconcentration areas, the results are presented by administrative regions.
For regions 3 to 8, (see table 5.6), an upward trend is found between period
0 (1973-74) and period 1 (1975-76). This trend can be explained by the fact
that this lending office, although in existence since the 1960's under the
name of Conafin (Comisio'n Nacional de Fomento Industrial) or National
Commission of Industrial Development, was restructured in 1974. With this
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reorganization --Conafin, now a Corporation-- reached out to entrepreneurs
in developing areas who were slowly becoming aware of the existence of this
financial organization. This awareness made more and more industrialists
in regions 3 to 8 apply for credits as seen in the 1975-1976 period. This
upward trend between period 0 (1973-74) and period I (1975-76) could be
expected to continue into period II (1977-78). When compared with the actual
credits made in 1977-78, the differences between actual and expected values
by region are small. This is shown in table 5.7.
Region
1 (Capital)
2 (Central)
3-8 (Others)
SOURCE:
NOTE:
TABLE 5.6
TRENDS IN REGION'S SHARE OF CREDITS
Actual Actual Extrapolated
share in share in Change in share in
period 0 period I share period II
(1973-74) (1975-76) (1977-78)
27.1 20.3 -6.8 13.5
24.7 23.8 -0.9 22.9
48.2 55.9 +7.7 63.6
Own estimations based on data from Ministerio de Fomento,
Memoria 1978, Anexo EstadIstico.
For definition of regions see chapter 3.
The implication of the results shown in table 5.7 is that the regional
trends existing prior to the granting of financial incentives seem to have
continued over the next two year period and that the introduction of the
incentives may have had little or not additional effect on the spatial
distribution of manufacturing industry.
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TABLE 5.7
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND EXTRAPOLATED REGION'S SHARE OF CREDITS
FOR THE 1977-78 PERIOD
Extrapolated share Actual share Difference
Region in period II in period II Actual-Ext
1 13.5% 12.4% -1.1
2 22.9% 25.6% +2.7
3-8 63.6% 62.0% -1.6
SOURCE: Own estimation based on data from Ministerio de Fomento,
Memoria 1978, Anexo Estadistico.
NOTE: For definition of regions see chapter 3.
5.3 Fiscal incentives
The policy of industrial deconcentration grants (Ministerio de Fomento, 2
a) 100% tax holidays for five years to new firms producing new
products in areas C and D; 50% in area BM.
b) 80% tax holidays, for five years, to new establishments
processing agricultural and livestock produce, which locate
in areas C and D; 40% tax holidays, for five years, for
those in area BM.
c) Tax holidays of up to 100%, for five years, to those firms
forced to leave area A and move into areas BM, C or D.
It has been impossible to find out how these incentives have been applied
in practice. Data on tax holidays are in the hands of the Ministry of
Treasury (Ministerio de Hacienda). Because this is a sensitive matter that
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is probably handled on a case-by-case basis and subject to a certain
amount of administrative discretion, the Ministry is reluctant to release
any information. A study done by the Ministry of Environment (Ministerio del
Ambiente, 3) estimates that the savings from tax holidays may represent only
1.5 to 2% of the sales value. Another study done by the World Bank in
regard to the industrial policy in Venezuela indicates that:
"The conclusion of this analysis, subject to the caveats regarding
statistical reliability, is that industrial profit rates are very
high in Venezuela. When petroleum refining and the state-enterprise-
dominated basic metal industries are removed from the total, the
average industrial profit rate, net of depreciation and taxes, rises
from 19% to 28%. This figure more accurately reflects what the
private sector, of both national and foreign ownership, is able to
earn through industrial investment."
Hence, in relation to the average profit margins of the Venezuelan
manufacturing industry, the saving due to fiscal incentives may well be
insignificant in many cases.
Indirect incentives
The first presidential decree related to the policy of industrial
deconcentration (No.134), indicates that the Ministers of the Presidential
Cabinet will be in charge of implementing policies designed to encourage
the deconcentration of industrial activity. One such incentive is the
provision of industrial parks in the designated growth centers. Another
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incentive is the provision in these growth centers of special housing and
public services programs.
5.4.a Industrial parks
The term industrial park, as used here, can be defined as a subdivided
tract of land, suitable located in reference to transportation routes and
adequately serviced with utilities, that is restricted and promoted solely
for industrial use by a sponsoring management organization. From theory
and intuition, industrial parks are said (Rosenstein-Rodan, 5) to:
a) Attract to designated areas private investment in industrial
activities that otherwise would not have come into the
region;
b) Create substantial employment opportunities which will reduce
the unemployment level of the region;
c) Reduce the out-migration of the local population;
d) Capture the external economies of scale (for which purpose,
it is better to have all the industries of the area located
in one very large site);
e) Cause a better division of labor by securing common
technical, repair and information services;
f) Save effort, trouble and red tape in creating a factory.
Brown , in his analysis of the deconcentration of manufacturing activity
in England, indicates that "the high success of the early postwar years
was certainly due in large part not to the incentives or restrictions but
to the existence of factory space belonging to the Board of Trade either
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newly or converted from wartime use." Rosenstein-Rodan's ideas, and the
experiences of other countries such as Britain, are reflected in the policy
of industrial deconcentration in Venezuela. Decree 1477 assigns to the
Venezuelan Development Corporation, the Regional Corporations and
Corpoindustria the promotion of industrial parks.
Since 1974, the Ministry of Development has been charged with keeping a
record of all the projects for industrial parks. Unfortunately, this has
not been done in all cases. Hence, it is not possible to know the total
supply of land designated for industrial parks during the 1974-1978 period.
Moreover, we do not know the level of services available. A study done by
the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente, ), as well as a
recent report prepared by the National Planning Office (Cordiplan, ),
conclude that the private sector and other institutions (mainly the
Municipal Councils) have not always followed the policy of industrial
deconcentration when building the industrial parks.
Because of the lack of a control mechanism, they have promoted and built
industrial parks in many areas which, according to the policy of industrial
deconcentration, should have had no new industrial activity. Furthermore,
in so doing, they are alleged to have used scarce resources --increasing
the cost of services, contributing to inflation, and favoring speculation.
5.4.b Social infrastructure
Another aspect that the industrial deconcentration policy emphasizes is
coordination in the supply of social infrastructure (such as housing,
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schools, hospitals) for growth centers in designated areas. A report
prepared by the National Planning Office (Cordiplan, 9) indicates,
however, that there is little evidence that in practice the government
agencies in charge of building the social infrastructure followed the
guidelines set by the policy of industrial deconcentration.
Interviews with entrepeneurs who located their plants in small towns along
the Caracas-Valencia highway indicated that they were satisfied with the
location chosen up to 1974. In 1975 and 1976, when changes in the
Venezuelan economy occurred, they saw a great deal of newly created
factories locating around them. Since then, problems started to appear:
scarcity of water, frequent blackouts, congestion and so on. One of the
managers interviewed said: "It seems like the new entrepeneurs coming to
our area assumed that either their consumption of basic infrastructure
such as water or electricity will not affect others, or that government
agencies will quickly come and increase the limited supply of
infrastructural services." This sort of problems became known to
prospective entrepeneurs who then realized the infrastructure limitations
as well as the scarcity of labor force and of housing, education and
health facilities. Indeed, entrepeneurs when choosing a location for their
manufacturing plants after 1976, seemed to have learned from these
experiences and to have been more careful in selecting their locations.
5.5 Negative incentives
As early as June 1974, a decree was issued (No.135) which prohibited new
establishments from locating in Caracas unless they qualified under special
114
conditions. Later in January 1975, with decree No.713, the prohibited area
was expanded to include not only the city of Caracas but the whole
Metropolitan Area (This enlarged area is identified as area A by the policy
of industrial deconcentration). Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, the
government drew up three lists of industries (identified here as Group I,
II and III). A firm's right to continue operating in, or to locate in, area
A depends on the list to which it is assigned. In this study, it will be
assumed that these lists, although approved in 1976, had actually been in
effect since January 1975 when the prohibition to locate in area A first
took place. Even if this assumption is not accepted because it may be
argued that it is more likely that the lag constituted an informal grace
period to reduce hardship on those firms whose location was already planned,
we will see that the results presented here are not changed.
To determine whether control of location took place during the periods
studied, data are required which reflects, as accurately as possible, what
really happened in terms of the location of manufacturing activity.
Otherwise, we would have to resort to sources of information which,
although reliable, may not reflect what actually happened. An example of
the latter can be seen in a document prepared by the Ministry of the
Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente, 0). When refering to the prohibition
of new industries in area A, this report indicates that "...it has been a
complete success: From 1975 to 1977 inclusive, the Ministry of Development
approved only 33 projects for new industries in the Capital District. The
prohibition is accomplished and growth has stopped." It is possible, however,
that "approved" projects are not the only ones to locate in prohibited
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areas. To find out if this is true, we need disaggregated data not
heretofore available, such as the directories whose recreation was
described in chapter 4. Some errors may have occurred during the recreation
and comparison of the directories. Therefore, the results obtained should
be considered as a first approximation which might give us an indication
of what probably occurred. The results for newly created firms, as well as
for existing firms will be presented.
As indicated earlier, an analysis of all the manufacturing sectors of the
Venezuelan economy is beyond the dimensions of this research. There are
over 27 3-digit manufacturing ISIC codes. Using the criteria discussed in
section 4.4, the following codes were chosen for further study, and the
results presented here are drawn solely from these six manufacturing
groups:
ISIC code Description
321 Textiles
323 Leather and leather products
356 Plastic products
382 Machinery and equipment, except electrical
383 Electric machinery and equipment
384 Transportation equipment
5.5.a New firms
New firms belonging to list I are the only ones --according to the policy--
allowed to locate in deconcentralization area A. All the others are
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considered "transgressors." The results obtained by a careful analysis
of the six industrial groups are presented in table 5.8.
Years
1975-197
1977-197
SOURCES:
TABLE 5.8
NUMBER OF NEW FIRMS LOCATED IN AREA A
THAT WERE NOT ALLOWED BY THE POLICY
Number of new Number of Percentage of
firms in area A "transgressors" transgression
6 290 127 43.8
8 64 33 51.6
Own estimations based on the recreated directories
and OCEI, Directorio Industrial 1978
In terms of percentages, period I seems to have fared somewhat better
than period II. A possible explanation could be that at the beginning of
the policy, government officials were more stringent. Because there are
no disaggregate data prior to 1975, it is not possible to know what was
happening before the control on location. It may well be the case that the
percentage of transgression would have been much higher. The opposite view
may be that the control on location was not effectively implemented during
the 1975-1978 period. It should be pointed out that there is no
surveillance system for industrial location in Venezuela, i.e., there are
no government officials "patrolling" the streets looking for "transgressors."
At most, they may check certain localities when a complaint has been
submitted by residents of the locality. This may take place when the
affected neighbors want to get rid of the noise, congestion or other
nuisances caused by the manufacturing plant.
Period
I
II
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5.5.b Moves of existing establishments
Before we attempt to see the extent to which the negative incentives may
have affected the location of manufacturing activity, we will use the
disaggregate data to see whether existing firms have moved into the
designated areas. Table 5.9 shows an origin-destination matrix of
inter-area moves for each of the two periods studied and for the six
industrial subgroups analyzed. The framed cells represent the expected
impact of the policy of industrial deconcentration. As can be observed,
in spite of the reduced number of cases, the general trend seems to be one
of concentration.
5.5.c Moves and negative incentives
During the study period, some firms moved from other areas into area A
(in-movers), some moved within area A (relocators), and other establishments
left area A for other regions (out-movers). An attempt will be made to
relate each of these cases to the control on location posed by the policy
of industrial deconcentration.
In-movers: Technically speaking and according to the policy, no firms are
allowed to move into area A. Nevertheless, since it is possible that firms
specified on list I can introduce themselves as "new" in area A, i.e., that
they can circumvent the policy by closing down the existing plant and
re-opening as a "new" one in area A, list I has been used in this analysis.
The results are shown in table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.9
ORIGIN-DESTINATION MATRIX OF INTER-AREA MOVERS
Move
A B BM C D out
to
from
A
B
BM
C
to
from
A
B
BM
C
11
1
12
Move
out
4
7 4
12
Inter-area moves 1975-1976
A B BM C D
2 2
2
3
Move
in
12
7
5
Move
in
5
2
2
Net
change
+1
+6
-7
Net
change
+1
-1
Inter-area moves 1977-1978
SOURCES: Own estimations based on the recreated directories
and OCEI, Directorio Industrial 1978.
NOTE: The-framed cells represent the expected impact of
the policy.
2
3
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Years
1975-1976
1977-1978
SOURCES:
TABLE 5.10
NUMBER OF FIRMS MOVED INTO AREA A, THAT
WERE NOT ALLOWED BY THE POLICY
Number of Number of P
in-movers transgressors t
12 4
ercentage of
ransgression
33.3
5 3 60.0
Own estimations based on the recreated directories
and OCEI, Directorio Industrial 1978
Relocators: Firms which appear on list II are allowed to relocate-within
area A. As indicated earlier, list II is a subset of list I. Hence, an
existing firm, (not belonging to list II but to list I), wanting to
relocate in area A, may circumvent the policy by appearing as a new firm.
For this reason, in analyzing this issue, list I will be used when
identifying '-transgressors" rather than the more stringent list II. The
results are presented in table 5.11.
During the second period, industries appear to have learned that, in spite
of the policy, they could easily relocate. The increased level of
transgressors suggest the decrease effect of existing control mechanisms.
Out-movers: During the study period (1974-1978), some firms moved from
area A to other areas. This aspect has already been presented in the
analysis of the spatial pattern of the manufacturing industry. Our
concern now is with those industries which, according to list III must
leave area A because they are hazardous to the inhabitants, i.e., involved
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with industrial chemicals, petroleum and coal derivatives, etc.
At the end of the first period, there were 21 establishments in the
hazardous category (belonging to the six industrial groups) located in area
A. These were supposed to leave since they are specified on list III.
However, during 1975-1976, only one of these firms left the area. Hence,
at the end of the first period, 95% of the transgressors remainded.
Similarly, by the end of the second period, of the 23 establishments which
were supposed to leave, none has left. Therefore, during the second period,
not only did firms belonging to list III remain in area A, but the number
increased.
Year
1975-1976
1977-1978
SOURCE:
TABLE 5.11
NUMBER OF FIRMS THAT RELOCATE WITHIN AREA A,
WHICH ARE NOT ALLOWED BY THE POLICY
Number of Number of
relocators transgressors
35
14
15
10
Percentage of
transgression
42.9
71.4
Own estimations based on the recreated directories
and OCEI, Directorio Industrial 1978
5.6 Preliminary conclusions of chapter 5
From the results presented above, there seems to be little or not evidence
that changes in the spatial pattern of industry can be related to the
application of government instruments. From the financial incentives point
of view, the nearly stable trend in the development region's share of
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credit does not support the hypothesis that these incentives influenced the
location of new firms. In spite of the fact that information is generally
not available on the actual application of fiscal incentives, their value
is likely to be insignificant when compared to the profits of the
manufacturing industry in Venezuela, and it is therefore probable that
they have had little or no effect on location. Control over location, i.e.,
negative incentives, does not seem to have been applied effectively during
the study period.
Based on the conclusions indicated above, we may ask ourselves the
following question: If it seems as though the pattern of industrial
location was unaffected by government incentives, why is that in chapter 4
we found some evidence that a group of manufacturing industries have a
tendency to deconcentrate? What made them select locations other than the
traditional industrial axis? In other words, we may ask: what other
influences have affected industrial location, and what has been their
relative importance? Answers to these questions will be attempted in the
next chapter.
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6 WHAT HAVE BEEN THE OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
AND WHAT HAS BEEN THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE?
In chapter 4 we found some evidence that a group of manufacturing industries
has had a tendency to deconcentrate. In chapter 5 it was shown that little
or no evidence existed to support the supposition that changes in the
spatial pattern of industry were related to the application of government
instruments. Hence, we may ask: if government incentives did not affect
the location of industry, why did some industry subgroups deconcentrate
while others did not?
Any attempt to answer this question requires first an understanding of why
manufacturing industries locate in one place rather than another. Since
there is a whole body of theoretical knowledge, it will be convenient at
this point to review the existing theories of industrial location and to
determine whether the theoretical locational factors are operational in
the Venezuelan manufacturing context.
6.1 Industrial location theory
In the context of standard microeconomic theory, several models have been
developed to be used as tools for historical analysis of the location of
a firm. A summary of the primary approaches is presented in appendix A.
Location theory attempts to explain why economic activities locate in
particular places. It turns out that the explanation depends almost
entirely on the existence of irregularities in space, including variations
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in the physical configuration of the land, discontinuities in the means of
transportation, the fact that resources are localized rather than
ubiquitous, or that wages are not spatially uniform. Because of these
irregularities and discontinuities, the business firm's cost of production
or transportation is potentially lower at some places than at others, or
the business firm's revenue is potentially higher at some locations than
at others. Places offering lower costs (or higher revenues) attract
economic activity, become centers of production and, therefore, increase
in market size and attract market-oriented activity, which contributes to
further growth.
6.2 Limitations of the traditional location theory
The traditional location theory concentrates mainly on transportation costs
because these vary in a patterned way over space, and it barely touches such
things as labor cost, which vary in no regular way. For these latter
expenses, all that is necessary is to compare the savings-per-unit among
alternatives. There are no theoretical difficulties here. But the theory
has little to say on some important topics (Alonso, 1), such as:
* Locational interdependence: In the typical modern oligopoly
a major location determinant for an individual firm is the
location and markets of like firms. Firms maneuver to control
or share competitors' markets. This is very difficult to
incorporate into a theory.
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* The impact of large modern corporations. It is difficult to
incorporate large enterprises into location theory as they contain
a wide variety of plants some of which may originally have located
for reasons independent of the present concern. Large enterprises
may also produce a wide variety of products, not all of which can
be produced at one optimum location. Furthermore, traditional
location theory uses the methods of partial equilibrium analysis,
assuming that the firm in question is so small in relation to the
relevant market that its activities have no perceptible effect on
the prices and on the location of other economic units. When we are
dealing with large firms relative to the economic environment the
method of partial equilibrium analysis breaks down.
* Firms may only be satisfiers: This problem raises the continuing
question of whether firms actually do "maximize" profits. For a
state concern, an "adequate" return on public money, with some
considerations of social cost and benefits, may be more important
than maximum returns. Alternative aims have also been suggested for
private enterprises. It is increasingly recognized that "profit
maximization" may be an oversimplified conception of the motivating
force behind business decisions, including those involving
location (Hoover,2 ).
* Behavioral factors: These factors have been generally neglected.
Behavioral factors, such as the businessman's attitude to the
troubled labor conditions of certain areas, or his attitute to the
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social life of "the North" compared with that of "the South", may
play an important role in industrial location (Hamilton, ).
* Uncertainty: The future is always uncertain. Tastes may change;
there may be a technological revolution; tax laws and custom duties
may be revised.
* Time: This dimension is not sufficiently considered in the existing
location theory. The decision that is best in the light of today's
situation may not be best at some future time; production methods
will change; transportation routes and costs, location of resources
and of customers, and the nature of the competition, may also change.
Even when these changes can be predicted with certainty, we do not
have a method of making a decision that will be best over a period
of time rather than at a moment in time (Alonso, 4).
Any of the above elements may account for almost the whole locational
phenomenon. Alternatively, the location decision may respond to a wider
variety of causes, many of which might be active at the same time. This
complexity is augmented by the fact that the "determinant" causes may be,
in general, different for each manufacturing group.
6.3 Location theory and the Venezuelan environment
So far, we have mentioned many factors involved in location, not only from
location theory but also from intuition. We may next ask whether these
factors are operational in the Venezuelan industrial context. A group of
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industrialists interviewed by the researcher pointed out that the most
important factors influencing location were availability of labor, good
transportation facilities --good roads, closeness to port facilities, etc.--
and availability of infrastructure, both life support --such as energy and
water-- and social facilities --such as housing and schools. Among the
entrepeneurs interviewed were representatives of the electric machinery
and equipment industrial subgroup, the non-electric machinery manufacturing
sector and the plastic industry.
Some of these industrialists complained that the lack of housing facilities
in the town where their factories were located --exacerbated by the sudden
increase in demand due to the 1974 economic changes-- forced workers to
live in nearby settlements, and "when it rains heavily, there is high
absenteeism". Other industrialists indicated that in the last few years
they were having frequent blackouts, and the shortages of water have been
aggravated. None of the industrialists interviewed gave an indication that
the government locational incentives were high enough , financially, to
compensate for the disadvantages they would face if they located in a less
desirable area. One entrepeneur who selected a site in a designated area
indicated that he would have located there anyhow because he needed to be
close to the source of raw material and that particular place seemed to be
the only place in the country where the required input was available.
Overall, entrepeneurs who have their plants in the industrial axis reported
that although the infrastructure and related services were inadequate, they
manage to operate. But from 1974 onward, the situation had become worse.
The sudden increment in new manufacturing activities in their surroundings
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has led to the repeated breakdown of the already inadequate services in the
form of frequent blackouts, water rationing, scarcity of labor, etc.
A study done by SAEDI5 surveyed more than 800 Venezuelan manufacturing
firms. This survey was carried out with the purpose of finding out the
major limitations industrialists encountered when increasing their
production of capital goods or when getting involved in the production of
these goods. The answers and priorities collected by this survey were:
1) Scarcity of labor and absenteeism
2) Difficulties to obtain inputs
3) Limited demand for the products
4) Unsatisfactory physical and social infrastructure
The elements of the SAEDI study (SAEDI, 6) coupled with the results of our
interviews give us some idea of the possible factors that may affect the
locational choice of the Venezuelan manufacturing industry. Furthermore, it
gives us some indication as to the awareness of Venezuelan industrialists
to the problems that may have to be faced when a location has not the
appropriate mix of the factors of location.
The above discussion has highlighted some locational factors that may have
affected the locational choice of the Venezuelan industrialist.
Nevertheless we may ask how these factors of location relate to the spatial
pattern of distribution of industries, in other words, why some industry
subgroups deconcentrate while others did not?
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6.4 Working hypothesis
Based on the information so far collected about the Venezuelan
manufacturing environment and the spatial distribution of economic
activities, we will attempt to answer the question posed above. We may
speculate that the changes in the Venezuelan economy -which occurred in
1974 (when the national budget increased threefold) had two major effects
on the Venezuelan manufacturing environment. On the one hand, these
changes gave rise to a large number of new manufacturing firms, most of
which were concerned primarily with satisfying the sudden increase in
demand and benefitting from the resulting high profits. Most of period I
entrepeneurs, i.e*,, those who set up a factory during the years inmediately
following the economic changes, could be characterized as having a
commercial or opportunistic approach to manufacturing rather than a
long-term approach or industrialist viewpoint. As a consequence, we may
speculate that most of the new firms, during the period 1975-1976, chose
locations without much concern for cost factors or other locational
factors. On the other hand, the steep increase in the number of
manufacturing establishments further accentuated the diseconomies of the
insufficient physical and social infrastructure. This was a phenomenon that
started in Caracas and slowly spread to many of the surrounding cities.
New industries locating in places where the level of services was
insufficient suffered along with those plants already located there
By our second period of analysis (1977-1978), the economy reached a point
of equilibrium in terms of supply and demand for national manufactured
products. At this time, most of the entrepeneurs were not only aware of the
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problems of locating in the already congested industrial axis, but they
were also aware of the fact that the "bonanza", or high profit period, was
over. Therefore, entrepeneurs planning to set up a factory during the
second period were more concerned with locational factors than period I
entrepeneurs. In other words, period II entrepeneurs probably planned the
selection of their plants sites more carefully. They would have looked for
places with lower wages, a satisfactory water supply, a good social
infrastructure, low transportation costs, etc. It may have been the search
for a location with the above characteristics which led some industrialists
to consider settlements outside the industrial axis. Consequently some
deconcentration occurred. Although deconcentration may have begun prior to
the economic boom of 1974, the sudden change in the economy at that time may
have accentuated the deconcentration process.
The arguments presented above may have explained why some manufacturing
sectors deconcentrated, but what about those who did not? A clue to the
answer to this question may be found in the World Bank report cited
earlier. In this report it was argued that the salient feature of the
Venezuelan industrial environment was the high degree of protection from
import competition by government policies. The report stated that "Possible
variations in government policy carry greater potential effect on
profitability than does any likely development in cost reduction or new
product promotion." If this is the case, and knowing (from chapter 3) that
the granting of exonerations and other government benefits to industry
were given on a case-by-case basis in the headquarters of the Ministry of
Development located in Caracas, we might expect highly protected
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industries to be attracted to Caracas. We might expect, for example, that
small highly protected industries would consider closeness to the
government's decision-making center to be crucial. They could argue that
exonerations, licences and other benefits received on a case-by-case basis
outweighed the disadvantages of locating in the industrial axis. So, they
concentrated. An additional and complementary explanation might be that
the savings that could have been obtained by deconcentrating were low
compared to the large profits made possible by the high level of protection.
If the above hypothesis holds, we would expect to see some evidence to
support these issues, such as:
1) Concentration of highly protected manufacturing activity in the
industrial axis and deconcentration of less protected
manufacturing firms;
2) Less protected industries to be more concerned with locational
factors. Furthermore, second period industrialists experiences a
higher sensitivity to locational factors, due to their
awareness of the physical limitations existing in cities of the
traditional industrial axis, and to the return to more realistic
profit levels.
3) Relatively little weight attached to government incentives as a
factor of location.
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An attempt will be made, in the rest of this chapter, to address some of
the above issues.
6.4.a Concentration and protection
As indicated earlier, if the benefits obtained by being close to those
government agencies which grant exonerations and other benefits outweighed
the diseconomies of being in the traditional industrial axis, we might
expect highly protected industries to concentrate and the less protected
industries to deconcentrate. Fig. 6.1 shows the pattern of association
obtained by using the disaggregate data from chapter 4, referring to the
six manufacturing groups analyzed as well as to the level of effective
protection (World Bank, 8). An industry subgroup is classified as low level
of protection when its effective protection is below 80 percent, and
classified as high level when is above 130 percent (see also Fig. 4.2).
One might, of course, argue that those who concentrated did so, not
because of government protection, but because of some other reasons, and
that the pattern of association observed in Fig. 6.1 is spurious. This is
quite possible and we do not want to present the results of Fig. 6.1 as
major evidence. Attempts to find some other causes were made. Two of
them are described below.
6.4.b Concentration and capital/labor intensity
We may speculate, for example, that labor intensive industries, in search
for areas with surplus labor and low wages, will tend to deconcentrate. If
this is so, we may expect to find industries with low electricity
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consumption (our proxy for capital/labor intensity) to deconcentrate.
Fig. 6.2 presents the pattern of association between dispersion and
electricity consumption per thousand hours worked.
Effective protection
High Low
Leather
Yes Non-electric machinery
Electric machinery
Deconcentration
Textiles
No Plastics
Transport equip.
Fig. 6.1 Pattern of association between deconcentration and
effective protection.
Sources: World Bank, Current Economic position and Prospects of
Venezuela Vol. 2: Industrial Policy in Venezuela
(Washington, 1977) p.9 8 .
OCEI, Directorio Industrial, 1978.
Recreated directories for 1974 and 1976.
The results presented in Fig. 6.2 do not support the proposition that labor
intensive industries deconcentrate.
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Yes
Deconcentration
No
Capital/Labor Intensity
High Low
Electric machinery Leather
Non-electric machinery
Plastics Transportation equipment
Textiles
Fig. 6.2 Pattern of association between deconcentration and
capital/labor intensity.
Sources: OCEI, Encuesta tape, 1977.
OCEI, Directorio Industrial, 1978.
Recreated directories for 1974 and 1976.
6.4.c Concentration and the product cycle theory
Another of the possible explanations explored is related to the product
cycle hypothesis. The product cycle model, Vernon9 concerns the evolution
of a product through three distinct stages in its life cycle:
1) The first stage is an innovation stage where a new product is
first developed and introduced to the market, or a new production
process is developed. The innovation phase, which needs a high-
input of R & D (Research and Development) is usually carried out
in large industrial agglomerations.
2) A growth stage, which is characterized by the gradual adoption of
mass production and marketing of the product.
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3) A standarization phase when production costs, due to learning
curve effects, can shift to low-cost locations. The technical and
managerial talents previously important are replaced with
low-skilled labor. Labor costs are particularly important because
of the higher proportion of labor to total inputs usually
associated with the standarization of the production process.
Hence, the standarization phase of development can be associated
with deconcentration (Rees, 10).
From the description of the product cycle theory presented above, it may be
argued that when the product and/or the process is "new", the manufacturing
plants are attracted to large industrial agglomerations, When the product
and the process is "old", plants are attracted to peripheral areas.
Examples of old product-new process may be found in the injection molding
processes in the footwear industry and in the introduction of the float
glass process for producing plate glass. In the opposite case, i.e., new
product-old process, examples can be found in the women's high fashion
clothing (Finger, 11).-Following this rationale, we may expect, then, to
find those industries that deconcentrate, to represent old product-old
process and those who concentrate to have either the product or the process
new, or both.
Analyzing the results obtained in chapter 4, it is difficult to envisage,
for example, that in Venezuela the electric as well as the non-electric
machinery and equipment industries (which deconcentrated) to belong to
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the old product-old process category. Nevertheless, if this description is
accepted, then we may argue that the transportation equipment industry also
falls into this old/old category. In so doing, the fact that the
transportation industry has not deconcentrated contradicts the expected
outcome of the product cycle model.
Returning to the pattern of association between concentration and level of
protection, we can see that the results presented in Fig. 6.1, although by
no means conclusive, indicate an interesting possible relationship which
might justify further research efforts in this direction and in the
direction of changes in the sensitivity of the Venezuelan entrepeneur
towards locational factors. Our next task is not only to determine whether
less protected industries were indeed more concerned with factors of
location, but in addition, to determine which are these factors and to what
extend government financial incentives has been considered a locational
factor by industrialists.
The factors of location may be seen as contributing to the space cost
curve of a manufacturing plant. The space cost curve represents the
average cost per unit of production at any point in space (Smith, 12). if
it would be feasible to construct a space cost curve for each industry
subgroup, it is likely that we may find direct answers to the above-
mentioned questions. Since it is very difficult --and sometimes
impractical-- to construct the firm's space cost curve, we have to rely on
other methodological approaches to determine the contribution of government
subsidies -- as well as other factors of location-- to a firm's space cost
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curve and hence, to the locational decision of the firm. These issues are
discussed next.
6.5 Traditional methodologies
The common approach to identifying the effects of an overall regional policy
is to explore the behavior of selected variables in the period prior to the
application of the policy. This is done in order to identify likely
developments in the absence of the policy, ice., the consequences of the
non-action alternative.
The steps of the classical methodology (Moore and Rhodes, 13) can be
summarized as follows:
1) Select variables which a priori should be affected by regional
policy;
2) Identify the periods of changing strength of regional policy
(passive and active periods);
3) Examine the behavior of the variables:
a) Describe the movement of the variables through time;
b) Predict tendencies in order to identify what would have
happened in the absence of stronger policies;
c) Adjust values to take account of differences in industrial
structure. (The technique commonly adopted for eliminating the
main effect of industrial structure is shift-share analysis);
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d) Compare actual movement with the no action alternatives;
e) Explain reasons for the difference.
This method can be useful because it enables presumptions to be made about
the effectiveness of the policy. But it also has weaknesses such as the
fact that it is mainly descriptive and its conclusions are easily debatable.
Disentangling the effects of individual policy instruments is even more
difficult. The approach used so far by most analysts is to obtain
information from a variety of sources and to carry out studies involving a
variety of economic and statistical analysis in order to find out whether
the results are consistent and whether convincing conclusions can be drawn
from a careful review of all the evidence (OECD, 14).
In addition to the classical methodology described earlier, questionnaires
and simple regression analysis also have been widely used.
The questionnaire approach involves direct questioning of firms which are
affected by the incentives. The idea is to find out what effects business
thinks the incentives have had. A closer look into this approach indicates
that in many instances a decision maker may declare that a particular
incentive is crucial for his new location because he/she is afraid that the
incentive may be eliminated. This is said in spite of the fact that the
firm would have moved to a particular location anyhow.
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Simple regression analysis, an indirect method of investigation which relates
observed movements to a series of possible causal factors, has the advantage
of being quantitative, and because of its simplicity it has been commonly
used. The main disadvantage is that it does not capture the reality of the
actual decision process which is discrete by nature: For example, one either
goes to city A, B or C. In addition, the focus of simple regression analysis
is usually on aggregate data. The results can yield only statistical
inferences about the reactions of particular firms under different
conditions.
During the last few years, discrete choice models, which are considered to
be at the frontier in econometrics (Zarembka, 15), have been slowly finding
wider application in economics and other fields (Hartman and Hollyer, 16
Such models have been widely used in the analysis of urban transport
choices, and most recently, have made important contributions to the
study of modal choices by energy consumers. In all such cases, they have
allowed analysts to take the discrete nature of real world choices into
account.
Industrial location decisions are obviously of the discrete type, but the
new econometric approach has not yet been applied to locational problems
in developing countries. A recent paper by Carlton,17 however, has used
discrete choice modelling in the analysis of branch plant location
decisions in the United States.
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There are three major differences between simple linear probability models
fitted to aggregate data by least squares and discrete choice models fitted
to individual observations by the technique of maximum likelihood. The first
advantage of discrete choice models lies in their imposition of the
constraint that all choice probabilities sum to one in a particular context.
The second lies in the obvious gain in degrees of freedom which results
from a consideration of individual circumstances. Finally (and this is
probably the most important point), aggregated models must use group
averages for right-hand-side variables. It has been shown that the use of
group averages leads to response parameter estimates which are
systematically biased (that is, they do not truly reflect the valuation
applied by individual decision-makers).
Due to the limitations of the methods used previously, this research will
attempt to use discrete choice models for the study of industrial
location in Venezuela. Problems such as the concentration of industrial
activity in very few locations and the limitations of the data make the use
of discrete choice models more difficult than would be the case in an
advanced economy. It is expected that by using this type of model, we may
obtain additional evidence on issues such as the awareness and sensitivity
changes of entrepeneurs to problems in locational factors as well as gain
a better understanding of the role of financial incentives as a factor of
location.
6.6 Discrete choice models
Discrete choice models assume that the individuals or firms are faced with
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a choice between two or more alternative sites or cities, and that the
choice they make depends on the characteristics both of the cities and the
firms. Assuming that we have information about the attributes of each of
the firms and the locational choices that they make (for example, city B
instead of A, C or D), the discrete choice method formulates an equation
that will predict the choices of those firms not in the original sample.
Hence, the discrete choice model will attempt to find a relationship
between a set of attributes describing a firm (e.g. size, energy
consumption, etc.) and the probability that the enterprise will make a
given locational choice. Each locational choice is described by its
characteristics such as existing unemployment level, availability of
government grants, availability of water, etc. Furthermore, the model
reflects the fact that a firm, when selecting a city, compares the
relative values of the attributes of the alternative locations. A
description of discrete choice models will be presented in the next
chapter.
6.7 Summary of chapter 6
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to suggest why some manufacturing
sectors deconcentrate while others do not. As pointed out in chapter 5, it
seems unlikely that the policy instruments applied have caused
deconcentration. Consequently it is hypothesized that changes in the
economy which occurred in 1974 had two major effects on the Venezuelan
manufacturing environment. On the one hand these changes gave rise to a
large number of new manufacturing firms, most of which were more concerned
with satisfying the sudden increase in demand --commercial or opportunistic
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approach, rather than a long-term approach or industrial viewpoint. On
the other hand, the sudden increase in the number of manufacturing
establishments further aggravated the existing problems in the industrial
axis, created by the already saturated and unsatisfactory physical and *
social infrastructure. By the second period, i.e., 1977-1978, the economy
reached an equilibrium point in terms of supply and demand for nationally
manufactured products. As a consequence, most of the new firms created
in this second period were headed by industrial-minded entrepeneurs. They
were aware of the problems in the congested industrial axis and were more
concious about production costs.
These industrialists carefully weighed the advantages and disadvantages of
locating in the traditional industrial axis. Some less protected
industries considered it more profitable to locate their new plants away
from the industrial axis. others --for example the small highly protected
industries-- may have considered that closeness to the government's decision
making center a crucial factor. They may argue that the exonerations,
licences and other benefits received as incentives, outweigh the
disadvantages of locating in the industrial axis. Furthermore, the
percentage savings that they may obtained by locating outside the
congested industrial axis may be very small when compared to their profit
rates. So, they concentrate.
Some evidence to support this hypothesis is presented. Mainly the fact
that the less protected industrial subgroups seem to deconcentrate while
highly protected ones do not. Furthermore, by interviews with industrialists
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and from other sources, anecdotal evidence is found to support this view.
Nevertheless, in order to gather more evidence and in an attempt to
disentangle the effect of government incentives, as well as to detect
possible changes in industrialist's sensitivity to locational factors, the
use of discrete choice models is suggested. It is expected that this
relatively new econometric method of analysis will permit a better
understanding of both the factors influencing industrial- location in
Venezuela and the possible effects of financial incentl\es as a factor of
location.
In the following chapters, --Part III of this research-- the econometric
analysis is presented. Chapter 7 will describe the discrete choice model
that will be used and chapter 8 will discuss the statistical findings.
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PART III: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
7 Methodology
7.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we discussed some of the determinants of the
location decision of a manufacturing firm, with primary concentration on
the theoretical explanation emerging from traditional location theory.
This chapter, along with the next one, represents an attempt to test some
of the determinants of locational choice that emerge from this theoretical
model as well as those obtained from empirical observation. In addition,we
shall consider other causal elements (such as financial incentives) which
may cause entrepeneurs to choose a given location.
7.2 The discrete choice of location
The decision to locate a manufacturing plant in a particular city is one
of many economic choices having lumpy characteristics. The entrepeneur is
confronted with a set of feasible alternatives -- cities-- one and only one
of which can be selected.
Discrete choice theory is based on the assumption that a decision-maker
chooses from a set of feasible alternatives so as to maximize his/her
utility. The utility of an alternative is a function of its attributes and
differs across individuals. Since some of the attributes are unobserved
and imperfectly measured, or because there is taste variation, it is
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impossible for an observer to determine precisely which alternative any
decision maker will select. Thus, we can predict only the probability of
a given alternative being chosen. These assumptions lead to a class of
models termed random utility models. (Appendix B presents a detailed
consideration of models of discrete choice).
The general form of a random utility model is that for a given individual,
i, the probability of choosing an alternative j from a set A is equal to
the probability that the alternative j has a higher utility than any other
alternative k in the set A. Thus:
P.(j:A) = Prob (U.. > Uik) for all k in set A (7.1)
Furthermore, the random utility model assumes that the utility of any
alternative is a function of the attributes of the alternative and of the
characteristics of the decision maker. The utility of any alternative j to
individual i, U.., is expressed as follows:
U.. = V.. + I.. (7.2)
1J IJ 1
where V. . is a systematic or representative component of utility, and
TI.. is a random element or unexplained random error.
1J
Multinomial logit, the most widely used choice model, is derived from the
assumption that the random effects of the unobserved attributes of the
alternatives as well as the unobserved characteristics of the decision
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maker are independent and identically distributed with the Weibull
distribution. The functional form derived from this assumption is as
follows:
V..
S7133)
i3 K V.
Z e
k=1
where P. . is the probability that a decision-maker i will select
ILJ
alternative j and e is the natural logarithm base. K is the number of
feasible alternatives.
By specifying the utility function as linear in its parameters, we have
N
V. = > n X n. (7.4)
n=1
where V.. = utility that decision maker i attaches to alternative j.
1J
X . = level of the nth attribute of alternative jo
nj
S = parameter associated with the explanatory variable n,
N = number of explanatory variables.
An example of X n may be the prevailing wage level in city j. It should be
noted that this variable can reflect interaction between, say, the number
of employees of an establishment (a firm's characteristic) and the wage
level of alternatives (a city's characteristic). The interaction
reflecting the total payroll that a firm will have if it locates in a
particular city.
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Substituting equation 7.4 in equation 7.3, we may express the logit model
as
exp( $ n X . )
p., n= I n na
'J K
k1 exp n n xkk1 1 n k
(7.5)
The estimation process used is based on the maximum likelihood method
where the estimated 's are those maximizing the likelihood function:
n
I K Q
L = T7 T | iki=1 k=1 (7.6)
1 when the firm choses city k
where Qik =
0 otherwise
I = number of observations
*
Now, given L in equation 7.6 the log-likelihood function L may be written
I K
L = Z Qik n P k
i=1 k=1
(7.7)
If we now replace P in equation 7.7 by the expression 7.5 the result isik
an equation which is a function of the unknown Ss since all the other
quantities in equation 7.7 are known (the Xs and Qik's).
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L is then maximized with respect to the $s in the usual manner, the
resulting estimates being the Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLEs) for the
model's parameters.
Equation 7.7 is maximized with respect to the parameters (fs) using
nonlinear maximization algorithms. These algorithms are usually iterative
in nature, the analyst being required to provide an initial guess as to
the value of So These values are used in equation 7.5 to calculate P..'so
1J
These latter values are then used in equation 7.7 to calculate a starting
*
value of L The usual procedure is then to search in some fashion for
"better" values of ~6s to use in equation 7.5 to get new P. . 's which will
1J
*
cause the value of L in equation 7.7 to increase. The iterative
procedure will continue until some predetermined level of tolerance is
reached (Hensher and Johnson, 1). There are several methods which may be used
to search for the optimal value of S. The Newton-Rapheson method has been
used in this study.
For predicting purposes, we choose one of the alternative cities as a
standard and we use it as the basis for performing differences:
P.. 
N
ij = exp > n ( X nj - X ) (7.8)
P. n=1is
where s is the standard category.
Equation 7.8 can be linearized taking logarithms, thus
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P.. N
kn ( ) = (X .- X ) (7.9)
P.n nj nis n=1
Therefore, we will estimate K-1 equation such as 7.9, where K is the
number of possible alternatives. Given the estimated values for the 's
n
the P.. s can readily be obtained.
3-J
7.3 Definition of choice set
The model presented at the begining of this chapter assumed that one
could meaningfully characterize the locational decision facing the
industrialist: The choice of a city in which to locate his plant is made
from a known set of alternative cities. In practice we, as modelers, are
faced with the task of explicitly defining this location choice set. In
one respect this is virtually a hopeless task: Venezuela consists of many
settlements of various sizes and qualities. The subset of these, actively
considered by any given entrepeneur is, at best, probably known to the
industrialist alone. Central place theory, on the other hand, would argue
that a natural hierarchy or system of settlements exists within a country.
If such a hierarchy exists, it would be possible to identify the most
important settlements of manufacturing activity within the country. (These
settlements presumably constitute a large sample of possible locations for
those manufacturing entrepeneurs who desire a regional or national market
for their products). On this issue the modeling technique employed here
is very useful. The logit model assumes one underlying utility function
and looks at relative choice frequencies as sample draws.
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Because of computational limitations --it is unlikely that existing
computer programs could adequately handle more than twenty potential
choices of location-- we had to select a limited number of alternative
locations. For this purpose, the following criteria were applied:
1) The choice set should be as large as possible so as to have a better
representation of the variables to be analyzed, i.e., to have a wide
range of values of the potential locational factors.
2) The choice set should include a good mix of core and periphery cities
as well as settlements with and without manufacturing activity. The
manufacturing activity need not necessarily be new.
3) The choice set should represent all the areas of deconcentration, as
well as the special growth centers identified by the policy of
industrial deconcentration.
4) The choice set should have a good geographical balance, with cities
located in the east, west and south of the country, as well as in the
traditional north-central area,
As a result of the above considerations, twenty cities were chosen (see
Fig. 7.1).
7.4 Data requirements
The model focuses on the attributes of the cities, relating them to the
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locational choice of manufacturers, We concentrate on explaining the
number of new establishments in each city for the two time periods
1975-1976 and 1977-1978. It is then necessary to create a detailed data
base for each period across the cities. The data are designed to capture
the differences in locational factors among cities. Data required for the
estimation of the model can be divided into two types: data describing each
of the possible locations, i.e,, city characteristics, and data concerning
an individual manufacturing firm in each of the locations included in the
study, i.e., the firm's characteristics. Each of these data types will be
discussed in turn.
7.4.a City characteristics
The attributes of a city which may affect the entrepeneur's choice of
location can be divided into seven general categories. These are as
follows:
1) Labor conditions
2) Support systems
3) Access to services
4) Amenities
5) Spatial or flow characteristics
6) General economic conditions
7) Government incentives
Appendix C contains a discussion of measurement problems for each of the
attributes within each of these categories, as well as other data issues0
A description of each category is given below.
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1) Labor conditions
A broad range of labor conditions has traditionally been considered relevant
in industrial location choiceo Out of the many attributes that could be
used to describe labor conditions, we managed to obtain data on the
following factors, for each of the twenty cities:
Wages: One of the most important determinants in the choice of a location
may be the prevailing wage rate. Wage rates at the three-digit ISIC code
level were collected for each of the periods. When the three-digit wage was
unavailable for a city, the existing data for the city's region was used to
estimate the relationship between the three-digit and the average
manufacturing wages for the region. Knowing the average manufacturing
wage for the city and assuming that the relationship in the city is the
same as in the region, the three-digit wage for the city was estimated.
When available, the two-digit wage was used instead of the average
manufacturing wage.
Manpower: Labor force is a fundamental factor in the location of industry:
The quality or level of skill of the labor force necessary for technically
advanced industries, or the quantity or abundance of manpower for labor
intensive, low skill industries are important issues for industry. In both
cases, the productivity of labor is an additional consideration. Data on
labor availability at two-digit ISIC were collected. The two-digit code
was thought most appropriate because of the possibility of using the same
labor across different industries within the same two-digit ISIC code.
It should be pointed out that the use of two-digit ISIC code does not
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necessarly captures the quality or level of skill of the labor force.
Nevertheless, due to data limitations, this surrogate was used.
Unemployment: For labor intensive, low technology industries, areas with
high unemployment rates may be desirable because the costs of replacing
labor is lowered by the slack labor market. To measure this variable,
unemployment levels using the two-digit ISIC code were collected. Again,
the reasons for using the two-digit code are the same as indicated for the
labor force.
Technical expertise: For industries with technological sophistication,
the presence of a highly skilled group of professionals is likely to be
an important locational factor. Data on the number of professionals,
technicians and related ocupations were obtained.
Management potential: Availability of managers, administrators and
directors may well be an important locational factor. It was possible to
find total number of managers (employed and unemployed).
Cost of living: In their efforts to reduce labor costs, industries may tend
to locate where living costs are lower so as to be able to pay lower wage
rates. Data on the comparative cost of living at least to the extent of food,
drink and tobacco were obtained.
Work stoppages: The troubled labor conditions of certain areas can often
be a deterrent to manufacturing activity. Data on time lost due to
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unexpected stoppages were collected.
Training facilities: Due to the importance of manpower, it is necessary to
have institutions capable of training and recycling manpowero As a proxy
measurement for this factor, the number of students enrolled in technical
training courses was obtained.
2) Support systems
Within the Venezuelan manufacturing environment, the physical infrastructure
seems to be one of the most important locational factors. Attempts were
made to obtain data on the various support systems. Indeed, the following
information was collected for each city:
- Percentage of population serviced with water
- Water availability in cubic meters per inhabitant
- Water cost
- Number of telephones and telexes.
It was originally intended to obtain data on electricity-blackouts as a
proxy for reliability of the service but this information was impossible to
gather. Furthermore, in terms of obtaining electricity costs, it was planned
to use the city's tariffs; this approach was discontinued when it became
apparent that not only can many- combinations be obtained, depending on the
characteristics of the firm, but information on these firm's characteristics
was not available.
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Furthermore, an analysis of electricity costs using aggregate data for each
city, showed no major differentials. It was also not possible to obtain
usable data on refuse disposal and sewerage.
3) Access to services
Services for manufacturing activities that a city offers can be very
important. Firms will tend to locate where service facilities for their
machinery and equipment are available as well as such services as
marketing and packaging facilities. We were able to obtain the following
data regarding city services offered to the manufacturing industry:
- Proportion of total employees in the financial sector
- Proportion of total employees in services to establishments
- Proportion of total employees in research institutions
4) Amenities
Amenity attributes are a particular set of city characteristics which seem
to have a strong effect on industrial location decisions. The need for
manpower may lead entrepeneurs to locate a plant in a favorable urban
environment. Nevertheless, employees will demand certain social and cultural
amenities such as housing, school for the children, meeting places, etc.
Furthermore, as the level of technical skill increases, there will be a
tendency to put higher values on places with better climates, landscapes
and surroundings. Amenities are particularly difficult locational factors
to measure, since amenity is a generic term for a complex bundle of
attributes and may be perceived in many different ways by different
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entrepeneurs. Nevertheless, we have attempted to measure these attributes
by means of several variables. The measure ultimately selected were,
expressed in each case, where not indicated to the contrary, relative to
total population:
- Number of doctors
- Number of hospital beds
- Number of 5-14 years old children per classroom (primary school)
- Number of 15-19 years old teenagers per classroom (high school)
- Teachers per classroom in primary school
- Teachers per classroom in high school
- Students per classroom in primary school
- Students per classroom in high school
- Number of retail employees
- Number of hotel and restaurant employees
- Number of employees in entertainment and cultural services
- Number of employees in transportation
- Number of public transport vehicles
- Delinquent index
We were unable to find data for all the cities under study for such
important attributes as housing, climate and police and fire protection.
A comfort index was proposed to be used as a proxy for climatic conditions.
The index would combine climatic factors such as wind, humidity and
temperature. Because data were only available for some cities, the use of
this surrogate was abandoned. Altitude may serve as a single measure for
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climate, but due to the "U" shape effect (extreme values are unconfortable)
the use of this measure was not pursued further.
5) Spatial or flow characteristics
An attempt was made to capture the advantage of proximity to markets and
sources of supply. For this purpose, the concept of flow characteristics
was defined. Flow characteristics are those attributes of a city that
reflect the accessibility to markets, ports, sources of inputs, etc. They
are a composite of linkages among economic units and transportation costs.
This group of variables is perhaps one of the most difficult to represent
and measure.
In order to determine, the proximity advantage of a particular industry
subsector, we used a spatial interaction model of the potential type.
In this model, it is assumed that the greater the potential for
interindustry trade, the higher the attractiveness of a particular location;
and the more distant this interindustry activity, the lower the
attractiveness of that location.
Seven models were developed. They reflect the agglomeration potential
associated with:
1) Local inputs
2) Foreign inputs (imports)
3) Intermediate markets
4) Foreign markets (exports)
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5 Domestic final consumers
5.1 Private consumption
5.2 Government consumption
6 The presence of manufacturing activity of the same industrial
sectoro
A summary discussion of the above-mentioned models is given in the
following section while further details are presented in appendix Do
The agglomeration potential model
The "potential" concept may be thought of as a measure indicating the
intensity of the possibility of interaction. The basic principles
underlying potential models can be formulated as follows (Carrothers, ):
At a given location p, the potential influence, or possiblity of
interaction with respect to an individual at p, which is generated by the
attractiveness of any given point q, will be greater as the attractiveness
of q is larger and will be smaller as the distance between p and q increases.
Then according to this formulation, the accessibility of an origin p to
attractions in the destination point q, can be expressed by the basic
equation:
Vpq KWq
V a (7.8)
pq
where V p = potential at point p generated by the attractiveness of (or
activity at) point q
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W = attractiveness of (or level of activity at) point q
T = transfer cost between point p and q.
a = transfer cost exponent. We have used a=2. (See further details
on the section dealing with measuring the proximity to places
in appendix D).
In our case the constant K is a scale factor which will depend on the
industry subgroup being analyzed.
The potential model can also be formulated as a constrained gravity model
(production constrained case). The gravity model is developed by analogy
with Newton's Law of Gravitation expressed by the formula
M M2
F =G 2 (7'9)
d
where F = force with which each mass pulls the other.
M1 ,M2 = size of masses concerned.
d = distance between them.
G = universal constant, the pull of gravity.
When the potential model is formulated as a production constrained case of
the gravity model, the single constant K in equation 7.9 is replaced by a
set of proportionality constants KM so that the constraint can be
satisfiedo For a comprehensive review and detailed presentation of spatial
interaction models see Reif o
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Since we are interested in the agglomeration potential of a point p taking
into account the activity that takes place in all the points q that are
part of the manufacturing spatial structure, we can generalize equation
(7.8) by summing over all points q:
VP = (K W (7.10)
q Tpq
Equation 7.10 may be identified as the generic potential model that will be
used in this study to determine the attractiveness of a location based on
the flow characteristics. In order to simplify the notation, the superscript
p will be dropped, since the potential will always be referred to a particular
point po
To give the reader an overview of how the generic model presented in
equation 7.10 is used, the agglomeration potential model associated with
local inputs will be briefly presented.
Agglomeration potential associated with local inputs
a) Level of activity:
In this model, the "level of activity" i at point q (W ) can be expressed
by the proportion of the national production of sector i that takes place
at point q Hence
X q
W. = (7.11)i X.
I
where X = the level of production of sector i at point q.
X. = the national level of production of sector i.
1
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b) Interaction factor:
Since we are interested in backward linkages, we shall use as interaction
factors, the Leontieff input-output technical coefficients. These
coefficients are estimated as follows:
X..
a.. = (7.12)
ij X.J
where a.. = amount of inputs that industry j must purchase from industry
i to produce one unit of its output.
X.. = production of sector i sold to sector jo
X. = total production of sector j0
J
In order to distribute the input requirements among the various sources,
we shall assume that sector j can potentially purchase a certain amount
from each point q and that other things being equal, the amount purchased
might be proportional to the production of i at point q Hence, in order
to compute the purchases of input i, that sector j makes at point q, we
have
M. = a.. W (7.13)
13L3 l
For the production of sector j, inputs are needed from various sectors i,
which may have part of their production in the same point q Hence
= Z a.. Wq(7.14)
J ij 1J
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where M = Amount of inputs that sector j purchases at point q.
J
c) Proximity to local sources:
Since we assume that as the distance from point p to the source q increases,
the attractiveness of source q decreases, the probability of an actual
purchase may be inversely related to the travel function, as expressed in
equation 7.9. To estimate the attractiveness to sector j of point p, due to
inputs located at point q, we have:
a.. W
V = 1 1 (7.15)
pq
Hence, to estimate the attractiveness of point p to industry j, due to
inputs located at all points q, we compute
Z a.. W q
V. = ij (7.16)
j q Ta
pq
The technical coefficients, a.., tell us the relative importance in money
value terms of the various industries i which are sources to industry j.
These belong not only to the processing sector but to the payment sector
as well; for example, payment of wages and taxes. Since our concern in this
model is with the relative purchases that industry j makes from the
various industries i belonging to the processing sector, we may neglect the
factor payment sector and use only purchased goods and services. The
purchase coefficients can be derived from the technical coefficients in
the following way:
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* a. .
a. = a.. for i = 1Y2, 06 k (7.17)
*
where a.. = Purchase coefficient.
2IJ
k = Number of industries in the processing sector.
In doing so, we will be able to compare not only the attractiveness, to
industry j, of one geographical point against another point (which is the
subject matter of the agglomeration potential model), but to also compare
the attractiveness of point p to industry i compared to industry j.
Hence, equation 7.16 should be rewritten as:
qqZa.. W.
V. = X -I i (7ol6.a)
J q Tpq
In terms of data requirements, the 1971 national input-output table
(Conavial, ) was used to determine the technical coefficients. To the
extent that production technology differs significantly on a regional basis,
these national input-output coefficients are biased estimators. Provided
elasticities of substitution between factors of production is not high,
the input-output model will provide an approximation of the interlinkages
among industrial sectors. The level of economic activity for each industry
subgroup at three-digit ISIC code was measured by the bolivares value of
output. The purchasing power was estimated by the population times the
per capita income; and Government expenditures were measured by the
operational budget of each state. To measure transfer costs between two
cities, several variables are suitable: straight line mileage, road
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mileage, transport cost, etc. Based on data availability, travel time
was selected (see appendix D).
6) General economic conditions
General economic conditions may represent an important set of locational
factors. Some of them are:
Unemployment rates: The level of unemployment in a city can be indicative
of economic conditions in that area. Actually, the change in unemployment
rates from the long-term city average is often a better measure of economic
conditions than the absolute level of unemployment, since systematic
differences in unemployment rates prevail among towns (Carlton, 5). The
deviation in the unemployment rate from its long-term city average is used
in this study0
Other measures that were obtained for each of the twenty cities are:
* Median household income
* Median per-capita income
* Number of private cars
* Number of wholesale employees
The cost of land for manufacturing activity as well as construction costs
are expected to have strong locational implications. Factories that require
large amounts of floorspace area are expected to go where these costs are
lower. Furthermore, the availability of land for industrial use may also
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be an important determinant of location. Unfortunately, information on
these factors was not available. Attempts to use as a proxy data on
residential land and construction costs proved equally difficult, and data
for only few cities were obtained.
7) Government incentives
Government incentives can be measured by a number of variables. Among them
are financial and fiscal incentives, municipal tax holidays, etc. As
indicated in chapter 5, data on financial incentives were obtained. Data
on the other incentives were not available. In order to determine how much
savings an entrepeneur could have made by locating in an area of
deconcentration, a single indicator for the level of subsidy in each area
was needed. This indicator had to combine into one measure subsidized
interest rates, a market interest rate, loan period and a grace period.
Furthermore, these aspects varied according to the use of the money: whether
for land and construction, machinery and equipment, or for working capital.
We selected a composite measure, as discussed in chapter 5, based on the
concept of net present value, which reflected the percentage savings (in
present value terms) obtained by an entrepeneur locating in each of the
cities. For each of the components of the loan, e.g., machinery, working
capital, etc., the present discounted value of the series of payments was
calculated. This measure allowed us to combine both subsidized and market
interest rates, as well as grace and loan periods.
7.4.b Firm's characteristics
Because the manufacturing sector is so varied, the number of possible
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characteristics for a firm is very large. (For example industry subgroup,
number of employees, electricity consumption, capital/labor ratio,
protection level, etc.). In this case we were constrained by data
availability. Our recreated directories for 1974 and 1976, as well as the
1978 directory, were used to obtain some information about the new firms.
The data for each firm included its five-digit ISIC code, its location and
its level of employment. It wan not possible to obtain information on
electricity consumption, production values, and other characteristics, for
each of the firms, although this information could be obtained as an
average for the surveyed firms.
7.5 Summary of chapter 7
In this chapter an attempt is made to describe the general form of a
discrete choice model of location. The model begins with the example of
an entrepeneur confronted with the problem of making a decision on where
to locate a manufacturing plant. It is assumed that the decision will
depend on the attributes of both the firm and the city. The model attempts
to relate the variables of the cities to the locational choice of
entrepeneurs. Then following are sections which discuss the issues related
to the selection of the cities to be studied, as well as the data required
to estimate the parameters of the model.
The measures presented in this chapter will be used in the specification of
the utility functions defined in the next chapter. Table 7.1 presents a
summary of the 2,255 measures for which data were collected.
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TABLE 7.1
SUMMARY OF MEASURES FOR WHICH DATA WERE OBTAINED
No. Description ca
1 Percentage of the city labor force to its population.
2-digits, 1975 & 1977 (LFR).
2 Wage rate. 3-digit, 1975 & 1977 (WAGE).
3 Comparative cost of living index for food, drinks
and tobacco, 1975 & 1977 (CST).
4 Working hours lost due to unexpected stoppages, 1975
& 1977 (STR).
5 Number of students enrolled in technical training
courses per thousand inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (TRN).
6 Number of employees in research institutes per thousand
inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (RES).
7 Water availability m3 per inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (WAT)
8 Percentage of population serviced with water, 1975
& 1977 (WPR).
9 Water cost, 1975 & 1977 (WCT)
10 Number of telephones per thousand inhabitants, 1975
& 1977 (PHN)O
11 Number of telexes per thousand inhabitants, 1975
& 1977 (TLX)O
12 Number of beds per thousand inhabitants, 1975 &
1977(HSP).
13 Agglomeration potential associated with local inputs.
3-digits, 1975 & 1977 (LIP).
14 Agglomeration potential associated with foreign inputs.
3-digits, 1975 & 1977 (FIP).
15 Agglomeration potential associated with intermediate
markets. 3-digits, 1975 & 1977 (INM).
16 Agglomeration potential associated with foreign markets.
3-digits (FOM). 20
No. of
tegories*
20
20
20
20
20
20
. 20
20
20 & 4
20
20
20
20
20
20
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TABLE 7,1-Continued
No.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Description
Agglomeration potential associated with private
consumption. 3-digit, 1975 & 1977 (PRC).
Agglomeration potential associated with government
consumption. 3-digits, 1975 & 1977 (GVC).
Agglomeration potential associated with the presence
of manufacturing industry of the same industrial
sector. 3-digit, 1975 & 1977 (CMP).
Population, 1975 & 1977 (POP).
Number of inhabitants per doctor, 1975 & 1977 (DOC).
Number of 5-14 year old children per classroom
(Primary school) 1975 & 1977 (CHC).
Number of 15-19 year old teenagers per classroom
(Secondary school) 1975 & 1977 (EEC).
Primary school: teachers per classroom, 1975 & 1977
(PTC).
High school: teachers per classroom, 1975 & 1977
(HTC).
Primary school: number of students per classroom,
1975 & 1977 (PSC)O
High school: students per classroom, 1975 & 1977
(HSC).
Public transport vehicles per thousand inhabitants,
1975 & 1977 (PTV).
Delinquent index (CRM).
Number of private cars per thousand inhabitants,
1975 & 1977 (CAR).
Number of wholesale employees per thousand
inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (WHS).
Median household income, 1975 & 1977 (FIC).
Per capita median income, 1975 & 1977 (INC).
No. of
categories*
20
20
20
20
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
12
7
7
7
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TABLE 7.1-Continued
No.
34
35
36
37
38
39
Description
Ratio of unemployment rate to the normal level of
unemployment, 1975 & 1977 (ECC)O
Unemployment by skills. 2-digit, 1975 & 1977 (UNS).
Number of professionals, technicians and related
occupation per thousand inhabitants, 1975 & 1977
(TEC).
Number of managers, administrators and directors per
thousand inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (MNG)o
Number of employees in the financial sector per
thousand inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (BNK).
Number of employees in services for establishments
per thousand inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (INS)0
Number of retail employees per thousand inhabitants,
1975 & 1977 (RET).
Number of hotel and restaurant employees per thousand
inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (HOT).
Number of employees in entertainment and cultural
services per thousand inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (ENT),
Number of employees in transportation per thousand
inhabitants, 1975 & 1977 (PTV).
Percentage savings in present value terms due to
financial incentives, Corpoindustria (SFI).
Percentage savings in present value terms due to
financial incentives, FCI (LFI).
* 20 means data by city
12 or 13 means data by state
7 means data by administrative region
4 means data by deconcentration area
SOURCE: Various0 See appendixes C and D.
No. of
categories*
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
4
40
41
42
43
44
45
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8 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
8.1 Specification of the logit model
8
.
1,a Selection of the independent variables
As illustrated by the measures discussed in the previous chapter, there are
many variables which may affect locational choice. In order to reduce the
feasible set, we examined the statistical correlation among all the
variables for which we had data. High correlations between variables of
the same locational factor group was found, for example, between
accessibility to local inputs and accessibility to final consumers. A
possible explanation for this colinearity may be found in the strong
linkages that the industries studied have with other industries, which in
turn are located in highly populated areas associated with above-average
income. (See chapter 4 for the criteria used to select the industrial
subgroups). Furthermore, we also found colinearity between variables
belonging to different factor groups (for example between services,
amenities and economic conditions). It is not surprising to find that
places with, say, high levels of financial services also have high
levels of entertainment facilities and of income.
After a careful examination of the variables in terms of factors such as
statistical correlation, existing empirical work (see for example
Carlton, 1), number of categories of the variable (see table 7.1), and
reliability of the source (see appendix C), and relying heavily on the
economic theory of location, the following variables were selected to
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represent each of the factor groups:
Labor conditions:
Support system:
Services, amenities and
economic conditions:
Flow characteristics:
- Wages (WAGE)
- Technical expertise (TEC)
- Work stoppages (STR)
- Percentage of population serviced with
water (WPR)
- Number of telephones (PHN)
- Number of doctors (DOC)
- Agglomeration potential associated with local
inputs (LIP)
- Agglomeration potential associated with foreign
inputs (FIP)
Government incentives: - Financial incentives (FI)
The independent variables used are summarized in table 8.1.a. The
variables are re-expressed as logarithms. The logarithmic transformation
serves several purposes (Tufte, ):
1.- The resulting regression coefficients sometimes have a more useful
theoretical interpretation compared to a regression based on unlogged
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variables (eog. elasticities).
2.- Logarithmic transformation pulls the extremely large values in toward
the middle of the scale and spreads the smaller values out in
comparison to the original, unlogged values of the variable.
3.- Some of the assumptions underlying the regression model and the
associated significance tests are better met when the logarithm of the
measured variables is taken.
The variables representing the characteristics of a firm are interrelated
with the characteristics of a city. See for example TWAGE (total firm's
payroll) in table 8.1.a.
The first variable, U1, is a constant term in the utility function. This
constant measures the so-called "pure alternative" effect, that is, the
net effect of all attributes of an alternative which are not measured by
the other variables. Since the city of Caracas is the location chosen by
about 66% of the new manufacturing industries, it was decided to assign
a dummy variable to this city.
The second variable, FI, represents the financial incentives of the
industrial deconcentration policy. This measure was developed because there
are a large number of elements that have to be considered, such as interest
rate, grace and loan periods, uses of money: whether for land and
construction, machinery and equipment, or for working capital. See
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TABLE 8.1,a
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED IN THE LOGIT ESTIMATIONS
DefinitionVariable
(1) U'
(2) FI
(3) TWAGE
(4) LIP
TEC
1 in the Caracas alternative
0 otherwise
Percentage savings in present value terms due to
financial incentives (log).
Wage times number of employees in the firm (log).
Agglomeration potential associated with local
inputs (log).
Proportion of the city's professionals, technicians
and related ocupations to its population (log).
Average number of working hours lost per thousand
workers, per year, due to unexpected stoppages (log).
Number of telephone lines (installed capacity) per
thousand inhabitants (log).
Number of inhabitants per doctor (log).
Agglomeration potential associated with foreign
inputs (log).
Percentage of the city's population serviced with
water (log).
(6) STR
PHN
(8) DOC
(9) FIP
(10) WPR
(5)
(7)
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appendix C for a detailed presentation of this variable.
The third of these variables, total wage (TWAGE), represents the interaction
between the prevailing wages of the city and the firm's number of employeeso
In other words, the variable represents the total payroll that each firm
would have in each of the twenty cities. This interaction reflects the
hypothesis that firms with large payrolls are proportionally much more
sensitive to labor costs, than smaller ones. Furthermore, we may hypothesize
that firms will tend to locate where wages are lower, hence, a negative
coefficient would be expected0
Variable 4, agglomeration potential associated with local inputs, LIP, was
designed to reflect the accessibility to local inputs that a firm might
have, if it located in each alternative city. It is a composite variable
reflecting not only industrial linkages, but also transportation costs. It
is assumed that as the distance to a particular source of inputs increases,
the attractiveness of that source decreases.
Due to the high correlation found between this variable (reflecting
accessibility to local inputs) and the variables measuring accessibility
to markets, we may argue that variable 4 (LIP) reflects accessibility to
both local inputs and markets. We further hypothesize that the higher the
agglomeration potential associated with local inputs and markets a city
has, the more attractive it will be to an industrialist. A positive sign
is expected.
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The variable TEC reflects the hypothesis that entrepeneurs look for places
where technicians and related professionals are available. This should be
especially true for firms with a high level and proportion of skilled
workers. We may expect a positive coefficient.
The variable STR reflects the hypothesis that entrepeneurs tend to locate
their plants away from areas of high labor unrest. By measuring this
variable in terms of the yearly average working hours lost per thousand
workers, (due to unexpected stoppages), a negative coefficient is
expected.
The seventh variable, PHN, reflects the effect of telephones on an
industry's desire to locate in cities with appropriate telecommunication
facilities. A positive coefficient may be expected.
Variable DOC measures the number of inhabitants per doctor. Since we may
hypothesize that entrepeneurs will be more attracted to cities with better
health facilities and assuming that lower number of inhabitants per doctor
implies better health services, we may expect a negative coefficient. As
indicated earlier, due to the high colinearity found between the amenities,
services, and economic condition group factors, we may argue that this
variable measures the locational effect of these three groups.
Variable 9, agglomeration potential associated with foreign inputs, FIP,
was designed to reflect the accessibility to foreign inputs that a firm may
have if it locates in each alternative. It is a composite variable
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reflecting the dependence on foreign raw materials and components, as well
as the transport cost to international ports. It is assumed that as the
distance to ports increases, the attractiveness of that port decreases. We
may expect that the higher the proportion of imported components for local
assembly, the closer the assembly plant will tend to be to international
ports. A positive coefficient is expected.
The last variable used in the logit model, WPR, reflects the hypothesis
that industries, --especially those which are high water consumers-- tend
to locate where there is availability of water.
8.1.b Selection of the model specification
For any applied model of locational choice, however, the selection of an
appropriate specification must include some experimentation with the data.
It is, of course, important to avoid "mining" the data. In order to guard
against this danger, all experimentation was done with the sub-sample of
data for the period prior to the introduction of the financial incentives
package. As will be seen in the reported results, this model fits the
second sub-sample equally well. As indicated earlier, this study has relied
heavily on the economic theory of location and existing empirical work in
selecting an appropriate model specification and set of right-hand side
variables.
Several distinct logit model specifications were estimated with data for
the first period. These models correspond to different combinations of
variables selected earlier. The details of five of the model specifications
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estimated are given in Table 8.1.b to give the reader a perspective on
some of the results obtained. For each model, the t-statistics are given
in parentheses below their corresponding parameter estimates. In addition,
five summary statistics are given, defined as follows:
Sum of squared residuals at convergence: The unexplained variation0
Degrees of freedom: The number of available observations minus the number
of constraints placed on the data.
Percentage correctly predicted
This summary statistic is a goodness of fit measure indicating the accuracy
with which a model approximates the observed data, where accuracy is judged
in terms of the ability of the model to forecast observed responses
(Domencich and McFadden, ). The percentage correctly predicted shows the
fraction of the observations for which the alternative with the greatest
systematic component of the utility (when evaluated at the estimated
parameters) was actually selected (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 4). Note that we
do not expect this statistic to be 100% since some decision-makers may not
choose the alternative that gives them the highest utility from the model's
perspective. (Recall that utility is measured in terms of observable
attributes, see appendix B)oTo give the reader an idea of how the percentage
correctly predicted is calculated, an example is given below.
Let us suppose that we have a sample of 30 establishments and three
alternatives: cities A, B, and C. The actual choices made by the 30
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TABLE 8.1.b
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE 1975-1976 PERIOD FOR FIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
1
Model specification No.
2 3 4 5
.35 -.95 -2.85 -3.04 -1.06
(.87) (1.50) (2.71) (2.88) (1.75)
-1.32 -.91 -1.42 -1.45 -1.47
(2.90) (1.93) (3.16) (3.21) (3.18)
1.12 1.16 1.36 1.29 1.09
(8.18) (8.06) (7.48) (6.91) (7.19)
1.90 3.20 3.26 3.41 2.71
(3.01) (4.20) (4.25) (4.48) (3.90)
-.19 -.16 -.49 -.51 -.31
(1.99) (1.52) (3.69) (3.68) (2.77)
1.24
(3.21)
.76 1.15
(1.94) (3.16)
-2.37 -. 82
(3.52) (2.46)
-. 50
(3.74)
1.39
(1.83)
4.12 3.78 1.59
(3.28) (2.83) (1.73)
Sum of squared residuals 12350 19890 43820 40660 15300
Degrees of freedom
Percentage correctly predicted
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio statistic
Number of firms in the sample:
7157
70.29
.5637
1273
7156 7156
70.29 70.29
.5742
1297
.5696
1287
7155 7156
70.29 70.29
.5714
1291
.5686
1284
377
Variable
1 U1
2 FI
3 TWAGE
4 LIP
5 TEC
6 STR
7 PHN
8 DOC
9 FIP
10 WPR
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entrepeneurs are distributed in the following way: 15 firms selected city A,
10 firms chose city B and 5 industrialists selected city C. Table 8.2 present
the prediction success table for this example.
TABLE 8.2
PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE. AN EXAMPLE.
Predicted
A B C
A
Actual B
C
15
10
5
Total 30
From the prediction success table we see that, for example, out of the 15
entrepeneurs which actually chose city A, the model correctly predicted
only 10; the other 5 of these 15 firms were allocated by the model to
cities B and C, i.e., 2 establishments to city B and 3 to city C. It can be
seen that the diagonal of the matrix represents those specific firms for
which the model predicted the alternative actually selected. The percentage
correctly predicted is estimated by adding the numbers in the diagonal and
dividing by the sample size, that is, (10 + 5 + 1)/30 = 53.3%
Note that in the example cited, the model predicted that a total of 15 firms
would locate in city A, 9 in city B, and 6 in city C. The prediction success
criteria, however, count as "correct" only the case when an individual firm
10 2 3
3 5 2
2 2 1
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does precisely as predicted, not when a group of firms on the average
behave as anticipated. The success criteria is thus considerably more
stringent than is found in the more common measures of statistical goodness
of fit.
Likelihood ratio index
Is a goodness of fit measure indicating the accuracy with which a model
approximates the observed data, where accuracy is judged in terms of the
fit between calculated probabilities and observed frequencies (Domencich
and McFadden, 5
The likelihood-ratio index, p2 , which can be used much as R is in
ordinary regression, is calculated by the statistic
2 L(S)2 = 1 -
L (0)
where L (S) = The value of the log likelihood function at convergence,
i.e., the maximized value of the log likelihood function.
*
L (0) = This is the value of the log likelihood function when all
the parameters are zero, or are zero except for
coefficients of alternative dummies. (Constant term).
Furthermore, the value of the log likelihood is evaluated
such that the probability of choosing the ith alternative
is exactly equal to the observed aggregate share in the
sample of the ith alternative.
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Clearly L will be larger when evaluated at 8 than when all the parameters
are zero, ie., when the explanatory variables are ignored. Intuitively,
the greater the explanatory power of the independent variables, the larger
A*
L (S) will be in comparison to L (0). We note that L (S) will be larger
*
than L (0) but for the multinomial logit, this means a smaller negative
number so that L ( )/L (0) will be between zero and one. The smaller this
ratio, the better the fit of the model and hence, the larger 1 minus this
ratio. Therefore, we use p2 (rho squares) as type of pseudo-R to measure
the goodness of fit for the model.(Hensher and Johnson,6 ).
According to Ben-Akiva and Lerman "p2 is analogous to R used in regression,
but it should be used with somewhat more caution. Values of p2 will depend
on the type of model being estimated. The measure is most useful in
comparing two specifications developed on the exact same data."
Hensher and Johnson8 refering to this statistic indicate that "It should
be noted, however, that values of p2 of between 0.2 and 0O4 are considered
extremely good fits so that the analyst should not be looking for values
in excess of 0.9 as is often the case when using R2 in ordinary regression."
Likelihood ratio statistic
This is the standard statistic to test the hypothesis that all the
parameters are zero. Under the null hypothesis it is asymptotically
chi-square distributed with number of degrees of freedom equal to the
number of parameters estimated. This statistic is defined to be:
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2 L (S) - L (0)
where L (S) = Value of the log likelihood function at convergence
*
L (0) = Value of the log likelihood function when all the
parameters are zero.
The higher the value of this statistic, the less likely it is that the
parameters are zero.
The computer program used for the statistical analysis is QUAIL in its
version 4.0. The multinomial logit procedure was developed by Daniel
McFadden, currently professor in the Department of Economics, at MIT. The
IBM version was coded by Jerry Berkman, Scott Luebking, Carlos Puig and
Daniel Brownstone. The program was run at the MIT Computer Center using an
IBM 370/168 computer. Usually, 1024 k of storage was used, although there
were situations when 2048 k was needed.
Since financial incentives were not in effect during the first period, i.e.,
1975-1976, this variable (FI) was not considered in the model specifications
tested. Table 8.1.b shows that the parameters of the variables TWAGE, LIP
and STR remain relatively stable across the five model specifications. This
pattern held true in the estimation of alternative model specifications.
Variable TEC was also found relatively stable in most of the specifications
studied.
From table 8.10b we can see that the parameter of variable 9 (FIP), the
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accessibility to foreign inputs, had the opposite sign from the one
expected. As a matter of fact, almost all the model specifications tested
had a negative coefficient for FIP. Since these findings were puzzling,
a closer look was taken. When plotting the number of new establishments'
in a city against the city's distance to the nearest international port,
we found that the bulk of new manufacturing activity takes place at a
certain distance from the port: mainly between 30 and 100 minutes. After
100 minutes, it drops very fast. A possible explanation for this parabola-
like curve may be the fact that we did not control for variables such as
the availability of land for industrial use. It is possible that
settlements closer to ports have topographical limitations for the
location of industries. If this is the case, we can hardly expect
manufacturing activity in these places.
Table 8.1.b shows that the parameters for the health services surrogate,
DOC, although having the expected sign, are relatively unstable. This can
be explained by the high correlation (0.62) between DOC and the proxy for
telephone service, PHN.
To give the reader an idea of some of the aspects considered in the
selection process of the model specification used in this analysis, we
shall refer to the five models presented in table 8.1.b. For example, out
of the five models, we may reject model 2 because of the unexpected sign
found in variable FIPo Models 3 and 4 can be dropped because of high
variation in the parameter values of the variable DOC. Having to choose,
in this example, between models 1 and 5, we may disregard model 5 because
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it has one more variable than model 1 adding no additional explanatory
power to the model.(Both have a likelihood ratio index of .56). Furthermore,
the unexplained residuals are higher in model 5.(The sum of squared
residuals is 15,300 in model 5 versus 12,350 in model 1). Hence, we select
specification 1 in this example. As a matter of fact, specification 1 was
selected out of all the specifications analyzed as the model to be used in
this research. The likelihood ratio index of .56 for this model indicates
that the overall goodness of fit is fairly good.
To analyze the data for the second period (1977-1978), variable FI
(financial incentives) was added to the model selected (specification 1)
and the parameters were estimated. The results appear in table 8.3.
Table 8.3 allows us to compare the results obtained by using this model
with data from both the first period (1975-1976) and the second (1977-1978).
Looking at the results presented in table 8.3, the model seems to be
structurally stable over time: The sign of the coefficients are the same
for both periods. Furthermore, the values of the coefficients are similar,
except for WPR (availability of water) which shows a significant increase
in the second period.
8.2 Analysis of the coefficients
The coefficients of all variables except the dummy variable associated with
Caracas can be interpreted as the proportional change in the probability
that results from a one percent change in the independent variable. For
example, let the coefficient for water availability, WPR, be twice that of
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TABLE 8.3
PARAMETERS ESTIMATES FOR 1975-1976 AND 1977-1978 FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE
OF THE SIX INDUSTRY SUBGROUPS
Variable
U1
FI
TWAGE
LIP
TEC
1975-1976
.35
(.87)
-1.32
(2.90)
1.12
(8.18)
l o .90
(3.01)
-019
(1.99)
1.39
(1.83)
STR
WPR
Number of firms in the sample 377
1977-1978
-006
(o08)
.01
(.31)
-1.69
(3.86)
.96
(5.26)
1.41
(1.50)
-.21
(1.91)
4.79
(3.45)
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Sum of squared residuals
Degrees of freedom
Percentage correctly predicted
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio statistic
12350
7157
70.29
.5637
1273
1914
2235
52.54
.3683
260.4
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the coefficient for telephone services, PRN. A two percent increase in the
level of service of PHN in city A will increase by certain amount the
probability of a firm to select city A as its location. The same increment
in probability can be obtained by enlarging city A's level of water service,
WPR, by only one percent. Hence, we see in this example that WPR is two
times more important than PHN as a factor of location. Therefore a direct
comparison between coefficient magnitudes of different variables can reveal
which factors exert the most influence in a new locationo
Looking at table 8.3, we can see that the dummy coefficient for Caracas, U1,
is subject to a wide confidence interval in both periods. It is possible
that the net effect of all attributes of Caracas, which are not measured by
the other variables, may be the most important in attracting new industry,
but the data simply do not allow us to determine this effect with much
precision. The opposite indeed might even be the case; i.e., Caracas may
exert a negative effect. Some evidence of the latter is seen in table 8.1.b:
in those cases where we have controlled for more variables, a negative
coefficient for Caracas is obtained.
The coefficient of the financial incentives variable (FI) is very small and
statistically insignificant. The failure of financial incentives to show up
as an important influence on location is consistent with our previous
finding in chapter 5.
Wage levels, especially when interacting with the number of employees,
TWAGE, exerts a large influence on the location of industry. The
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coefficients are statistically significant in both periods.
The accessibility to both sources of local inputs and to markets, LIP,
enters significantly in both periods. The coefficients are highly
statistically significant.
Having a pool of technical expertise in the city, TEC, as measured by the
proportion of the city's professionals, technicians and related occupations
to its population seems to be an important factor of location.
The coefficient of the variable measuring work stoppages is not large but
statistically significant in both periods, implying that entrepeneurs are
concerned with locating their plants away from cities with high labor
unrest.
The coefficient for the variable measuring water availability, WPR,
increases more than three times in the second period. At the same time, it
becomes even more statistically significant. A closer look at variable
WPR in table 8.3 indicates two major issues. On the one hand manufacturing
firms seem to be, in general, attracted to places with water availability.
On the other hand, it is likely that during the second period, industrialists
were more concerned with water, i.e., second period entrepeneurs were more
sensitive to water availability.
Based on these sample results, without stratifying by industry subgroups,
it seems reasonable to conclude that:
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1) Wages are an important factor in explaining the location of industry.
2) The evidence provides little support for the proposition that financial
incentives have exerted an effect on the location of manufacturing
activity.
3) The accessibility to both local inputs and to markets exerts a large
influence on the locational decision of a manufacturing firm.
4) The presence of technical expertise is likely to be important as a
locational factor.
5) The more labor unrest a city has, the less likely is it to attract new
manufacturing activity.
6) The availability of water exerts a large influence on the location of
new manufacturing activity. Furthermore, during the second period of
analysis, it seems likely that this variable exerted even more influence
in the location decision of firms than during the first period.
8.3 Results stratified by industry subgroups
The results presented so far deal with the establishments corresponding to
the six industrial subgroup studied, without stratifying by manufacturing
sectors. It is important to ask, then, if these results would apply to each
industry subgroup. A priori we may expect the importance of the attributes
to vary among manufacturing groups.
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Table 8,4 indicates the number of establishments (by industry subgroup
and by year of foundation) to be used in our econometric analysis. It
should be noted that the number of establishments considered is less than
the total number of new establishments, The reason for this is that firms
locating outside the choice set (the twenty cities selected) are not
considered in the logit model.
TABLE 8.4
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE CHOICE SET BY INDUSTRY SUBGROUP
AND YEAR OF FOUNDATION
Textiles
Leather
Plastics
Non-electric machinery
Electric machinery
Transportation equipment
Total
1975-1976
Considered Omitted
68 14
47 5
79 19
71 16
51 10
61 13
377 77
1977-1978
Considered Omitted
23 3
14 3
23 4
24 9
9 3
25 9
118 31
SOURCE: - OCEI, Directorio Industrial,1978.
- Recreated directories for 1974 and 1976.
In table 8.4 we see that the electric machinery subgroup had a sample of
9 establishments in the second period. Due to the small number of
observations, it is unlikely that we can infer any meaningful conclusions
from their analysis. Hence, results for the second period for the electric
machinery subgroup will not be considered.
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The rsults stratified by manufacturing groups are presented in tables 8.5
to 8.7. For the plastic industry, the maximum likelihood routine had
difficulty converging when the WPR variable was included in the model
specification for the 1977-78 period. Hence, in table 8.7 we present the
results for the plastic industry related to the first period only.
Nevertheless, in order to know the possible effects of the variables
selected on the locational decision of the plastic industry, several other
model specifications without WPR were analyzed. The results are presented
in table 8.8.
8.3.a Wages (TWAGE)
We have indicated earlier that for the sample of industries without
stratifying by manufacturing groups, wages seem to exert a large influence
on the location of industry. When stratifying by industry subgroups, the
wage coefficient for all six industries is always subjected to a wide
confidence interval. (See table 8.5 to 8.7). Except for the plastic industry,
the expected negative sign is obtained. In terms of effect, wages seem to
be very important for leather, non-electric machinery and textiles
industries. Furthermore, for the leather and the non-electric machinery
industries, the coefficients in the second period are larger, possibly
implying more sensitivity to this variable during the second period.
Recalling that our hypothesis proposes that less protected industries were
more concerned with locational factors and that the economic "bonanza" of
the first period may have distorted the true effects of the factors of
location, we may expect, in general, values for the coefficients of the
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TABLE 8.5
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE TEXTILES AND THE TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
INDUSTRIES FOR THE TWO PERIODS
Textiles
1975-76 1977-78Variable
Transportation
equipment
1975-76 1977-78
Ul
FI
TWAGE
LIP
TEC
STR
WPR
Number of firms in the sample
Sum of squared residuals
Degrees of freedom
Percentage correctly predicted
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio statistic
795.7
1286
86.76
.7685
267.7
430
78.26
.67
929.4
1153
44.26
03478
465.1
468
52,0
.3793
313.1 92.32
005
(.02)
-2.66
(.88)
1.42
(1.79)
4.69
(1.78)
-. 22
(.80)
9.73
(1.37)
68
-2.38
(1.78)
-3.31
(1.78)
2.00
(3.31)
3.54
(1.85)
-. 55
(2.12)
1.22
(.72)
-. 09
(.02)
,04
(.38)
-2.54
(.79)
1.36
(1.54)
2.21
(.51)
-. 09
(.31)
20.93
(1.66)
23
-. 33
(.16)
.04
(.25)
.14
(.13)
1.23
(2.36)
-. 16
(.07)
-047
(1.68)
6.88
(1.52)
61 25
127.1 56.81
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TABLE 8.6
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE LEATHER AND THE NON-ELECTRIC MACHINERY
INDUSTRIES FOR THE TWO PERIODS
. Leather
1975-76 1977-78Variable
Non-electric
machinery
1975-76 1977-78
Ul
FI
TWAGE
LIP
TEC
STR
WPR
Number of firms in the sample
Sum of squared residuals
Degrees of freedom
Percentage correctly predicted
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio statistic
803.1
887
87.23
.7891
190.6
259
57.14
.47
1364
1343
73.24
.5831
345.2
449
29.17
.2118
222.2 39.50
5.26
(2.02)
-2.66
(.73)
.66
(.95)
1.01
(.30)
-.46
(1.57)
10.36
(2.32)
47
-2.26
(.67)
-. 16
(.99)
-12.23
(1.40)
1.15
(1.10)
7.77
(1.32)
-. 48
(.54)
9.71
(1.76)
14
1.26
(1.36)
-. 86
(.49)
1.03
(2.89)
.90
(.43)
-.26
(.80)
1.15
(.61)
71
-. 20
(.13)
.15
(.97)
-2.26
(.94)
.96
(2.36)
2.82
(.76)
.10
(.26)
4.09
(1.22)
24
248.0 30.46
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TABLE 8.7
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE PLASTICS AND THE ELECTRIC MACHINERY
INDUSTRIES FOR THE PERIOD 1975-1976
Variable Plastic
Electric
machinery
1.87
(2.22)
-. 59
(.63)
1.09
(.74)
.45
(1.69)
1.51
(1.15)
-. 11
(.51)
-. 93
(.60)
Number of firms in the sample
Sum of squared residuals
Degrees of freedom
Percentage correctly predicted
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio statistic
79
-. 42
(.17)
1.40
(3.61)
1.20
(.54)
-. 27
(.72)
.42
(.21)
51
1727
1495
74.68
.5889
278.7
764.8
963
52.94
.4428
135.3
Ul
FI
TWAGE
LIP
TEC
STR
WPR
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TABLE 8.8
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR 1977-1978:
FOUR MODEL SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PLASTIC INDUSTRY
Model specification
A B C D
67.32 69.26 70.71 67.08
(2.74) (2.65) (2.65) (2.66)
7.30 8.21 7.11 7.52
(2.78) (2.76) (2.80) (2.78)
1.57 3.07
(.93) (1.45)
-1.32
(.29)
.03
(.00)
2.70 2.57 3.18 3.40
(2.52) (2.27) (2.31) (1.78)
3.70 9.94
(1.07) (2.04)
2.63 7.81
(.68) (1.55)
-1.33 -1.57 -1.32 -1.73
(1.81) (1.90) (1.64) (1.51)
4.75
(1.39)
6.38
(1.15)
5.70 7.70
(.77) (1.06)
Number of firms in the sample 23 23 23 23
Sum of squared residuals
Degrees of freedom
Percentage correctly predicted
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio statistic
168.1 95.92 159.8 87.13
431 430 430 429.0
60,87 52,17 60,87 52,17
.5736 .6055 .5793 .6150
79.04 83.44 79.83 84.75
Variable
U1
FI
TWAGE
LIP
TEC
STR
PHN
DOC
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less protected industries to be larger during the second period (expected
behavior). This is to say that, during the second period, entrepeneurs of
less protected industries are hypothesized to have searched more carefully
for places that will give them advantages in terms of reducing costs and
increasing revenues.
Table 8.9 shows the pattern of association between the protection level and
the expected behavior for wages, The plastics and the electric machinery
industries are not considered because of the limitations indicated earlier.
In table 8.9 as well as in the following ones, an industry subgroup is
classified as having a low level of protection when its effective
protection is below 80 percent, and classified as having a high level when
is above 130 percent (see Figo 4.2 as well as the World Bank9 report,
cited earlier).
TABLE 8.9
PATTERN OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PROTECTION LEVEL
AND EXPECTED BEHAVIOR FOR WAGES
Expected Behavior
(larger TWAGE coefficients in second period)
Yes No
Low
Protection
High
Leather
Non-electric machinery
Textiles
Transportation equipment
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Table 8.9 indicates that less protected industries (as expected according
to our hypothesis) were more sensitive to wages during the second period,
It should be stressed that even if plastics and electric machinery
industries are considered, these conclusions hold. This finding gives
additional support to our hypothesis that protection for manufacturing
activity may supress the entrepeneur's interest for locating in low wage
areas.
8
.
3.b Access to both local inputs and markets (LIP)
The coefficients for the variable measuring access to both sources of local
inputs and markets (LIP) are usually important for all the six
manufacturing groups, although variations exist. (See tables 8.5 to 8.7).
In the transportation equipment, plastics and electric machinery industries
this variable seems to have important effects. Furthermore, coefficients
for transportation equipment, non-electric machinery and electric machinery
are statistically significant. This is also true for the plastic industry,
especially in the light of the four model specifications that appear in
table 8.8.
8.3.c Technical expertise (TEC)
When stratifying by industry subgroups, the technical expertise variable
seems to exert influence on each of the six manufacturing sectors. The
coefficients had a wide confidence interval (primarily during the first
period) except for textiles and transportation equipment industries. From
table 8.5 we can see that textiles and transportation equipment industries
behave in an unexpected way, by lowering their coefficient during the
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second period. Table 8.6 on the other hand, indicates that leather and
non-electric machinery industries have larger coefficients in the second
period, i.e., shows the expected behavior,
Table 8.10 shows the pattern of association between the level of protection
and the expected behavior for technical expertise.
TABLE 8.10
PATTERN OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PROTECTION LEVEL AND EXPECTED BEHAVIOR
FOR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
Expected Behavior
(larger TEC coefficients in second period)
Yes No
Low
Protection
High
Table 8.10 gives us additional evidence to support our hypothesis that less
protected industries in the second period were more concerned with
locational factors, i.e., the values for the coefficients of the less
protected industries during the second period are larger than the values
for the first period.
Leather
Non-electric machinery
Textiles
Transportation equipment
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A possible complementary explanation as to why some industry subgroups have
unexpected behavior in terms of technical expertise could be that it may
be better to take the necessary technicians with the firm -- and to pay
whatever amount is required-- rather than to locate in places where
technical expertise is available but where other locational factors are
not present. This additional cost is a burden that can be absorbed by an
establishment. Nevertheless, this additional expense is more easily
absorbed by high profit firms which usually are highly protected.
8.3.d Labor unrest (STR)
The coefficient for the variable measuring labor unrest is usually small
and subject to a wide confidence interval except in the transportation
equipment industry where it is statistically significant. A possible
explanation for the high significance (although low value) of the parameter
STR in the transportation equipment industry may be that this sector
include the assembly of motor vehicles and the specialized manufacture of
motor vehicle parts. Workers in this manufacturing sector are generally
better organized. The existence of labor organizations within this industry
makes the transportation equipment sector more prone to be involved in
labor conflicts. Locating the plants away from areas of high labor unrest
may be perceived by entrepeneurs as a measure to reduce the probability of
unexpected stoppages.
8.3.e Water availability (WPR)
Plastics and electrical machinery industries seem to be little affected by
the proxy for water availability. The coefficient for this variable is
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quite large for the other four manufacturing industries studied, Furthermore,
with the exception of the leather industry, for which the coefficient in
the second period remains stable, the parameters for the other three
industry subgroups increased drastically during the period 1977-78. Again,
we may argue that this increase in importance placed on water availability
as an important locational factor may be due to an awareness by second
period entrepeneurs.
A possible explanation of why the coefficient for water availability
remained unchanged during the second period for the leather manufacturing
sector, can be found by analyzing the ISIC 323 code. This code comprises
the manufacture of leather and products of leather (see table 4.12). It
includes tanneries and leather finishing as well as fur dressing and
dyeing industries. According to Fair and Geyer10 high-quality water is
required for this industry subgroup. Hence, water is a crucial input to
their production, and it is unlikely that first period entrepeneurs would
have overlooked its importance. Hence, water availability was seen as
equally important to leather industrialists during both periods.
8.3.f Caracas dummy (Ul)
As indicated earlier, the net effect of all attributes of Caracas which
are not measured by the other variables are reflected in the dummy
variable for the city of Caracas (Ul). Among the attributes which are not
measured by the other variables are those diseconomies related to
congestion, land cost and control over location. But there are factors,
such as access to the bureaucracy, which should continue to work in favor
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of Caracas.
According to our hypothesis, we may expect that the contribution of
Caracas per se to the utility function of less protected firms would
diminish as time passes because of increases in diseconomies. Although for
highly protected industries the disadvantages of Caracas as a location
also increases as time passes, this effect may be offset, for example, by
the increasing fear that protection will be removed (a likely event for
textiles today) or by looking for additional benefits such as those
related to the local content regulation (see chapter 3), both issues makes
Caracas more attractive. According to the World Bank11 study cited
earlier: "Regulations are best known in the automobile industry, which
throughout Latin America has been developed under a schedule of increasing
local content requirements. The Venezuelan automobile industry is no
exception to this general pattern." Hence, this behavior, i.e., large
negative effects in the second period can not be expected for highly
protected industries since it is likely that nearness to government is an
advantage that counteract the disadvantages of locating in Caracas.
Table 8.11 shows the pattern of association between the level of
government protection and the expected behavior for the Caracas variable.
It may be argued that not necessarly, as time goes by, Caracas was
perceived by entrepeneurs as offering larger diseconomies. It is likely
that the larger negative effects observed in the second period, represent
a return to the historically perceived situation which had been distorted
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by the sudden economic changes occurred in 1974. Unfortunately, the effect
of control over location, as a diseconomy, can not be separated here from
other diseconomies such as congestion or land cost.
TABLE 8.11
PATTERN OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT PROTECTION AND
THE EXPECTED BEHAVIOR FOR THE CARACAS VARIABLE
Expected Behavior
(larger U1 negative effect in second period)
Yes No
Leather
Low
Non-electric machinery
Protection
Textiles
High
Transportation equipment
8.3.g Financial incentives (FI)
From table 8.5 and table 8,6, we can see that the coefficients on the
variables measuring financial incentives are sometimes negative, always
very small and usually statistically insignificant. It should be noted
that these results can not be extended to the electric machinery and
plastic industries. As indicated earlier, the sample of firms locating
within the sample location set for the electric machinery industry
subgroup is composed of only nine observationso As such, it was decided
that conclusions for the electric machinery industry based on this
limited number of observations should not be considered.
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For the plastic industry we should also recall that the maximum likelihood
routine had difficulty converging with the WPR variable in the model
specification for the period 1977-78. However, several other model
specifications (without WPR) were analyzed for the plastic industry and the
results for four of them are presented in table 8.8. A careful analysis of
the coefficients for the variable FI in table 8.8 shows that for the plastic
industry, the financial incentive variable enters in all four specifications
--A, B, C and D-- with a large coefficient which is significant by the
standard statistical criteria. From these results, we may argue that for
the plastic industry, financial incentives exerted a substantial effect on
locational decisions. We might also argue that one positive result may be
simply a sampling accident. On the assumption that it is not, however, we
may offer the following explanation for this unique pattern of
responsiveness, based on interviews with entrepeneurs. The explanation in
question can be found by analyzing the nature of the ISIC 356 code (see
table 4.12). This code includes the moulding, extruding and fabricating of
plastic articles. A typical factory has few employees, requires
relatively small floor space and is composed of one or two machines
which process the raw material. The basic component of the machine is the
mold which determines the end product, as for example, a fork, a plate or
a syringe. For each product manufactured, a different mold is usually
needed. The mold comprises a high proportion of the machine cost.
The relatively ease in which a factory of plastic products is set up
(disregarding quality issues) contributed to the growth of this
manufacturing sector. During the first period, 79 new establishments were
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created, out of which 59 located in Caracas. By the second period, private
financial institutions apparently become more aware of the risks involved
in giving loans to this manufacturing sector due to the proliferation of
many plastic factories. Furthermore, the low flexibility of the plastic
machinery may have contributed even more to this perception. In other words,
in case of bankruptcy, a bank would have to take over the plant and sell it;
the prospective buyer would have to be interested in producing the same
sort of products as the previous owner, unless additional costly
investments in molds were made. Since it is possible that the earlier owner
went bankrupt because of the high competition that his/her products had,
the total operation seems to be a risky one. As a conseuquence, during the
second period, it is likely that private financial organizations were
reluctant to give loans for plastic products manufacturing plants.
Under these conditions, an industrialist wishing to set up a plastic
industry may well be pushed into applying for a loan to a government
financial institutiono According to the policy of industrial
deconcentration, entrepeneurs may benefit from government loans provided
they go to the designated areas. Hence, some industrialists reacted
favorably to the financial incentives of the policy by locating in the
areas of deconcentration. It is likely that some of these entrepeneurs
selected locations in the area of deconcentration closest to Caracas (BM).
By doing so, they in effect remained close to the industrial axis, i.e.,
did not deconcentrate.
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8.4 Summary of chapter 8
This chapter describes the estimation results for the logit model described
in chapter 7. After selecting the main independent variables to be tested,
several model specifications were analyzed, and model specification 1 was
selected. This model specification uses as independent variables the
following attributes: financial incentives, total wages, accessibility to
both local inputs and markets, technical expertise, labor unrest and
water availability0 A dummy variable for Caracas was also introduced. The
parameters of the model were estimated with data for the period 1975-1976
for the six industry subgroups~without stratifying by manufacturing sectors.
The likelihood ratio index of ,56 indicates that the overall goodness of
fit is relatively good. When using the model with data for the period
1977-1978, it seems to be structurally stable.
Among the main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the model
(without stratifying by industry subgroups) are the following:
1) The existing financial incentives seem to have no effect on the
locational decisions of manufacturing firms.
2) Wages, accessibility to both local inputs and markets, presence of
technical expertise, and water availability seem to exert a large
influence on the location of new manufacturing activity.
3) Labor unrest seems to be considered by entrepeneur a factor of location,
although its importance is relatively limited.
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As expected, when the parameters are estimated after stratifying the data
by industry subgroups, the variables differ in relative importance. Table
8.12 shows which variables are important by manufacturing sector.
TABLE 8.12
IMPORTANT VARIABLES BY MANUFACTURING GROUP
Transport
Textiles equipment
Non-electric
Leather machinery
Electric
Plastics machinery
FI X
WAGE X X X X
LIP X X X
TEC X X X X X X
STR
WPR X X X X
* Important only during the period 1975-1976.
An unexpected finding is that financial incentives seem to be an important
locational factor for the plastics industry. Nevertheless, from the point
of view of deconcentration, this manufacturing group remained close to the
industrial axis, i.e., deconcentrated little if at all.
Our hypothesis that less protected industries are more concerned with
locational factors is supported by the general pattern of results.
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The development of this model is an effort to identify the locational
factors that affected the locational decisions of firms. The question of
alternative explanation factors, arose as a consequence of having found
little or no evidence that government incentives had an effect on a firm's
locational decision (see chapter 5). With this model, it was possible to
test once more the insignificant weight that entrepeneurs attached to
government financial incentives. The model developed in this chapter does
not claim to represent accurately the complex set of locational factors
that goes into the locational decision process. It only attempts to point
out some of the locational factors (for which data were obtained) that
decision-makers seem to consider when choosing a location. Fortunately,
some of them may be subjected to control by policy-makers. It should be
noted that it is likely that a lot still can be learned from examining
the behavior of firms for which the percentage correctly predicted is low.
The next chapter will attempt to indicate some possible implications of
these findings for policy making, as well as some recommendations for
fu'ture work.
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PART IV: APPRAISAL
9 Conclusions
9.1 Summary of findings
In 1974, the Venezuelan government, concious of the socio-economic problems
caused by the concentration of activities in the north-central area as well
as the limited amount of economic activities in the lagging areas, decided
to intervene in the spatial distribution of the country's manufacturing
industry. A series of presidential decrees was issued giving legal framework
to the policy of industrial deconcentration. Although very little time has
elapsed since the promulgation of the policy of industrial deconcentration,
several reports have already been written attempting to evaluate the
policy. There seems to be little or no agreement so far as to the results.
A report prepared by the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del
Ambiente, ) claims that the pattern of behavior of the entrepeneur is
changing. On the other hand, a document prepared the same year by the
National Planning Office (Cordiplan, 2) indicates that the policy has merely
accentuated existing tendencies towards concentrating manufacturing
activity in Caracas and its surroundings.
This current research was initiated to address this controversial issue
and to attempt an "early understanding" of the possible consequences of the
policy. As indicated in chapter 2,'the answer to the main question: Have
government instruments (both incentives and restrictions) contributed to
the deconcentration of industry? requires answers to the following more
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specific questions:
Issue 1 Has deconcentration of industry indeed taken place?
Issue 2 Is any such deconcentration a result of the policy instruments
applied?
Issue 3 What have been the other factors influencing industrial
location and what has been their relative importance?
The first question is analyzed in chapter 4. Results using stratified data
at three-digit level gives some evidence that the leather, non-electric
machinery, as well as electric machinery manufacturing groups, have
deconcentrated their locations during the period 1977-1978. The others
industrial groups studied, textiles, plastics and transportation equipment,
seem to have had no major changes in their relative location. It should be
noted that although some deconcentration occurred, the industrial axis
usually continues to be the preferred location for a large number of new
industrial activities.
Question 2, discussed in chapter 5, deals with whether or not deconcentration
is a result of the policy instruments applied. From the results obtained,
there seems to be little or no evidence that changes in the spatial pattern
of industry are related to the application of government instruments. In
spite of the fact that information is generally not available on fiscal
incentives, their value is probably insignificant when compared to the
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profits of the manufacturing industry in Venezuela. It is, therefore,
unlikely that they have had any effect on location decisions. Furthermore,
interviews with industrialists showed no evidence to support the opposite
view.
Control over location, i.e., negative incentives, does not seem to have
been applied effectively during the study period.
From the financial incentives point of view, the nearly stable trend in
development region's share of credit does not support the hypothesis that
these incentives influenced the location of new firms. Results obtained
by econometric analysis further support this conclusions .(See chapter 8).
Nevertheless, when the logit model was applied to the data stratified by
industry subgroups, the plastics manufacturing sector seemed to react
significantly to financial incentives. It is interesting to note that
although the plastic industry reacted strongly to financial incentives, it
did not deconcentrate; i.e., new plastics manufacturing plants continued
to locate in or close to the industrial axis during 1977-1978 in
proportions similar to those of the period 1975-1976.
Having found some evidence that a group of manufacturing industries indeed
had a tendency to deconcentrate and, furthermore, since little or no
evidence could be uncovered at the aggregate level to support the
supposition that changes in the spatial pattern of industry were related
to the application of government instruments, we asked ourselves why some
deconcentration in fact occurred. In other words we addressed question 3:
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What have been the other factors influencing industrial location and what
has been their relative importance?
In answer to this question, it was hypothesized in chapter 6 that changes
in the economy occurring in 1974 had two major effects on the Venezuelan
manufacturing environment. On the one hand these changes gave rise to
a large number of new manufacturing firms, most of which were more
concerned with satisfying the sudden increase in demand. This resulted in a
short-run, commercial or opportunistic approach, rather than a long-term
approach or industrial viewpoint. On the other hand, the sudden increase in
the number of manufacturing establishments further aggravated the existing
problems in the industrial axis created by the already saturated and
unsatisfactory physical and social infrastructure. By the second period,
i.e., 1977-1978, the economy moved towards more of an equilibrium in terms
of supply and demand for nationally manufactured products. As a consequence,
most of the new firms created in this second period were headed by
industrial-minded entrepeneurs. They were aware of the problems in the
congested industrial axis and were more conscious about production costs.
Second period industrialists were more likely to carefully weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of locating in the traditional industrial
axis. Some less protected industries considered it more profitable to
locate their new plants away from the industrial axis. Others --for
example the small highly protected industries-- may have considered that
closeness to the government's decision making center remained a crucial
factor. They could argue that the exonerations, licences and other benefits
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received as incentives outweigh the disadvantages of locating in the
industrial axis. Furthermore, the percentage savings that they obtain by
locating outside the congested industrial axis can be very small when
compared to their profit rates. So, they continue to concentrate.
Evidence to support this hypothesis was obtained from several sources,
including interviews with industrialists. It was found that less protected
industries seem to deconcentrate while highly protected ones do not.
Furthermore, the statistical results obtained give us additional evidence,
i.e., the coefficients on the variables representing the factors of
location are usually found to be larger during the second period of analysis
than during the first period. This is true for less protected industries,
implying changes in the industrialist's sensitivity to traditional
locational factors. By interviews with industrialists, anecdotal evidence
to support this hypothesis was obtained.
Some researchers, for example Gilbert , argue that "In many ways, it may
be suimested that industrial location is not a matter that is decided on
the basis of detailed investigation. Most new companies, excepting some of
the large foreign corporations, seem not to make studies of alternative
sites and base their decisions on more subjective grounds." In a sense, the
results obtained in this study show that entrepeneurs in Venezuela may be
basing industrial location decisions on more investigation than is usually
thought. This is especially true for less protected industries.
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The results of the logit model indicates that for the sample studied
(before stratifying by industry subgroups):
(1) Wages, accessibility to both local inputs and markets, presence of
technical expertise and water availability seem to exert a large
influence in the location of manufacturing activity.
(2) Labor unrest seems to be considered as a factor in location by
entrepeneurs, although its importance is relatively small.
(3) As expected, the relative importance of the variables changes
according to the manufacturing sector considered. This was
determined once the sample was stratified by industrial subgroups.
(See table 8.12 for details).
The findings summarized so far, should be interpreted in the light of two
major limitations. On the one hand, there is a limitation imposed by the
very short period that has elapsed since 1974 when the first presidential
decree relating to industrial deconcentration policy was issued. On the
other hand, the data base of this study cannot be accepted without the
standard caveats. Therefore, the results must be considered tentative.
Hence, this research attempts to make cautious conclusions on the basis of
admittedly fragile ststistics as well as to indicate a methodological
approach by which more accurate estimates can be done in the future. The
study also shows that it is feasible to use disaggregate models in the
context of some developing countries.
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9.2 Policy implications
We want to stress again what was indicated at the beggining of this study,
namely that in Latin American countries as well as in many other countries,
policies aimed at the regional dispersal of industry have a long history.
These countries have chosen deliberately to plan and promote the process
of deconcentration under the expectation that industrial activity will
otherwise concentrate further if left to the vagaries of the market forces.
For example, the first country in Latin America to adopt financial incentives
was Mexico (Gilbert, ) when, in the 1930's, several states bordering on the
United States were granted concessions from import duties. Other countries
such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile also had a long experience with policies
of industrial deconcentration. (United Nations, 5). In spite of the richness
of the experiences available, it seems that too little attention has been
given to learning from the mistakes of others.
In order to discuss the policy implications of the findings in this study,
the following suggestions expressed by Rodwin6 are used as a framework.
Rodwin indicates that an effective urban growth strategy presupposes the
existence of:
(1) a stable government;
(2) some intelligence mechanisms to analyze problems and suggest roles
which the government should play;
(3) some central power over the principal incentive and control mechanisms,
including those affecting the allocation of capital; and
(4) a relatively efficient civil service.
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We will address each of these components in turn:
9.2.a Stable government
We may certainly assume that the first condition exists in Venezuela. Unlike
most of the governments in Latin America, the Venezuelan government faces a
stable situation, and there is no reason whatsoever to think that conditions
will change.
9,2.b Intelligence mechanisms
In Venezuela, the responsability to formulate the guidelines for regional
development is in the hands of the National Planning Office (Oficina Central
de Coordinaci6n y Planificaci6n, Cordiplan). The task of designing policies,
strategies and instruments is one of the most difficult ones. It is
important at this point to stress again an important problem indicated by
Rodwin : "...the problem of the level of intellectual capital. It is
debatable whether we know enough about urban growth strategies either to
deal with them effectively or to secure the necessary understanding early
enough to avoid doing more harm than good."
Two issues may be addressed here:
(1) When designing policy instruments, we tend to assume that we know
how the system works, and hence, how the instruments will direct the
behavior of the system toward our desired goals. But the socio-
economic system is a very complex one. We know very little about how
the system really operates. Hence, we should not be surprised when
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our policies have not worked. For example, when designing the
Venezuelan policy instruments, it was assumed that the financial and
fiscal incentives given were large enough to overcome the cost
disadvantage of not locating in the preferred area. This study has
suggested that this assumption may be challenged. Furthermore, the
system is so complex that unexpected results were obtained, such as
the strong favorable reaction of the plastic industry to financial
incentives which, however, did not accomplish the objective of
deconcentration.
(2) In addition, the societal system is a dynamic one. It constantly
tries to adapt to external and internal stimuli. This implies that
when the system is affected say, by the policy instruments, the
system attempts to adapt to the new stimulus, i.e., the system will
try to find ways to respond to the stimulus, avoiding undesired
situations. An example of this is found in those small industries
which were not allowed to locate in Caracas. Those entrepeneurs
affected by this policy may have camouflaged their plants as service
or retail establishments to avoid this situation.
These two issues suggest that we need a proper administrative machinery
within the government intelligence mechanism that could closely monitor
the system that it is trying to direct. This machinery should have two
important properties:
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(1) capable of learning, especially from its own mistakes; and
(2) capable of reacting reasonably promptly to the ever-changing
conditions.
A pre-condition for reacting is that some signal should be received and
compared with the desired goals. Hence, the control mechanism should
constantly monitor how the system behaves and follow very closely the
consequences of policy instruments.
This study may be considered as an "early signal" as to the behavior of
the system. Under the assumption that the findings of this research will
contribute to the learning property of the intelligence mechanism,
recomendations for immediate reaction in the following areas are suggested:
Level and type of incentives: The econometric model developed in this study
allows us to explore alternative policy measures and their impact on the
locational decision of firms. The model predicts the probability that an
entrepeneur will select a particular city. For example, if, for firms of
a particular industrial subgroup, the model indicates a probability of 0.3
that a firm will locate in city B, this implies that we can expect 3 out of
10 future new firms, to select city B. If, however, the goal is that 5
instead of 3 new firms select city B, the model will indicate the
percentage saving that should be given (as financial incentives) to
industrialists so as to increase to 0.5 the probability of selecting
city B. Furthermore, we can study the trade-offs between subsidizing
industry vs. subsidizing infrastructure. For example, it may be possible to
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obtain the same response from industrialists by improving the water supply
system (which also benefits the city's population) as by offering direct
subsidies to entrepeneurs; or by a combination of both. In any case, the
model will suggest the required level of service of the locational factors
considered to achieve a particular locational objective.
As indicated in chapter 8, the model developed in this research does not
claim to represent accurately the complex set of locational factors that
goes into the locational decision process. It only attempts to point out
some of the locational factors (for which data were obtained) that
decision-makers seem to consider when choosing a location and which may be
subjected to control by policy-makers.
Compatibility of objectives: Almost all economic and social policies have
an implicit urban impact, though many of these impacts are frequently
ignored as well as unintended. It is not only a problem to recognize and
identify these implicit impacts, but the problem is complicated by the
fact that the spatial consequences of policies may be internally
contradictory. For example, we may argue that in Venezuela, there is a
conflict between the policy of industrial deconcentration (spatial policy)
and the industrial development policy (economic policy). By granting high
protection to spur industrial development, it is likely that the effect of
traditional locational factors is distorted and that this may in fact give
rise to concentration, i.e., to the opposite objective of the spatial policy.
It seems that Venezuelan policy-makers, when designing the industrial
deconcentration policy, guarded themselves against contradictions among
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explicit spatial policies but probably neglected or were unaware of the
contradictions between the explicit spatial measures and the implicit
economic strategies.
There is no simple solution to these problems. One necessary first step is
to identify as many of the consequences as possible both explicitly and
implicitly of all policies in order to ascertain whether there are
contradictions between them and to determine how serious they are and
whether or not they can be avoided. The important point is not to try to
eliminate all the spatial implications of non-spatial policies, for that
would'be impossible, but to be aware of them and to avoid wasteful
expenditures of resources and effort in implementing contradictory and
self-defeating measures. Nevertheless, in terms of the existing policy of
industrial deconcentration, it is recommended that the level of protection,
as well as the means by which national industry is promoted through
protection, should be revised. A useful guide for this purpose could be the
World Bank8 study cited earlier.
The spatial framework: It is recommended that the spatial framework of the
policy be revised.-For example, it is not clear why the area of
deconcentration BM surrounding the Metropolitan Area of Caracas should
receive incentives. Considerations should also be given to interrelating
the spatial aspects of the policy of deconcentration (mainly the
deconcentration areas) with the economic aspects of a region such as its
comparative advantage. The region's comparative advantages should not only
be seen in terms of inputs, such as the availability of specialized labor
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force or raw materials, but also in market terms, such as the possible
implications of the Andean Common Market, i.e., trade with neighboring
countries.
Monitoring: It is recommended that the statistical foundation for
industrial policy be improved. Among the different aspects that should be
considered, we suggest that inmediate steps be taken to assign a unique
identification number to each manufacturing plant. Furthermore, measures
should be taken to see that a copy of the industrial directories elaborated
yearly, is preserved.
9.2.c Central power
This third assumption is a little more difficult to envisage. Although the
political institutions may have the legal power to enforce the policy
instruments, the complex relationship with the economic institutions
(characteristic of a mixed-economy) lessens this legal power. This is an
issue that has generally been underestimated and we want to stress again
what was indicated by Gilbert9:
"In several Latin American countries, political conditions have
allowed governments to implement policies aimed at the regional
dispersal of industry. But, in general, these policies have employed
rhetoric rather than action, and only in Chile, Brazil, Cuba and
Puerto Rico have any major changes been made in the regional
distribution of industry. Even in these countries government action
has only slowed the tide towards a highly localized spatial
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distribution and not reversed it. Such a situation has not arisen
because governments lacked suitable tools for dispersal, for a variety
of methods have been employed. Rather, it seems as if the political
will to implement these methods is the element that was lacking."
Within the realm of central power issues, an additional aspect that should
be considered is related to coordination among the various government
entities.
The implementation of the policy of industrial deconcentration requires the
participation of many government institutions and the coordination of their
activities is likely to be one of the greatest challenges that any
government may face. It is extremely difficult, for example, to get
financial agencies, as well as other branches of the government such as
housing, health and education, to follow the priority deconcentration
areas indicated by the policy and to coordinate their efforts toward the
improvement of the designated growth centers.
We should note that when dealing with institutional arrangements, it is not
only important to describe the administrative machinery, but also to
distribute decision powers over different policy instruments. A particular
guide in allocating decision powers to different levels of government is
the rank of a policy instrument (United Nations, 10). The rank of a policy
instrument may be determined on the basis of:
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time dimension: the longer the effective period of influence,
the higher the rank of the instrument.
spatial dimension: the larger the area of influence (territorial
unit), the higher the rank. Thus, those
instruments that affect the nation as a whole,
such as nation-wide subsidies or credits, have
the highest rank.
There should be a closer correspondence between the rank of a policy
instrument and the rank of the authority that controls the instrument. In
practice, for example, national entities such as the Ministry of
Development should not exert control on instruments such as the prohibition
to locate in Caracas. This activity should be left to local authorities.
9.2.d Civil service
The final assumption,that of an efficient civil service, again deserves
some consideration. Under normal circumstances, we might expect to have
good professionals in both private and public sectors. But, due to the
special circumstances which the country faces, there has been a "brain-
drain" from the public sector into the private one. Therefore, precautions
should be taken to try to equalize this imbalances in human resources. To
this should be added the fact that in most LDCs, the professionals are
generally concentrated in the core region, and few have received
appropriate advance training.
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This limitation, for example, is particularly noticeable in the number of
industrial projects for which financial incentives were given but which
were economically unfeasible. One possible reason projects of this sort
were able to obtain government financial support may be traced to the
inability of some government officials to appropriately evaluate a project.
9.3 Future work
In the immediate future, there is clearly a great need for development of
scientific attitudes and growth of fundamental theory in industrial
location together with a need for more and better organized data. More
information about the relationships between the different elements of a
firm's locational decision, as well as theoretical and model specification
improvements, are necessary in order to be able to better understand
industrial location issues. There are many areas where future work should
be directed. Some of them are the following:
9.3.a Data issues
Updating of information.The analysis of this research covered two periods:
1975-1976 and 1977-1978. This analysis can easily be updated, i.e., the
period 1979-1980 can be added. By adding this third period we can see
whether the pattern of spatial distribution of industries identified in
this study remains or whether changes have ocurred. This is a key task for
policy purposes. This task is relatively easy because the methodology
designed in this research makes it very simple to manipulate the data.
The only additional piece of information needed is the 1980 industrial
directory which by now is already available.
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Addition of variables. We have mentioned earlier that, due to limitations
of the data, variables that may be important for locational decisions, such
as cost and availability of land for industrial use were left out. It is
recommended that data reflecting these locational factors be gathered and
its relative importance assessed. It is also recommended that data on
non-traditional factors of location, such as the birth location of the
principal entrepeneur, be collected and incorporated into the model.
Furthermore, other non-traditional elements such as risk factors should
also be introduced.
Expansion of the sample. As indicated in chapter 4, only 6 of the 27
three-digit ISIC code manufacturing activities were analyzed in this study.
There is no need to study all the 27 sectors for policy analysis. Only
those manufacturing sectors more prone to be affected by the policy of
industrial deconcentration should be considered. We suggest that for
completing the study of the eleven sectors initially chosen in chapter 4,
five industry subsectors be added to the findings of this research. In so
doing, we will have a better understanding of the spatial behavior of the
manufacturing activity suceptible to being manipulated by policy.
Employment as an indicator. This study considers a firm or establishment as
the basic unit of measure. As discussed in chapter 4, using the number of
establishments as the only indicator may give an incomplete picture of
reality. We should recall that one of the objectives of the policy of
industrial deconcentration is to reduce the level of unemployment in the
lagging areas. Hence, it is suggested that the findings presented here be
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complemented with employment figures. The analysis of employment figures
will give additional valuable information about the pattern of spatial
distribution of economic activities.
9.3.b Theoretical and model specification issues
Simultaneous decisions. The single most important improvement in theoretical
and model specification aspects involves the need to represent the
simultaneity of decisions made by an entrepeneur. It is likely that the
decision regarding where to locate is made -simultaneously with the decision
of how large the plant should be and how many shifts should be operated.
Hence, modelling efforts should be directed toward capturing the
manufacturing firm's problem of making three interrelated choices: where to
locate, how many employees to utilize and how many shifts to operate.
Abusada-Salah 11,has already done an interesting study where he analyses the
extent and characteristics of capacity utilization in Venezuela. Carlton12
on the other hand, studied the joint decision on where to locate and how
large to be, for branch plants in the United States.
9.3.c Evaluation and development issues
In chapter 2, we may recall that this study mainly addresses the policy-
instrument relationship, i.e., the question: Is the changing pattern of
industrial location a result of the policy instruments applied? We still
need to address the other two questions related to the effects on the
regional objectives caused by the policy or the instruments. That is, we
recommend that the following two questions (already presented in chapter 2)
be answered:
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The first question is: Has the policy of industrial deconcentration
fullfilled the regional objectives? Although the current research
suggests that the policy of industrial deconcentration has had a
negligible effect, it may be important to evaluate the extent to which the
policy has affected the regional objectives. For example, it is probable
that the proliferation and concentration of plants manufacturing plastic
products are a consequence of financial incentives. In other words, we may
hypothesize that some of the plastic firms created were non-competitive
and the only reason they were set up was due to the policy. This
proposition should be studied.
13
An example of similar issues in other countries may be found in Gilbert
In his comments about the concentration of investment in the lagging areas
of the north-east of Brazil he points out:
"A fundamental criticism made of the scheme has been that it is
creating an inefficient manufacturing sector. Rather than creating a
series of industries based on the north-east's resource or labor
advantages, it is claimed that it is duplicating the import-
substitution process that has only recently been completed in the
country as a whole. One symptom of this process has been that most
of the new industries are higly dependent upon supplies from,
and markets in, the south-east. Rather than creating a highly
integrated industrial-complex in the north-east, industrial
decentralization is merely tending to the development of
inefficient plants and to the generation of inter-regional transport
flows."
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Gudgin 14, refering to the U.K. experience indicates:
"It is, however, easy to argue that a new direction in policy is
required after thirty years of building control, investment
incentives, and other aid. These policies have achieved a great deal
but in the last resort have not solved the problem, and have now
reached a low ebb in which the donor regions for industrial
movement are beggining to suffer and in which areas of very high
unemployment are not longer restricted to the traditional problem
regions. A long-term policy adopted soon after the war alongside the
conventional regional measures might by now have been paying
dividends."
The second question: How have policy instruments affected regional
objectives? should also be addressed. As discussed in chapter 2, it is
important to analyze whether, for example, subsidies to capital have
encouraged capital-intensive technology which in turn has a limited effect
on the creation of new employment opportunities. We suggest that future
work be directed toward answering the two questions mentioned above.
Other issues that should also be addressed are related to the policy of
deconcentration itself. We may ask whether the benefits involved in
attracting manufacturing industries to lagging areas is worth the cost. In
other words, is the policy of "moving industries to people" the most
efficient and effective?
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Are other approaches better? The purpose of these questions is simply to
expand the horizons of possible policies or combination of them that could
be used in the Venezuelan context.
A related issue is the fact that the policy of industrial deconcentration,
as well as the policy of manufacturing promotion, follows very closely the
process of development called "from outside", i.e., the process is based on
impulses from outside the region. Growth from outside is usually stimulated
in an undeveloped region by a demand for the region's natural resources. In
order to mobilize these resources, transport and communication lines are
established into the region to move out natural resources, while labor,
capital, and technology are moved in as complementary production factors.
There is also another type of development process which may contribute to
the development of a region begining at the subsistence level and
developing into a modern complex economy and society. This process is based
on impulses from inside the region, i.e., development from "within." This
development process explains the development of a region from a subsistence
economy (where local production is essentially consumed locally) towards
maturity through agricultural specialization, as transport facilities
become available permiting the exchange of agricultural products. With
specialization, the productivity of agriculture increases and surplus is
created which can pay for services such as transportation and
commercialization of the agricultural surplus.
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In relation to this subject matter, it is strongly recommended that future
work be directed towards considering the potentialities involved in the
process of development from "within" that could complement the development
form "outside." This alternative is open now, since the revenues that are
obtained from the oil exports could be channeled into opening up other
development opportunities.
A final suggestion that could be made about future work concerns regional
objectives. The objective of reducing interregional income differentials
seems to assume that interpersonal disposable income differentials are
automatically reduced when interregional differences are reduced. This may
not be true. Future work should be directed in this direction.
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APPENDIX A: INDUSTRIAL LOCATION THEORY
Industrial location theory is the rubric under which falls many attempts to
establish a general theory of industrial location. These attempts all have
in common the purpose of deriving the "optimum location" for the
individual firm.
The major work on industrial location theory has been carried out by
economists trying to provide an all-embracing system of "pure rules" of
location and has been developed in the context of a free market economy.
It attempts to explain why manufacturing industries locate in one place
rather than another and, consequently, to account for the fact that cities
of a particular kind and size are where they are instead of somewhere
else.
Production involves the use of inputs --factors of production to produce
outputs, whether goods or services. The location of the units of production,
the firm, will obviously be determined in relation to the source of the
inputs and the market for the output. The various factors of production,
such as land, labor and capital, plus the market factor, constitute primary
determinants of location. These factors can be refined into more specific
determinants, such as the quality and quantity of labor, the geographical
location of a site and the availability of the necessary infrastructure.
Other determinants, such as central and local government policy and
behavioral factors, can also be added.
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According to Beckmann (quoted in Berry et al, ), the prices received by
producers for their output can either be the same from place to place, or
they may vary spatially. The same is true for the prices paid by the
producers for their needed inputs.
If both input and output prices are uniform from place to place, the firm
is locationally indifferent. If, however, output prices are uniform from
place to place but input prices vary locationally, then the firm can
optimize by minimizing cost.
If, on the other hand, input prices are uniform from place to place but
selling prices vary locationally, the obvious strategy for the businessman
is to locate where he can maximize revenues. This is the case, for example,
where goods are highly complex and there is substantial product
differentiation and selling price variability. Generally, such high value
producers purchase semi-processed parts at input prices that vary little.
In other words, the revenue maximizers will, in general, be the high
value-added producers, who, in turn, seek out demand-maximizing rather
than cost-minimizing location.
Finally, if both input and output prices vary locationally, the optimum
location behavior --that which maximizes profit-- is to find the location
that maximizes the spread between revenues and costs.
From this analysis, we can bring forth a useful framework for the study of
industrial location theory. This framework can be expressed by three main
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approaches, which are by no means mutually exclusive:
1) The least-cost approach, which attempts to explain location in
terms of the minimization of factor cost;
2) Market-area analysis, where there is more emphasis on the
demand, or market factors, and the maximization of revenues is
pursued;
3) The profit-maximizing approach --the logical outcome of the
other two.
The least-cost approach
This approach tries to codify the relationship of production costs to plant
location. It begins by recognizing that any business must go through
several stages in getting its product onto the market:
1) Procurement of raw materials;
2) Processing of raw materials into finished products;
3) Distribution of products to the consumer.
The first and third of these stages involve transportation costs. The
second involves the productive operations -- capital inputs and scale, for
example-- plus labor costs.
A variety of situations can be studied, in which plant location is
affected by variations of procurement, processing and distribution costs.
For example, cases can be noted where plants are very much alike in their
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labor requirements and scale of operations, wherever they are located, so
that these costs do not vary much spatially, but these plants incur
substantial transport costs that do vary considerably from one location to
another. Under these conditions, plants have to minimize transport costs
to maximize their competitive advantage.
This approach can be expressed as in Fig. A.l.
In 1909, Alfred Weber presented his theory of industrial location. The
Weberian model produces perhaps the simplest view of manufacturing location,
based principally on transports. Weber's basic principle was that a
businessman would choose a location where his costs were least.
Weber made the following assumptions in his model:
* Conditions of perfect competition are implied with all firms having
access to unlimited markets;
* Consideration of a single product at a time. Goods of different
quality, though of similar type, are treated as different products;
* The position of sources of raw material is assumed to be known.
Some natural resources, such as water, sand and clay, are
ubiquitous (i.e., materials available practically everywhere and
presumably at the same price everywhere). Other materials, such as
mineral fuels and ores, are "sporadic" with availability limited to
a number of sites;
* The position of points of consumption (i.e., concentrated at
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certain given centers) is also assumed to be known;
* Labor is not ubiquitous (i~e., it is geographically fixed), with
several fixed labor locations and fixed labor mobility. Weber
assumes that a number of places exist where labor at definite,
predetermined wages can be had in unlimited quantities.
* Transport costs are a function of weight and distance. Differences
in topography are allowed for by appropriate additions to distance,
and differences in transportability by additions to actual weight.
Within these assumptions, Weber believed three factors influenced
industrial location:
1) Transport costs;
2) Labor costs;
3) Agglomeration factors.
The first two are general regional factors which determine the
fundamental location pattern and the geographic framework; the
third factor is a local one which determines the degree of
dispersion within the general framework. Later on, other
researchers have expanded the second factor to include othe input
costs.
Under these assumptions, and holding constant everything but
transport costs, the best location is quite obviously that which
minimizes transport costs.
1.- Transport costs
Weber first considered the impact of transport costs, the primary location
determinant, and then showed how the other two factors might modify the
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location, i.e., Weber derived his theory using a method of successive
elimination. He assumed transport costs to be directly proportional to
distance moved and weight carried. Thus, the point of least transport costs
is that at which the total weight movement of assembling inputs and
distributing outputs is at a minimum (locational triangle concept).
To indicate whether the optimum location was closer to the source of
materials or to the market, Weber devised a material index (m.i.):
Weight of Local Material Inputs
mOi. =
Weight of Final Products
If the index was greater than one, the firm was material-oriented; if the
index was less than one, it was market-oriented.
2.- Labor costs
Other than the least-transport cost, labor costs can attract a firm to
a location if the savings in labor costs per unit of output are greater
than the extra transport costs per unit involved.
3.- Agglomeration factors
Having combined the effects of transport and labor costs, Weber then turned
to the problem of determining how that location may be deflected within
the region by the tendency of firms to agglomerate. In Weber's view, there
are two main ways in which a company can gain the benefits of agglomeration.
First, it may increase the concentration of production by enlarging its
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factory, thus obtaining savings through a larger scale of operation.
Second, it may benefit by selecting a location in close association with
other plants. Hence, a firm may be diverted away from both the least
transport and labor cost locations if cost economies can be achieved
through a third location factor of agglomeration.
The advantage of agglomeration might include the development of a pool of
skilled labor and the establishment of specialist services, although, of
course, there may also be diseconomies, such as rising land prices and
congestion.
Production-cost and transport-cost orientation
So far, we have considered industries which find transportation costs of
paramount importance in selecting a location; that is, transport-oriented
industries. Typically, these are industries with a high bulk-to-value
ratio for materials or products. For other industries, other considerations
may be more important (Helbrun,2 ).
Industries for which geographic differentials in production cost are more
important than geographic differentials in transport cost are said to be
"production-cost-oriented" rather than "transport-cost oriented."
Production-cost orientation is sometimes further subdivided according to
the sort of input involved. One can distinguish:
- Power orientation as, for example, aluminum refining;
- labor orientation such as textiles;
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- amenity orientation: research and development laboratories;
- communication orientation: industries that need face-to-face
contact with customers;
- external economy orientation: firms that take advantage of
economies of agglomeration.
All of them may be seen as a way of minimizing production costs.
Criticisms of Weber's theory
The Weberian model has been criticized for some of its facets, in particular:
its concern with supply, that all firms have access to unlimited demand,
and its notion that the market exists as a single point. While it is
reasonable to consider the pattern of inputs in analyzing location
determinants, it is unreasonable to underestimate the importance of markets
as areas of varying demand strength. In addition, the model has also been
criticized for the assumption that transport costs and production costs
remain constant, and for its disregard of institutional factors, such as
government policy.
In 1948, Hoover elaborated the Weberian model, making far more realistic
cost assumptions. Hoover divides costs into transport (procurement and
distribution) and production, each of which is analyzed in a more detailed
and realistic way. For example, transport costs may vary according to the length
and direction of haul and the composition of the goods involved. Hoover
also gives more emphasis to institutional factors, such as local taxes,
which may have a considerable impact on locational decisions. He also
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mentions market areas, but only from an assumed location, and his concern
is much more with cost than with demand.
Market area analysis approach
One of the fundamental weaknesses of the least-cost approach is the
overemphasis on the input side (cost-minimization) and the underemphasis of
the output, or demand, side, simply assuming that the firm can sell all it
produces wherever it locates. But the market is variable. Buyers are
scattered over a wide area and the intensity of demand varies from place to
place. Firms will seek to gain access to the market and serve the greatest
demand. Hence, the market may be a major location determinant and the
businessman will try to locate where he can maximize his revenue.
In 1954, LOsch attempted to incorporate demand into the theory by
considering the optimum size of the market. He considered a fixed
individual producer --a farmer producing beer-- and attempted to
determine his market area and market revenue on the basis of the following
assumptions (Glasson, ):
- No spatial variations in the distribution of factor input --raw
materials, labor and capital-- over a homogeneous plain;
- Uniform population densities and constant tastes;
- No locational interdependence between firms.
For the analysis, L*sch uses and adapt a simple demand curve. After
rotating it, a "demand cone" is produced, The base of the cone represents
239
the market area, the height represents the quantity sold at any one point,
and the volume represents the total revenue from the market demand, In
time, if beer production is profitable, other farmers will develop their
own circular market areas, which will finally adjust into a series of
hexagonal market areas covering the entire plain.
This approach is equally one-sided. For, by assuming no spatial variations
in the distribution of factor inputs, L'sch eliminates spatial cost
variations. Thus, while Weber neglects demand in his attempt to find the
least cost location, LOsch neglects input supply and sees optimum location
as primarily a function of market demand.
This approach may be represented by Fig. A.2.
Dispersive forces
In order to gain access to the market, the firm has to recognize explicitly
the role of competition and other kinds of interdependence among locational
units (Hoover, ). Therefore, to maximize its revenue, a business firm may
tend to select a location where there is no nearby competition. Each firm
will seek to keep its distance from others, and a pattern dominated by
dispersive forces will emerge.
When an output-oriented seller is trying to find the most rewarding
location in terms of access to markets, he will have to evaluate the
advantage of any location on the basis of how much demand there will be
within the market area that he could expect to command from that location.
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Each location that he might choose entails a market area and a sale potential
determined by where the buyers are and where the competition is.
The best location from this viewpoint is one where demand for his kind of
output is largely relative to the nearby supply. This suggests that he will
look for a "deficit area" into which the output in question is flowing. In
other words, he will try to find the largest gap in the pattern of already
established firms of his activity as the most promising location for
himself (Hoover, 5
The market-area boundary between two sellers of the same good, with equal
production and input costs, is a straight line midway between the sellers.
If one seller has a cost advantage, the boundary will be further from him
and concave toward his higher-cost competitor.
According to Alonso 6, "the theory of market areas seems to be the key to
future developments. It was, in a sense, the culmination of the theory of
the firm. But it was also the beginning of the theory of August LOsch in
the form of central-place theory."
The profit-maximizing approach
In practice, both costs and revenue vary with location and the optimum
location is the one which yields the greatest profit. This approach can be
expressed as seen in Fig. A.3.
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In this situation, the optimum profit-maximizing location may be neither
the least-cost nor the maximum-revenue location.
In the 1950's, W. Isard, among others, tried to remold the approach
introduced by LO5sch by considering costs more closely. He has suggested a
model in which the optimum location is the point which combines the lowest
possible costs with the greatest possible revenue. However, there are
problems in deriving the profit-maximization location. These problems are
related to the limitations of the theory (Glasson, ), For a detailed
presentation of these problems, as well as other issues related to
traditional location theory, the reader may consult Smith 8, Greenhut9 or
10
Isard
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APPENDIX B: MODELS OF DISCRETE CHOICE
I Introduction1
B.1 Background information
The standard theory of consumer behavior has focused on decision problems
in which commodities are assumed to be finely divisible. In situations
where this assumption remains a valid one, choices are made over a
continuum of possibilities; for example, how much to consume, to produce
or to market. Demand functions, derived from the assumption of optimizing
behavior by the consumer, reflect marginal adjustments by the consumer in
response to changes in prices or other factors in the environment.
In many other situations, the assumption of easily-divisible goods and
services is not valid, i.e., when choices are discrete. Examples can be
found in the locational choice of a manufacturing firm, or in the choice
of mode of travel, or in the selection of a school for the children.
In these discrete cases, the standard microeconomic theory is generally,
no longer applicable, i.e., small marginal adjustments are not always
feasible. For example, in the case of choice of travel mode, an increase
in transportation cost (say, in a car) may either leave the patron
unaffected (i.e., he will continue to use the car) or it may cause him to
switch to another mode alltogether (say, bus). Nevertheless, it is
possible to have some substitution along other dimensions, as for
example, fuel.
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Discrete decision problems are very frequently found in the public sector.
Because knowledge of the determinants of discrete choices is important to
the policy maker, a considerable effort has recently been devoted to the
study of discrete choice decisions.
II The conceptual framework
B.2 The behavioral approach
One of the most recent approaches used to deal with the issues of discrete
choice decisions has been a development from the theory of individual
behavior. The modeling of discrete choice behavior is essentially a
derivative of standard microeconomic choice theory. This theory follows
the behavioristic approach to theory building, where it is assumed that
larger groups will act in ways which can be derived from the understanding
of the individual unit.
The behavioristic approach to discrete choice decisions attempts to
establish the relationship between choices on the one hand and attributes
of alternatives and characteristics of individual decision-makers on the
other hand.
The behavioristic approach assumes that an individual has a utility
function and that the observed behavior is the result of the maximization
of the utility function. This approach accepts the premise that the
utility which is perceived by an individual is determined by his attitudes
about all the stimuli which act on him over his lifetime, but does not
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attempt to study the link between attitudes and behavior. Hence, the
internal mechanisms which intermediate between the perceived attributes of
the alternatives and the actual decisions taken are ignored by this approach.
Therefore, it treats the individual as a "black box", i.e., as a system
about whose structure we know nothing except that which can be deducted
from its behavior. Thus, the interest is shifted from the psychological
aspects of decision making such as the processes of attitude formation
and modification of behavior to more observable aspects such as the
discovering of statistical relationships between the inputs (attributes)
and outputs (decisions) for which the theory attempts to give an
explanation.
B.3 The theory of individual behavior
The theory of rational choice behavior asserts that a decision maker can
rank possible alternatives in order of preference, and will always choose
from available alternatives the option which he considers most desirable.
It is expected that by establishing the statistical link between the
attributes of the options available to the individuals, and the actual
choices made by them, it will be possible to forecast the effects of
changes in the system.
In order to introduce the main ideas of the theory of individual behavior,
let us suppose that we have drawn three decision makers from a population
of "similar" individuals. "Similar" is defined with reference to
observable characteristics of the individual themselves. For example, the
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three decision makers may be "similar" because they manufacture the same
product, use the same technology, and employ the same number of workers.
Furthermore, suppose that each of these individuals faces the same two
alternative choices. Now imagine that we find that two of them --decision
makers I and II-- have selected alternative 1 while one individual
--decision maker III-- has chosen alternative 2. We can ask ourselves,
how it is possible that similar individuals, facing the same alternatives,
behave in different ways? It is precisely through answering this question
that the theory of discrete choice behavior is developed.
This theory asserts that this "abnormal"finding is due to unobserved data.
Recall that the estimation procedures available are based only on observed
data. Only a portion of the factors that determine individual decisions
are observed and measured. The theory suggests that there remain
unobserved attributes of the alternatives in the choice sets available to
decision makers as well as unobserved characteristics of the decision
makers themselves which should be taken into account to explain the
behavior of the decision maker. It is precisely the treatment of these
unobserved determinants of individual decisions that are emphasized in
discrete choice theory. Recall that in our example, we have assumed that
the three individuals are similar only with reference to some observable
characteristics. Hence, there is still room for unobserved characteristics
to play a role in the decision process.
B.4 The conceptual model of discrete choice
Discrete choice models, as well as their continuous couterparts, assume
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the existence of a "representative" or "average" individual who has
tastes equal to the average over all decision makers with given observed
characteristics. The model assumes that this representative individual
has a utility function measuring the desirability of an option. This
utility function can be expressed as
u... = U(X. ,s.) (B.1)
'13 '3 '
where u.. = Utility that the average individual i attaches to
iJ
alternative j.
x.. = Vector of the levels of relevant and observable attributes
iJ
of alternative j from the perspective of individual i.
s. = Vector of the relevant and observable characteristics of
individual i.
Equation (B.1) is the deterministic functional form representing the
average (e.g. mean) behavior of the individual i. In order to take into
consideration deviations from this average, a nondeterministic part should
be added to represent the random fluctuations observed. The stochastic
utility function can be expressed as
u.. = U.. (x. . ,s.) + n.. (B.2)
'13 123 23 i '23
where i. . is a random variable for individual i related to alternative j,
and
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ri.. = -.. (x. ,s ) (B.2.a)
The stochastic term -n is assume to reflect the unobserved attributes of
the alternatives and the unobserved characteristics of the decision maker.
Hence, according to this model, the reason decision maker III of our
example behaves in a "non-representative" way by choosing alternative 2,
is due to the effect of unobserved data.
If we analyze more closely individual I and individual II we find that
they have chosen option 1 over 2 because the utility that each gains from
alternative 1 is greater than that obtained for alternative 2, i.e.,
because u. > ui2 .
By substitution, an equivalent expression is:
U i(X ,lsi ) + 11l(x il,s ) > U i2 (Xi2,si ) + qi2 (xi2, s ) (B.3)
By rearrangement, we have
U 1 (x.1 ,s ) - U 2 (xi2 ,s.) > qi 2 (xi2 ,si) - k7. (x. 1 ,s.) (B.4)
The common sense underlying this re-expression is easy to interpret: the
decision to choose alternative 1 over alternative 2 will follow from the
observable utility superiority of alternative 1, as long as the margin of
superiority- is greater than any countervailing effect of utility differences
based on unobservable phenomena.
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In general, we may say that individual i will choose alternative k if
U.k (x ,s.) - U. (x. ,s.) > .. (x. ,s.) - (x ,s ) (B.5)
for j A k, j = 1,...J
Equation (B.5) expresses the conceptual model of discrete choice:
individual i will choose option k if this is the alternative which
maximizes his utility, i.e., individual i will choose option k as long as
the margin of superiority of the observable utility is greater for option
k, than any countervailing effect of utility differences based on
unobservable phenomena.
III The operational framework
B.5 General concepts
Now it is necessary to transform the conceptual model into an operational
model, so that it can help us to predict the behavior of individuals not
included in the original sample. It should be stressed that the model will
not predict how a particular individual will behave; it will only give the
probability that an individual will select a particular option. For
example, if for firms of a particular industrial group, the model indicates
a probability of 0.7 that they will locate in city B, this implies that we
can expect that out of 10 new firms, 7 will select city B. The model will
not tell us which of the 10 firms will locate in city B, only that 7 will
locate there. Furthermore, the model may predict, for example, what the
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locational response of the industrial group will be to changes in some
attributes of the city such as electricity costs or levels of subsidy or
wage rates. Indeed, by explicitly stating those attributes capable of
being manipulated by policy-makers, the model forecasts the effects of
changes in the system.
Recall that the stochastic model of utility has been expressed as
u.. = U.. (x. . ,s.) + ri.. (B.2)
13 13 13 1 13
We have indicated that the first term of the right hand side of this
equation is non-stochastic or determinate, while the second term is
stochastic.
Now, in order to build any econometric model, we have to address two
important issues:
1) How should the utility function be specified? i.e., how should the
first term of the stochastic model be defined?
2) What assumptions should be made about the error term? For the second
term of the stochastic model, assumptions have to be made about the
structure of the errors which lead to deviations of the observed
pattern of choice among observationally identical individuals.
B.5.1 Issue 1: Specification of the utility function
At the most general level, an appropriate utility function can be
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specified as
u.. = 0 + S z .(x..,s.) + ... z . (x. ,s.) (B.6)
13 1 li13ii 13 i
This function is linear in its parameters (SoS1,... 5,) but its
arguments (z1, .. .z-y- ) are themselves a series of transformations of the
data. Hence, the z-variables can be logarithms, reciprocals, exponentials,
etc. The z-variables may also incorporate interactions between the
attributes of the alternatives and the characteristics of the individual.
Thus, a utility function could be simply a purely linear (and quite
unrealistic) specification:
u.. = S + S x . + ... + S x . + 5 sl. + ...Ss . (B.7)
13 o 1 13j g g3 gel lJ T3
On the other hand, the same general specification can also encompass the
translog function, which has the advantage of being additive in the first
powers, squares and cross-products of the logarithms of alternatives and
individual characteristics.
Since the linearization of the utility function in a set of
z*- transformations does not appear to be very restrictive, we may
consider it general enough for most applications.
To simplify the notation, equation (B.6) may be written
u = 0+ z .. + ... + ST Z Tij (B. 6. a)
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Equation (6.a) can further be simplified in its notation:
u.. = z.. g (B.8)
13 1]
where z.. as are now vectors:
1J
= 1 i
Z. = [ z ..j ... z- ..
1, 0[ ... 4
Hence, the stochastic model can be expressed as:
u. =z. + r1. (B.9)
1 1 1
B.5.2 Issue 2: Assumptions about the error term
The theory of individual behavior assumes that the only reason for
different discrete choices by observationally -identical individuals in the
same choice environment, must be the effect of unobservable attributes of
the alternatives and unobservable characteristics of individuals. In any
real situation, of course, there will be a huge number of such attributes
and characteristics. Thus, we can define the error term in the utility
function as being the sum of the contribution to utility made by a very
large number of characteristics and attributes which are distributed
randomly across individuals and alternatives.
As long as a fair number of these unobservable characteristics and
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attributes are independently distributes, it makes no difference if each
distribution of random occurrences has no regular pattern. The sum of
the effects of the occurrences will approximate a normal distribution, and
the Central Limit Theorem guarantees that the distribution will be closer
to normal, the larger the number of independently distributed unobservable
characteristics. Hence, a strong argument for normality in the error-
generating process can be made in discrete choice modelling.
The assumption that the error-generating process is normal has the
following additional advantage: the sum or difference in repeated draws
of two normally-distributed random variables is also normal. This aspect
will facilitate the construction of the operational model of discrete
choice, as we shall see next.
B.6 The operational model
B.6.1 The cumulative distribution function
Recall that the conceptual model of discrete choice behavior is expressed
in the inequality which governs the choice between two modes:
u.1 (x. ,s ) - u.2 (x. 2 ,s.) > n (x 2 ,s.) - *n (x. 1 ,s.) (B.4)
For convenience, we can adopt the following notation:
u. - u. > i2 - (B. 10)
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Substituting for the linearized utility model, equation (8):
u.. = z.. S we have:
iJ iJ
z. S- z. i2 > n i2- T1i (B.11)
Now, if l. and T. have been assumed to be normally-distributed, so must
be their difference. If we let
1i2 nil - (B.12)
the inequality can be re-written as
(zi - z ) 6 > n. (B.13)
The recast conceptual model as expressed in inequality (B.13) says that
alternative 1 will be chosen over alternative 2 if their utility difference
is greater than the value taken on by the normally distributed variable
n.. Obviously, the greater the weighted sum of the distances between the
values, the greater the probability that it will be larger than the value
taken on by the associated random draw. The normality of n . guarantees that
this probability will decline very rapidly for possible values as they
get further away from the mean of the distribution.
A closer look into the recast conceptual model in inequality (B.13), will
show that the description of it is simply a description of a cumulative
distribution function. In this case, because of the assumptions made, it
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is a normal cumulative function.
Hence, the probability that individual i will choose option 1 rather than
option 2 is the same as:
Prob [n. < (z. - z. 2 ) (B.14)
To see why this is so, recall that for any continuous random variable, rb,
the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) is defined as
n.
F ('1) = f (ni ) d -n (B.15)
This is a mathematical representation of the proportion of total area under
*
the probability density function (p.d.f.) from -- to n j . Fig. B.1 depicts
the p.d.f.
F(Pl.)
T1 i
Fig. B.1: Probability density function
f (T ) FOn)=
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If we let n. = (z. - z ) , the c.d.f. will give us the probability thati i 2
the normal random variable, rl. , is less than a particular value,
(z. - z. ) , as can be seen in Fig. B.2.i1 i2
P . < (z.
.5
- zi2 ) I
(z 
- z. )i1 12
Fig. B.2: Cumulative distribution function
Thus, the normal distribution of the error term -in the original model of
utility leads to a nice, regular function which relates differences in the
alternative valuations to the probability that option 1 will be chosen
over option 2. Hence,
= Prob ( .< (z1 - z 2 ) I =
(z. -z. 2 )S
f (in.) d 'n.
The probability that individual i will choose option 1 over option 2 can be
read directly from the cumulative distribution. Note that when the utility
difference is zero, the decision maker is indifferent to the two options
that he faces and therefore, the probability of choosing alternative 1 can
be obtained from the graph (Fig. B.2). And it is equal to 0.5.
P. (B.16)
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B.6.2 The joint probability density function
Earlier, in equation (B.12) we have let qi2~Ui be I, , since the
difference of two normally distributed random variables is also normal.
Hence, TI. is a normal random variable that belongs to a joint probability
density function. Now, we should take a closer look into the joint
p.d.f. of the random variable n. For simplicity in the presentation of
this important aspect, we shall drop the subscript i.
The random variable rI , has to be seen as joint (difference) distribution
of two equally random variables 112 and n For this purpose, three steps
should be considered:
* The first step is related to the probability of drawing a
particular value of n2'
* The second step deals with the probability that the n2-draw is
greater than nl.
* The third step is related to the combination of the two earlier
steps.
To illustrate this, let us see figures B.3.a to B.3.d.
Step 1:
Each value of T2 from -c to + has a relative frequency of occurrence.
This frequency can be read out of the probability density function for n2
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in Fig. B.3.a.
Step 2:
For each of the -2 values, there is a definite probability that a is
smaller. This probability can be read out of the cumulative distribution
for I in Fig. B.3.c.
Step 3:
Thus, for any given pair of values, we know that the probability that
n2-draw will be greater than n 1-draw is given by:
Prob I T2 * = Prob (T12) - Prob (T2 > 1) (B.17)2 ' ~2 >r ~ r 2 2 1
The superscript i indicates a particular value of l2 . The joint probability
is the product of the individual probabilities here because the draws on
T2 and n are independent of one another.
There are an infinite number of possible values for T2 (from -c to +c)
and since equation (B.17) gives us the joint probability for only one
particular value of T2,n , we have to sum over all possible values of 2'
To see why this is so, recall from simple probability theory that
Prob (A or B) = Prob (A) + Prob (B) where A and B are draws of a random
variable. Thus, if there were a finite number (M) of possible values in
the distribution n 2 , we would have
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Prob [n or T or ... or n = Prob (1 ) + ... + Prob (2n)E Ti + Pro (in)2
Prob (ri)
m
i=1
Similarly, we would have
Prob [ (- 1 1 ) or (n2 2 > 1) or ... or (T2' > 1
=2 o ( ) - P (2
-Prob (TI) - Prob (n 1 > Tn) + ... + Prob (n)-Prob (Tm>n
i=1
Prob (T1) - Prob (n > n )2 2 1
In our case, of course, we have an infinite number of such possible draws
of 2 Recall that f2(r() is another way of representing the p.d.f. for n2
and F ('n) is another way of representing the c.d.f. for T11, we can therefore
replace the discrete probability expression above with an analogous
integral to represent summation along all values of the continuous
variable T12 :
+2)
f2 (T)F 1 (q) dinProb E 2' 2 > T1  I
(B.18)
(B.19)
(B. 20)
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Note that equation (B.20) is the joint p.d.f. of the random variable n,
i.e., the component f(f) of the equation (B.16):
P = Prob [ n < (z1 - z2) a =
Substituting in equation (B.16) we have:
(zI-z 2 )a +M
P, = f2(T) F1
-CO -00
(z - z2)a
f(n) dTI
Hence, equation (B.16.a) is the operational model for analyzing discrete
choices.
B.7 Limitations of the normal distribution
To estimate the a-parameters,observed values of z are introduced into the
operational model, where P takes a dichotomous value of zero or one.
Note that the cumulative normal distribution function can only be
expressed as a mathematical integral. Furthermore, all the subsequent
operations which lead to econometric estimation of the a's are very
complicated. These two arguments have spurred researchers to find
alternatives in order to simplify the manipulation of the model. One of
the alternatives most widely employed is based on the use of the Weibull
distribution as a substitute for the normal.
(B.16)
(B. 16.a)TI) dT
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B.8 The Weibull distribution
The shape of the Weibull distribution is fairly close to that of the normal
distribution.At the same time it is generated by a function which is more
convenient analytically.
The major advantage of the Weibull distribution as a characterization of
the error term in the utility model emerges from the proposition that
the cumulative probability function associated with the difference
between two Weibull-distributed random variables is an extremely simple
mathematical form called the binary logit. The basic assumption behind
the binary logit model is that the disturbances are independent and
identically distributed.
For a Weibull-distributed variable, the c'.d.f. is
F (n) = e (B.21)
The frequency function for a Weibull-distributed variable is given by:
f (T)= F' (-) = e ( e (B.22)
Substituting equations B.21 and B.22 in equation B.20, and letting
e = [ e~4X + eaz ], we have:
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Prob ['ni, TI1 > 2 =
+) -
f -(Tl+a) 
e-
~00
e- (fl+a 2)e
e-(n+1ai) -ef e-1 + e-a2 da
-C 1  - -e e-aie e e d = e
+CO
f e -Ie- 
e-T
~00
-ai 1 1 -e
- e -e
e-ai
e-ot + e-a2
e-ai
e + e- T
-00
_00
e -Ge
e + e
1
e
1
e(I / ) S -e(00)
e
ea1 + ea2
4-w
+00
~00
+00
i.00c
e1 -
ea + e-az
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Hence, for two independent, Weibull-distributed variables with values ai
and az, we have
Prob (n > -n ) = (B.20.a)
r 1 T 1 '2 e a + ea2 1+ eC&1-2B
As can be seen in equation (B.20.a), this is a remarkable result.
Although the integrals of equation B.20 look complex, the extraordinary
properties of e, the natural logarithm base, make it simple.
For the estimation process of the parameters as well as other related
issues, the reader may consult chapter 7 in the main text of this study.
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APPENDIX C: CITY CHARACTERISTICS, MEASUREMENT AND DATA ISSUES
Most of the variables are divided by the city's population. A better
approach is to use the city's total labor force instead. The latter
approach was abandoned when it was realized that data on labor force was
obtained by administrative regions and not by cities. Hence, additional
assumptions as well as estimations would have to be made which probably
would add little to the accuracy of the results.
In some cases, data by city were not available. Fortunately it was possible
to obtain relevant data by administrative regions or by states. Under
these circumstances, it is assumed that cities within a spatial unit have
the spatial unit's value.
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy 1:
Central place hierarchy
Wholesale employment.
Proportion of the city's wholesale employment to its
population.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 8, Poblaci6n urbana ocupada
en comercio al por mayor. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975
and 1977.
Administrative region.
Income level
Median household income
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Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 2:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 3:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
The median, estimated from the urban household income
distribution.
Encuesta de Hogares, cuadro 29, Ingresos totales e
ingresos medios de los hogares por escala de ingreso, area
urbana, OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
Per capita median income
The median income for urban households divided by the
average urban household size.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 29: Ingresos totales e
ingresos medios de los hogares, por escala de ingreso,
area urbana. Cuadro 30: Distribuci6n de los hogares y
miembros de hogares por escala de ingreso mensual, area
urbana, OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
Number of private cars.
Proportion of the city's private cars to its population.
Ministerio de Transporte y Comunicaciones, Direcci6n de
Procesamiento de Datos, Oficina de Secretaria Tecnica.
State.
Local economic conditions
Unemployment rates.
Deviation in a city's unemployment rate from its long-run
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Source:
Spatial un
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
average, i.e., ratio of unemployment rate to the normal
level of unemployment. The normal level of unemployment
is measured as an average over several years.
Encuesta de Hogares, cuadro 11. Poblaci6n 15 afios y mas
desocupada, rama de actividad econ6mica del 'Gltimo trabajo
por sexo, area urbana. OCEI, 1970-1977.
Administrative region.it:
Labor availability by skills
Labor force.
Proportion of the city's two-digit ISIC code labor force
to its population. The two-digit code was thought most
appropriate to use because of the possibility of using
the same labor category across different industries
within the same two-digit ISIC code.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 7. Poblaci6n de 15 anos y mas
en la fuerza de trabajo, rama de actividad economica, area
urbana. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Note: This source gives the urban two-digit labor force by
administrative regions. It is allocated to cities within
the region in proportion to the city's population.
Unemployment levels by skills
Unemployment percentage.
Percentage of the city's unemployed labor force.
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Unemployment
percentage
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Total labor force / Employment 1
two-digit code) two-digit code /
Total labor force
two-digit code /
The two-digit code was thought most appropriate to use
because of the possibility of using the same element of
the labor force across different industries within the
same two-digit ISIC code.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 7: Poblaci6n de 15 a-nos y mas,
en la fuerza de trabajo, rama de actividad econ6mica, area
urbana. Cuadro 8: Poblaci6n de 15 afios y mas ocupada, rama
de actividad econ'mica, area urbana, OCEI, Segundo semestre,
1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
Technical expertise
Number of professionals, technicians and related
occupations.
Proportion of the city's professionals, technicians and
related occupations to its population.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 14, Fuerza de trabajo:
Profesionales, tecnicos y personas en ocupaciones afines,
area urbana. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
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Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Management potential
Number of managers, administrators and directors.
Proportion of the city's managers, administrators and
directors to its population.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 14, Fuerza de trabajo urbano:
Gerente, administradores, directores y otros funcionarios
de categoria directiva. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and
1977.
Administrative region.
Wage rate
Bolivares paid to blue collar workers per hour worked.
The wage rate is equal to production workers' earnings
divided by production manhours. That is,
q
where: S
S ii
1
= average wage rate paid by industry
blue collar workers.
= total wages paid by all industry i
located at point q.
i at point q to
establishments
= total number of hours worked by blue collar workers
in all industry i plants located at point q.
HqHi
S
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Source:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Cost of living
Buying power of money.
Comparative cost of living for food, drinks and tabacco.
Boletines del Banco Central, Cuadro A-III-19, 1975 and 1977.
City.
Labor unrest
Working hours lost due to unexpected stoppages.
Proportion of the yearly average working hours lost (due
to unexpected stoppages) to the labor force.
Memoria y Cuenta del Ministerio del Trabajo, Division de
Organismos Sindicales, Contratos y Conflictos de Trabajo,
1975 and 1977.
1975 and 1977 Survey tapes, OCEI.
Note: Wage rates at the three-digit ISIC code level were estimated.
When the three-digit wage was unavailable for a city, the
existing data for the city's region was used to estimate
the relationship between the three-digit and the average
manufacturing wages for the region. Knowing the average
manufacturing wage for the city and assuming that the
relationship in the city is the same as in the region,
the three-digit wage for the city was estimated. When
available, the two-digit wage was used instead of the
average manufacturing wage.
Mit: City.Spatial
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Facilities for training personnel
Students enrolled in technical training courses.
Proportion of students attending technical training courses
to the city's population.
Memorias del Ministerio de Educaci6n, Matricula
Estudiantil de Educaci6n Superior, 1975 and 1977.
City.
Access to financial services
Employment in financial services.
Proportion of the city's employment in the financial sector
to its population.
Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo, Cuadro 8, Poblaci6n
urbana ocupada en establecimientos financieros. OCEI,
Segundo Semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
Access to industrial services
Employment in services for establishments.
Proportion of the city's employment in services for
establishments, to its population.
Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo, Cuadro 8, Poblaci6n
urbana ocuapda en seguros y servicios prestados a las
empresas incluyendo alquiler y arrendamiento de equipo.
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State.
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Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy 1:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 2:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
Access to research services
Employment in research institutes.
Proportion of the city's employment in research institutes
to its population.
Boletin Estadistico, Oficina de Planificaci6n Universitaria,
Consejo Nacional de Universidades, 1975 and 1977.
City.
Water availability
Cubic meters of water consumed per inhabitant.
Proportion of the city's consumption of water to its
population.
INOS, Direcci6n de Planificaci6n de Desarrollo, OCEI,
Proyecciones de Poblaci6n, 1974.
City.
Percentage of population serviced with water.
Percentage of the city's population serviced with water.
INOS, Divisi6n de Planificaci6n de Desarrollo, INOS,
Proyecciones de Poblaci6n, 1972.
City.
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Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy 1:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 2:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy 1:
Measure:
Source:
Water cost
Water cost.
The industrial rate taken from the "higher usage" schedule
of the city.
INOS. Gaceta Oficial No. 2077 Extraordinaria del 15/8/77.
City.
Availability of Communication Facilities
Telephone services
Number of telephone lines (installed capacity) per
thousand inhabitants.
CANTV, Division de Planificaci6n, Anexos Estadisticos,
1975 and 1977.
City.
Telex services.
Number of telex lines (installed capacity) per thousand
inhabitants.
CANTV, Division de Planificaci6n, Anexos Estadisticos,
1975 and 1977.
City.
Health services
Available medical doctors.
Number of inhabitants per doctor
Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Departamento
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Spatial unit:
Proxy 2:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy 1:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 2:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
de Estadisticas Vitales.
State.
Available hospital beds.
Number of beds per thousand inhabitants.
Ministerio de Sanidad, Divisi6n de Sistemas Estadisticos y
Computaci6n, Secci6n de Estadisticas de Salud.
City.
Educational provision
Children per classroom.
Number of 5-14 year old children per classroom.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 1, Poblaci6n total por grupos
de edad. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Memorias del Ministerio de Educaci6n, Educaci6n Preescolar
y Primaria, Anexos Estadisticos 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
Teenagers per classroom.
Number of 15-19 year old teenagers per classroom
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 1, Poblaci6n total por
grupos de edad. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Memorias del Ministerio de Educaci6n, Educaci6n Media,
Anexos Estadisticos 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
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Proxy 3:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 4:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 5:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 6:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy: -
Teachers per classroom in primary school.
Number of teachers per classroom.
Memorias del Ministerio de Educaci6n, Educaci6n Preescolar
y Primaria, Anexos Estadisticos 1975 and 1977.
State.
Teachers per classroom in High School.
Number of teachers per classroom.
Memorias del Ministerio de Educaci6n, Educaci6n Media,
Anexos Estadisticos, 1975 and 1977.
State.
Students per classroom in primary school.
Number of registered students per classroom.
Memorias del Ministerio de Educaci6n, Educaci6n Preescolar
y Primaria, Anexos Estadisticos, 1975 and 1977.
State.
Students per classroom in high school.
Number of registered students per classroom.
Memorias del Ministerio de Educaci6n, Educaci6n Media,
Anexos Estadisticos, 1975 and 1977.
State.
Shopping facilities
Retail employment.
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Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy 1:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proportion of the city's retail employment to its
population.
Encuesta de hogares, Cuadro 8, Poblaci6n urbana ocupada
en comercio al por menor. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975
and 1977.
Administrative region.
Hotel and meeting facilities
Employment in restaurants and hotels.
Proportion of the city's employment in restaurants and
hotels, to its population.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 8, Poblaci6n urbana ocupada en
restaurantes y hoteles. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975 and
1977.
Administrative region.
Entertainment and cultural provision
Those employed in entertaining and cultural services.
Proportion of the city's employment in entertainment
services to its population.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 8, Poblaci6n urbana ocupada en
servicios de diversi6n y esparcimiento. OCEI, Segundo
semestre, 1975 and 1977.
Administrative region.
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Variable:
Proxy 1:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Proxy 2:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Measure:
Source:
Spatial unit:
Variable:
Proxy:
Spatial unit:
Measure:
Local transportation facilities
Employment in transportation.
Proportion of the city's employment in transportation to
its population.
Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 8: Poblaci6n ocupada en
transporte y almacenamiento. OCEI, Segundo semestre, 1975
and 1977
Administrative region.
Public transportation units.
Number of public transportation vehicles per thousand
inhabitants.
Ministerio de Communicaciones, Direcci6n de Transporte.
State.
Personal safety
Delinquent index.
Number of registered cases per thousand inhabitants.
Anuario Estadistico, Cuadro 11-5-4, Indice delictivo,
OCEI, 1977.
State.
Financial incentives
Percentage savings in present value terms.
Area of deconcentration.
In order to determine how much savings an entrepeneur
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could have made by locating in an area of deconcentration, a single
indicator for the level of subsidy in each area was needed. This indicator
had to combine into one measure subsidized interest rates, a market interest
rate, a loan period and a grace period, but these aspects varied with the
use of the money: whether for land and construction, machinery and
equipment, or for working capital. After studying several approaches, the
one chosen was based on the concept of net present value. This approach
reflected the percentage savings in present value terms obtained by an
entrepeneur locating in each of the areas of deconcentration. For each of
the components of the loan, e.g., machinery, working capital, etc., the
present discounted value of the series of payments was calculated at the
actual rate of interest. This discounting procedure allowed us to combine
both subsidized and market interest rates, as well as grace and loan periods.
It should be noted that when the subsidized and market rates were the same,
the percentage savings was zero.
From the information available, it was possible to determine what
proportion of a loan was for working capital, for machinery, etc. The
following are the average percentages for the loans given by Corpoindustria:
Land and construction 30%
Machinery and equipment 60%
Working capital 10%
By multiplying the percentage savings for each use by the proportion of its
corresponding participation and summing the three uses, a single indicator
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of the percentage savings in present value terms was obtained for each
deconcentration area.
The following example will help to clarify the process used. Suppose an
entrepeneur is considering borrowing Bs. 100. Furthermore, suppose that if
he goes to a designated area, the following loan conditions are offered to
him by the government financial institutions:
loan period: 3 years
grace period: 1 year
interest: 8%
Otherwise, he would have to pay the outgoing market rate of, say, 12%.
The entrepeneur may want to know what the current value is, i.e., Present
Discount Value (PDV), for the sum of a series of future payments, a, over
the period t=1 through t=4, when the market interest rate is 12%. This can
be estimated by
4 a
PDV = t (.1)
t=1 (1+.12)
The value of the constant stream, a, when the subsidized interest rate is
8% is given by
(.08) [ (1+.08)n
a = (C.2)
n(1+.08) - 1
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where n is the number of periods during which payments are made. In our
example n=3, since during the first year no payment are made (grace period).
Since the interest for the grace period, i.e., Bs. 8, is not paid but added
to the amount borrowed, the value of I at the end of the grace period is
100+8=108. Hence the debt service using equation C.2 is:
( .08) (108) (1. 08)3
a = 3 = 41.91 (C.2.a)
(1.08) - 1
This implies that from years 2 to 4, our entrepeneur will pay Bs. 41.91
each year. To determine how much these "future payments" are worth to him
today, we substitute this value for a in equation C.1. This gives us
PDV = 0 + 33.41+29.83 + 26.63 = 89.87 (C.l.a)
For our entrepeneur, paying back three installments of Bs. 41.91 to the
government in the future is worth Bs. 89.87 to him today. Furthermore, by
getting Bs. 100 today from the government as a loan, he is making a profit
of Bs. 10.13 (100.00-89.87). In other words, by going to the designated
area, our entrepeneur is saving 10.13%.
Now suppose that the percentage savings for our entrepeneur on the following
items is:
Land and construction 10%
Machinery and equipment 15%
Working capital 20%
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To obtain a single indicator, we multiply the percentage savings for each
use by its corresponding participation and then sum over the uses:
Percentage
savings
10
15
20
Participation
proportion
(.30)
(.60)
(.10)
Total percentage savings
=3
=9
=2
14%
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APPENDIX D: AGGLOMERATION POTENTIAL MODEL
D.1 Flow characteristics
Flow characteristics are those attributes of a point which reflect the
interaction that takes place between a particular city's activity and the
activity and geographic location of neighboring cities. For the purpose
of this study, the city's activity will be expressed mainly in terms of the
manufacturing sector of the economy. Hence, flow characteristics take into
account the spatial structure of the manufacturing system.
When the flow characteristics of a city offer locational advantages, it
is generally said to have localization economies, i.e., economies external
to the firm but internal to a group of firms in a particular location. For
example, localization economies may arise from similar plants clustered
together and obtaining benefits from joint use of subsidiary facilities, or
they may arise by a firm being near to its sources of input and/or market
for its output.
A simple classification of the interaction of manufacturing activities may
be helpful here. Following Hoover's terminology (Hoover, 1) we have:
1.- Vertical relationships
2.- Horizontal relationships
3.- Complementary relationships
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D.1.1 Vertical relationships
Vertical relationships occur when the outputs of one industry are inputs to
another industry. In terms of location it generally implies mutual
attraction due to the reduction of transfer costs. Localization advantages
obtained by this type of relationship, i.e., from the juxtaposition of
several industries linked by trade or production factors, are defined as
"industrial complex economies" (Isard and Schooler,2 ). Rarely however, is
such attraction equal in both directions. We can distinguish between cases
where the linkage is predominantly backward or forward.
Backward linkage:
In the backward linked industrial complex, linkages exist between a firm in
industry j and its suppliers in various other industries or sources i.
Because of the incipient conditions of the manufacturing industry in
Venezuela, there is a high proportion of inputs which are imported. Hence,
it will be useful to separate the attractiveness of the ports and
international airports, as sources of imported material, from the local
sources.
We will need two different models to measure the attractiveness of
backward linkages:
1.- Agglomeration potential associated with local inputs;
2.- Agglomeration potential associated with foreign inputs (imports).
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Forward linkage:
In the forward linked industrial complex, linkages exist between a firm in
industry i and purchasers of its output in many other industries j. Because
the purchasers may be other industrial sectors, (final consumers as well as
foreign countries), it will be useful to separate the locational effects
that each of the markets have on an industry. Hence, we need a model to
represent each of these cases:
3.- Agglomeration potential associated with intermediate markets;
4.- Agglomeration potential associated with foreign markets (exports);
5.- Agglomeration potential associated with domestic final consumers.
D.1.2 Horizontal and complementary relationships
Horizontal relationships involve the competition of firms for either markets
or inputs. While the localization effect of horizontal relationships is
basically one of mutual repulsion, the localizational effect of
complementary relationships is mutual attraction, i.e., an increase of one
activity in a city encourages the growth of a complementary activity. This
is due to the localizational economies obtained from joint use of subsidiary
facilities.
Hence, we need a model to measure these relationships:
6.- Agglomeration potential (negative or positive) associated with
the presence of manufacturing activity of the same industrial
sector.
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D.2 Description of the agglomeration potential model
It has been stated earlier that the attractiveness of a point in space to
new manufacturing activity is assumed to also be based upon the flow (or
inter-city related) characteristics of the point. This implies that the
level of existing activity at that point and points in the vicinity has to
be considered, i.e., to be based upon the existing spatial structure of
manufacturing.
The model that will be used to measure the agglomeration potential of a
point will be based on a spatial interaction model of the potential type.
The "potential" concept may be thought of as a measure indicating the
intensity of the possibility of interaction. The basic principles
underlying potential models can be formulated as follows (Carrothers, 3
At a given location p, the potential influence, or possibility of
interaction with respect to an individual at p, which is generated by the
attractiveness of any given point q, will be greater as the attractiveness
of q is larger and will be smaller as the distance between p and q increases,
Then according to this formulation, the accessibility of an origin point
p to attractions in the destination point q, can be expressed by the basic
equation:
V = (D.1)
pq
where: V = Potential at point p generated by the attractiveness of
(or activity at) point q.
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W = Attractiveness of (or level of activity at) point q
Tp Transfer cost between point p and q.
a = Transfer cost exponent. We have used a=2, (See further details
in the section below, D.4.3, dealing with measuring the
proximity to activities).
In our case the constant K is a scale factor which will depend on the
industry subgroup being analized.
The potential model can also be formulated as a constrained gravity model
(production constrained case). The gravity model is developed by analogy
with Newton's Law of Gravitation expressed by the formula
M M2F =G 2 (D.2)
where F Force with which each mass pulls the other
M ,M = Size of masses concerned
d Distance between them
G = Universal constant, the pull of gravity
When the potential model is formulated as a production constrained case of
the gravity model, the single constant K in equation D.1 is replaced by a
set of proportionality constants K(1) so that the constraint can be
satisfied. For a comprehensive review and detailed presentation of spatial
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4interaction models see Reif
Since we are interested in the agglomeration potential of a point p taking
into account the activity that takes place in all the points q that are
part of the manufacturing spatial structure, we can generalize equation
(D.1) by summing over all points q:
(K W qVP = F- ( a (D.3)
q Tqpq
Equation D.3 may be identified as the generic potential model that will be
used in this study to determine the attractiveness of a location based on
the flow chatacteristics. In order to simplify the notation, the superscript
p will be dropped, since the potential will always be referred to a
particular point p.
D.3 Development of the models
We have identified earlier, the need to develop six different agglomeration
potential models to measure the attractiveness of a point for a particular
industry. Based on the generic potential model, (equation D.3) we shall
develop each of these.
Model 1: Agglomeration potential associated with local inputs
a) Level of activity:
In this model, the "level of activity" i at point q (Wq) can be
expressed by the proportion of the national production of sector i that
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takes place at point q. Hence
X
W1 = (D.4)i X.
where Xq = the level of production of sector i at point q.i
X. = the national level of production of sector i.
b) Interaction factor:
Since we are interested in backward linkages, we shall use as interaction
factors, the Leontieff input-output technical coefficients. These
coefficients are estimated as follows:
X..
a.. - - (D.5)
ij X.J
where a.. = amount of inputs that industry j must purchase from industry
i to produce one unit of its output.
X. . = production of sector i sold to sector j.
1J
X. = total production of sector j.
In order to distribute the input requirements among the various sources,
we shall assume that sector j can potentially purchase a certain amount
from each point q and that other things being equal, the amount purchased
might be proportional to the production of i in point q. Hence, in order
to compute the purchases of input i, that sector j makes at point q, we
have
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M . a.. W (D.6)ij Ij i
For the production of sector j, inputs are needed from various sectors i,
which may have part of their production in the same point q . Hence
M = a.. W . (D.7)j . 1j i
where M = amount of inputs that sector j purchases at point q.
c) Proximity to local sources:
Since we assume that as the distance from point p to the source q
increases, the attractiveness of source q decreases, the probability of an
actual purchase may be inversely related to the travel function, as
expressed in equation D.1. To estimate the attractiveness (probability
of actual purchases) to sector j of point p, due to inputs located at point
q, we have:
E a.. W
V = I (D.8)
pq
Hence, to estimate the attractiveness of point p to industry j, due to
inputs located at all points q, we compute
q
E a.. W,(1) ____1 ______V. = , 1 (D.9)
pq
The superscript (1) refers to model 1: Agglomeration potential associated
with local inputs.
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A problem with the index of agglomeration potential associated with local
inputs may arise when the industry itself happens to be major supplier
of its own inputs, making interpretation of the agglomeration potential
index difficult. A large value could indicate not only the great
attractiveness of locational input advantages,. but could also indicate a
large number of potential competitors at that point. In these cases, the
interpretation should be done together with model 6 (explained later on)
which will pick up this competition effect.
The technical coefficients, a.., tell us the relative importance in money
value terms of the various industries i which are sources to industry j.
These belong not only to the processing sector but to the payment sector
as well; for example, payment of wages and taxes. Since our concern in
this model is with the relative purchases that industry j makes from the
various industries i belonging to the processing sector, we may neglect
the factor payment sector and use only purchased goods and services. The
purchase coefficients can be derived from the technical coefficients in
the following way:
* a..
a.. = for i = 1,2,... k (D.5.a)
13 a..1 1J
where a.. = purchase coefficient.
eJ
k = number of industries in the processing sector.
In doing so, we will be able to compare not only the attractiveness, to
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industry j, of one geographical point against another point (which is the
subject matter of the agglomeration potential model), but to compare also
the attractiveness of point p to industry i compared to industry j.
Equation D.9 should be rewritten as:
* q
(1) a.. W.(1) __iiJ i
q T ( a (D.9.1)
pq
Model 2: Agglomeration potential associated with foreign inputs
Level of activity:
For this model, the "level of activity" at a point q reflects the proportion
of the production of sector j, that is imported via point q, where q is an
international gate(such as a port or airport).
The coefficient for imports, i.e., the amount of inputs per unit of output
that sector j imports, m , can be computed as:
I.
M. =(D.10)
J x.J
where I. = amount of inputs imported by sector j.
X. = national level of production of sector j.
3
If we assume for a particular point p that the components of sector j will
be imported through the nearest international port, q, then m..=m .J J
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Hence, the attractiveness of point p to industry j can be expressed as
q
V(2) j (D11)
TaO
pq
The superscript (2) refers to model 2: Agglomeration potential associated
with imports.
Model 3: Agglomeration potential associated with intermediate markets
a) Level of activity:
The "level of activity" j at point q (W q) can be expressed as the -
J
proportion of the production of sector j that takes place at point q:
X
W = - (D.12)
J X.J
where X = the level of production of sector j at point q.
J
X. = the national level of production of sector j.
J
b) Interaction factor:
Since we are interested in forward linkages, we shall use as interaction
factors the input-output delivery (usually sales) coefficients. These
coefficients are estimated as follows:
X..
b.. - - (D.13)
ij X.
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where b.. = amount of dollars of output demanded by industry j for every
dollar produced by industry i.
X.. = production of sector i demanded by sector j.
1J
X. = total production of sector i.
In order to distribute the output of sector i among the various markets, we
assume that sector i potentially can sell a certain amount to each point q
and that this amount is proportional to the production of j at point q.
Hence, in order to compute the potential sales that industry i might make
to sector j at point q, we have
N. = b.. wj (D.14)
where N q. = the proportion of the production of sector i that is sold at
13
point q to sector j.
At point q, industry i sells not only to sector j, but to other sectors as
well. Hence, the total sales that industry i makes to all industries
located at point q is computed by:
N0 = b.. Wq (D.15)1 133
c) Proximity to the intermediate markets:
Since we assume that, as the distance from point p to market points
increases, the attractiveness of market q decreases, we will want to
divide by the travel function as expressed by equation D.l To estimate the
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attractiveness of point p to industry i, due to purchases made by industrial
sectors located at point q, can be expressed as:
q tb.. Wq
V. = - (D.16)
pq
Hence, a measure of the probability of sales from industry i, located at
point p to intermediate markets located at all points q, can be expressed
as:
Sb.. w q
V (3) (D. 17)
q CT
pq
The superscript (3) refers to model 3: Agglomeration potential associated
with intermediate markets.
A problem with the index of agglomeration potential associated with
intermediate markets may arise when the industry itself happens to be a
major consumer of its own products. This problem makes the interpretation
of the agglomeration potential index difficult. A large value could
indicate not only the great attractiveness of locational market
advantages, but could also indicate a large number of potential competitors
at that point. In these cases, the interpretation should be done together
with model 6 (explained later on) which will pick up this competition
effect.
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Model 4: Agglomeration potential associated to foreign markets
For this model, the level of activity at point q reflects the proportion
of the production of sector i that is exported via point q, where q is an
international gate (such as port or airport).
The coefficient for exports of industry i, e., can be obtained as:
E.
e. =- (D.18)
1 X.
where E. = amount of output exported by sector i.
X. = national level of production of sector i.
If we assume that, for a particular point p, the products of sector i will
be exported through the nearest international port, then e.=e . Hence, the
1 1
attractiveness of point q to industry i can be expressed as:
eq
V = 1 (D.19)
i ~Ta
pq
The superscript (4) refers to model 4: Agglomeration potential associated
with exports.
Model 5: Agglomeration potential associated with domestic final consumers
We may identify two basic domestic final sectors:
1,0- Private consumption
2.- Government consumption
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Hence, we will need a model for each of them.
Model 5.1: Private consumption -
a) Level of activity:
For the purpose of this model, the "level of activity" at point q, y ,
reflects the purchasing power of the population in that and neighboring,
settlements (catchment area).
To determine the purchasing power of point q, y , we assume that this
value is proportional to the share of the national income generated at
point q. This value is computed by:
q Y q
Y (D.20)
where Y = Income generated at point q and its catchment area.
Y = National Income.
b) Interaction factor:
The coefficient of final private consumption, c., may be estimated as
follows:
X.
c. = (D.20.a)i X.
where c. = Amount of dollars of output demanded by the private
consumption sector for every dollar produced by industry i.
X. = Production of sector i demanded by the private consumption
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sector.
X. = Total production of sector i.
In order to distribute the output of sector i among the various points of
final private consumption, we assume that private consumption is distributed
in the geographical space in the same way as the purchasing power. Hence,
the sales to private consumers that industry i makes, Fq, at point q, is
computed by:
F = cy (D.21)
l 1
c) Proximity to the final consumer:
Since we assume that, as the distance from point p to the points of final
consumption increases, the attractiveness of the market q decreases, we
have to take into account the deterrence function, T, as expressed by
equation D.1. To estimate the attractiveness of point p to industry i, as
a result of the purchases made by the final consumers located at point q,
we have:
Fq c. yq
Vq = = -(D.22)
Ta T
pq pq
Hence, the attractiveness of point p to industry i due to the location of
final consumers at all points q, can be expressed as:
q
(5.1) c y (
q Tq1 pq
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The superscript (5.1) refers to model 5.1: Agglomeration potential associated
with national private final consumers.
Model 5.2: Government consumption
a) Level of activity:
For the purpose of this model, the "level of activity" at point q, g ,
reflects the purchasing power of the government sector in that locale.
To determine the government purchasing power at point q, g , we assume
that this value is a proportion of the city's government operational
expenditures to the national government operational expenditures. This
value is computed by
g q = (D.20.1)g G
where Gq = local government operational expenditure.
G = national government operational expenditure.
b) Interaction factor:
To estimate the coefficient of final government consumption, r., we
estimate how much the local government spends in each sector i. When data
for local government distribution of purchases is not available, we may use
the national values and assume that local governments spend their operational
budgets in the same way.
When data problems arise in determining the values of the interaction
factors c. and r., we may not be able to separate the national final
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onsumers into private and government.
able to estimate only one coefficient
following way:
Under this condition we will be
of final consumption, c., in the
C.
I
c. =-
1 X.
1
(D.24)
where C. = production of sector i demanded by the sector of final
consumers, both private and public and also including net
changes in inventories.
X. = total production of sector i.
The value of the production of sector i demanded by the final consumers,
C., can be computed as a residual if necessary. Since we know that
X. + I.
1 1
= N. + C. + E.
1 1 1
(D,25)
where X.
N.
1
C.1
E.
I
= total
= total
= total
= total
= total
production of sector
imports of sector i.
sales of sector i to
sales of sector i to
exports of sector i.
i.
intermediate markets.
final consumers.
We can easily obtain the value of C. from equation D.25.
Model 6: Agglomeration potential associated with the presence of
manufacturing industry of the same industrial sector
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a) Level of activity:
For the purpose of this model, the "level of activity" i at point q, W. ,
is obtained by the proportion of the total production of i that takes place
at point q:
Xi
W q = 1(D.4)
i X.i
where X = production of sector i at point q.
:1
X. = national production of sector i.
b) Interaction factor:
Since we are interested in the effects due to the presence of the
manufacturing industry of the same industrial sector, we only need to
consider the purchase coefficients that relate to the same sector and we
can disregard all others. Hence,
0 for i # j
*)
a.. =
1]
a..for i = j
c) Proximity to the same industrial sector:
Since we assume that as the distance from point p to the points where the
production of the same sector is located increases, the attractiveness
(negative or positive) of the point q decreases, we have to take into
account the deterrence function, T.
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To estimate the attractiveness of point p to industry i as a result of the
presence of the same sector i at point q, we have:
W q
Vq = (D.26)
1 Ta
pq
Hence, to estimate the attractiveness of point p to industry i, due solely
to the presence of industry i at all points q, we compute:
V (6) W ) (D.27)
q T
pq
The superscript (6) refers to model 6: Agglomeration potential associated
with the presence of the same industrial sector.
D.4 Measuring and data issues
D.4.1 Measuring the level of economic activity
X = level of production of sector i at point q measured by the
bolivares value of output.
Source: Survey tapes for 1975 and 1977.
m. = amount of inputs per unit of output that sector j imports
J
e. = coefficient for exports of industry i.
Source: Input-output table for the Venezuelan economy, Conavial,
1972.
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Y = income in bolivares generated at point q and its surroundings.
Source: Encuesta de Hogares, Cuadro 29, Ingresos totales e ingresos
medios de los hogares por escala de ingreso mensual y area. OCEI,
Segundo semestre 1975 and 1977.
G = local government operational expenditure.
Source: Presupuesto de las Entidades Federales, Programas Ordinarios
de Administraci6n en Inversi6n. Clasificaci6n Econ6mica de
los Gastos Acordados para 1975 and 1977. Adquisici6n de Bienes
y Servicios por Entidades Federales (Partida A-21-Gastos
Corrientes).
D.4.2 Measuring the interaction between activities
a.. = bolivares of input that industry j must purchase from industry
1LJ
i to produce one bolivar of its output. (Technical coefficients).
b.. = amount of bolivares of output demanded by industry j for
LJ
every bolivar produced by industry i.
c. = bolivares of production of sector i demanded by the sector of
private final consumers.
r. = bolivares of production of sector i demanded by the sector
of government final consumption.
Source: Input-output table for the Venezuelan economy, Conavial, 1971.
Since the input-output table give us the technical coefficients (a..) which
are by "columns", the "row" coefficients may be estimated as follows:
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We know that
X..
ij X.
and:
X..
a.. =; X.. = a.. X.
1J X 13 13 J
then, substituting we have
a.. X.
b.. = j
1j X.
D.4.3 Measuring the proximity to the activities
T = Transfer cost between point p and point q.
Several variables are suitable for measuring distance:
straight line mileage, road mileage, transport costs, etc.
Due to data availability, travel time is used.
Source: Tiempos entre centroides, Ministerio de Conmunicaciones.
a = Transfer cost exponent. Due to data limitations, it was
not possible to calibrate this exponent for the Venezuelan
environment. Nevertheless, most of the studies done in other
countries have used values which range between 1.5 and 2.5.
(See for example Blair 5). Ablas and Azzoni6 use a=1 in their
study of Brazil. For our purposes it was selected a=2.
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2W. Isard and E. W. Schooler, "Industrial Complex Analysis,
Agglomeration Economics and Regional Development", Journal of
Regional Science, 1, (1959) pp. 19-33.
3G.A. Carrothers, "An Historical Review of the Gravity and
Potential Concepts of Human Interaction", Journal of the
American Institute of Planners, Vol. 22 No. 2, (1956), pp. 94-
102.
4Benjamin Reif, Models in Urban and Regional Planning
(Aylesbury: Leonard Hill Books, 1973) Chap. 6..
5John Blair, Industrial Polarization and the Location of New
Manufacturing Firms: An Empirical Application RSRI Discussion
Paper Series No. 89 (Philadelphia: Regional Science Research
Institute, 1976).
6Luis A. de Queiroz Ablas and Carlos R. Azzoni, Requisitos
Locacionais de Industrias (Sao Paulo: Fundacao Instituto de
Pesquisas Economicas, 1978).
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